Gun Torts:  Defining a Cause of Action for Victims in Suits against Gun Manufacturers by Eggen, Jean Macchiaroli & Culhane, John G.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 81 | Number 1 Article 4
12-1-2002
Gun Torts: Defining a Cause of Action for Victims
in Suits against Gun Manufacturers
Jean Macchiaroli Eggen
John G. Culhane
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jean M. Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining a Cause of Action for Victims in Suits against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. Rev.
115 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol81/iss1/4
GUN TORTS: DEFINING A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR VICTIMS IN SUITS AGAINST GUN
MANUFACTURERS
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Although tens of thousands of Americans die from gun violence
every year, the regulation of firearms remains inadequate. Those
who are injured, or the survivors of those killed by guns, therefore
have sought relief through tort law against those who manufacture
these uniquely deadly products. With rare exceptions, however,
these suits have been unsuccessful. Most courts have found that
the conduct of gun manufacturers is not actionable under strict
product liability doctrine, negligence, or the law of abnormally
dangerous activities. This Article argues that courts have been too
reluctant to apply tort liability to gun manufacturers. It is possible
and necessary, the authors demonstrate, to fashion a rule of
liability that will call irresponsible gun manufacturers to account,
and that doing so will not amount to absolute liability against the
gun industry. Drawing theoretical support for their position from
central pillars of tort law, the authors offer a test for judging
whether a class of guns should be considered defectively designed.
Such a determination should hinge on whether the impugned gun
is a "manifestly unreasonable" design. This concept is recognized
in the Third Restatement of Torts, but too narrowly defined there.
The authors flesh out the concept by reworking the factors for
abnormally dangerous activities to make them more directly
applicable to the complex array of design and marketing decisions
that gun manufacturers make. Through a series of illustrations,
they then apply this test to different types of guns and show how
the test supports liability for certain egregious practices, but not for
some other practices. In addition, the authors recommend that
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claims for negligent marketing be allowed to supplement the
design claims in appropriate cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The Littleton, Colorado, school shootings of 1999 sparked
national interest in the development of measures to control access to
and usage of firearms in this country. Because of a deeply divided
and partisan Congress, however, no definitive and uniform legislation
emerged.' Prospects for effective firearms control dimmed following
the Election 2000 anomaly, which resulted in the installation of a
president who was actively anti-gun control.2 The trend away from
1. One piece of proposed legislation was emblematic of the problem gun control
advocates faced. A pending Senate bill received a boost from the media attention and
public concern following the Columbine shootings. The bill contained a variety of
provisions, including: requiring background checks on firearms sales at gun shows and
pawn shops; requiring gun safety devices to be sold with all handguns; assisting
prosecutors and the juvenile court system in the prosecution and processing of violent gun
offenses committed by juveniles; funding studies on the impact of the entertainment
industry on children and on the marketing practices of the firearms industry with regard to
children; and limiting the liability of gun owners who use a gun lock for injuries resulting
when the gun has been stolen and subsequently used to commit a crime. See Helen
Dewar, Legislators Stymied On Gun Measures, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at A33. A
heavily partisan and Republican Senate barely passed the bill, with Vice President Al
Gore casting the tie-breaking vote on the measures related to gun shows. See Janet Hook,
Senate OKs Crime Bill; Gun Curbs Come After New Shooting, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1999,
at Al (referring to S. 254, 106th Cong. (1999)). In a bipartisan split, the House of
Representatives entertained, then defeated, a weaker version of the Senate bill. Frank
Bruni & James Dao, Gun Control Bill Rejected in House in Bipartisan Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1999, at Al. The proposals languished in a House-Senate conference and did not
survive the end of the 106th Congress. See John Lancaster, Campaign Bill Unearths a
Senate Relic: Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at A01; see also Helen Dewar, Senate
Narrowly Passes Gun Control Resolution, WASH. POST, May 18, 2000, at A9 (outlining the
political haggling that accompanied the issue of gun control in Congress).
2. When he was Governor of Texas, President George W. Bush signed into law a bill
allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons, and a separate measure intended to deter
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comprehensive solutions to gun violence has been bolstered by recent
court decisions refusing to recognize causes of action against gun
manufacturers for the harmful effects of their products.3 The net
result of these rebuffs has been frustration for gun control advocates.
While judicial and legislative interest in gun control has waned,
the violence, regrettably, has continued. One only has to peruse the
daily news for examples of deadly shooting incidents and rampages.4
Further, the American propensity for gun violence may be
contributing to this country's vulnerability to terrorist attacks.
Especially troubling is information disseminated by Al Qaeda
terrorists, suggesting ways to exploit the United States' lax gun
control practices to advance their violent cause.5
Perhaps reflecting the renewed laissez-faire attitude of
government, media coverage of school shootings has taken a curious
twist. The current focus has been largely on the failure of students
and school officials to read certain psychological and social "signals"
that may have prevented the shootings. The manufacturers and other
sellers,6 meanwhile, have taken a comfortable back seat as public
municipal lawsuits against gun manufacturers. James Dao, New Gun Control Politics: A
Whimper, Not a Bang, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at § 4, 1.
3. Most notably, in California and New York, decisions from the states' highest
courts concluded that victims of gun violence do not have a cause of action for negligent
marketing against the manufacturers of the firearms causing their injuries. See Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 134-35 (Cal. 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750
N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) (ruling on certified questions from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
4. A relatively recent and troubling event was reported at Francis X. Clines, 3 Slain
at Law School; Student is Held, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A18.
5. See PRESS RELEASES, VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, Jihad Trainees Urged to Use
Lax U.S. Gun Laws to Wage Holy War (Nov. 21, 2001), at http://www.vpc.org/press/
01lljihad.htm (last visited October 14, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
6. This Article recognizes that in product liability law, the term "seller" includes
manufacturers, retail dealers, and all other persons and entities within the chain of
commercial distribution of the product. This Article focuses on the manufacturer, which is
the most remote of those entities to the victim and, thus, the most difficult entity on which
to impose liability in most cases. Because the problems of gun manufacturer liability are
complex, this Article limits its thesis to manufacturers. Theoretically, at least, there is no
reason why the proposal presented in this Article could not be applied to other gun sellers.
In reality, however, the closer a seller is to the perpetrator of the gun violence, the easier it
will be for the plaintiff to establish specific negligent conduct on the part of the seller that
fits within the traditional interpretation of negligence law. From a policy standpoint, the
proposal in this Article should be applied to sellers other than manufacturers because the
deterrent aspects of tort law function best when participants in the system responsible for
placing the product into the marketplace, and into the hands of the user, are made
answerable for the harm that the product visits upon another. See John G. Culhane, Real
and Imagined Effects of Statutes Restricting the Liability of Nonmanufacturing Sellers of
Defective Products, 92 DICK. L. REV. 287 (1992). Where the term "seller" is used in this
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concern has shifted to the personal responsibility of citizens rather
than the collective responsibility of an industry that markets
dangerous products.7 The practical result is that the gun industry is
immunized from the most serious impacts of its products. Thus, the
unfortunate victims of gun violence will likely be forced to bear the
costs-monetary and emotional-of their injuries.
Political issues aside, one clear fact remains: Guns are inherently
dangerous products, uniquely lethal in that they are designed and
manufactured to maim and kill people. Although used in sport, guns
also are used by military and law enforcement personnel, by citizens
for protection of their persons, homes, and families, and by criminals.
Notwithstanding the variety of laws that punish people for crimes
committed with guns, little regulation governs the manufacture and
sale of guns and ammunition. Although the sellers of these products
are fully aware of the propensity of their products to cause serious
harm and death, their industry, along with the tobacco industry,
remains one of the least regulated hazardous industries in our
country.'
Tort law has an established role in supplementing regulation,9
but the tort system so far has done little to fill the deep hole in
firearms regulation. The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability have taken the paradoxical position that inherently
dangerous products do not fall within the definition of "abnormally
Article, it is intended to be interchangeable with "manufacturer" unless specifically noted
otherwise.
7. In May 2001, Governor Bill Owens of Colorado made public the report of the
Columbine Review Commission, a twenty-person blue-ribbon panel charged with
evaluating the shootings and recommending initiatives to prevent future occurrences.
Michael Janofsky, Columbine Panel Blames Lack of Action for Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2001, at A12. The report amounted to an indictment of the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Office for, among other things, failing to take steps to prevent the shootings prior to their
occurrence. See STATE OF COLORADO, THE REPORT OF GOVERNOR BILL OWENS'
COLUMBINE REVIEW COMMISSION 73-117 (May 2001), available at http://www.state.co.
us/columbine/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Criticism was also directed at school officials, see id. at 12-13; students, see id. at xv, 18;
and the parents of the killers, see id. at 91-92 & nn.204-05. Although the charge of the
commission was not directly to determine fault in the matter, the report provided a
detailed evaluation of the failures of these persons, but refrained from suggesting any
responsibility that may have resided with gun sellers.
8. See infra notes 59-83 and accompanying text.
9. Imposing liability for harm caused by one's products requires the seller of the
product to internalize its costs, either by spreading the cost among all buyers or, if such
internalization reveals that the product is too costly, eliminating it from the market. The
point is explored further infra at notes 313-38 and accompanying text.
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dangerous,"'" thus placing guns outside the scope of strict product
liability. Claims based on negligence have focused mainly on retail
dealers, who often defend by arguing that the third-party perpetrator
of the criminal act that injured the plaintiff is the proper defendant.
Negligence claims against manufacturers have failed on similar
grounds. t2 Victims of gun crimes and accidental shootings often are
unable to bring an action directly against the perpetrator of the
violent act, because that person is either unknown or judgment-proof.
Lacking a remedy against the seller, victims must bear the costs of
their own injuries.
Under both corrective justice and economic accounts of tort law,
compelling arguments favor extending liability directly to gun
sellers. 3 Yet, the judicial system has been reluctant to do so. A
major factor in this reluctance has been judicial unwillingness to
extend generally accepted principles of tort law to cases involving
guns. This intransigence is not news: that the law is slow to change
and adapt is a fact of legal life. Strict product liability law became
accepted doctrine only in the 1960s, almost fifty years after the court
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'4 recognized a product liability
claim sounding in tort law, rather than in contract law. The unique
challenges of late twentieth century products cases-such as
tobacco, 5 blood clotting products,16 prescription drugs, 7 and guns-
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, rprtrs' note IV.D
(1998) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
11. See, e.g., Jantzen v. Leslie Edelman, Inc., 634 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(awarding summary judgment to a sporting goods retailer on the basis of an intervening
act of the gun purchaser); Chapman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 792 S.W.2d 785
(Tex. App. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for a retailer, holding that the plaintiff had
not come forward with evidence that the gunman's conduct was foreseeable at the time of
sale).
12. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001)
(stating that the defendant generally has no duty to control the actions of third persons,
absent a special relationship); infra notes 126-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part V.A.
14. 111 N.E. 1050,1051 (N.Y. 1916).
15. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that the
federal cigarette labeling act preempts some, but not all, common law claims against
cigarette manufacturers); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (allowing a class action for nicotine addiction).
16. See, e.g., Ray v. Cutter Labs., 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (applying the
market share liability theory to negligence claims brought by hemophiliacs who contracted
HIV from a blood clotting factor product); Royer v. Miles Lab., Inc., 811 P.2d 644 (Or. Ct.
App. 1991) (using the Oregon state blood shield statute to bar a strict liability claim of a
hemophiliac who contracted HIV from a blood clotting factor product).
17. See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (holding that under
New Jersey law, manufacturers of mass marketed prescription drugs must warn consumers
directly about drugs' risks); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (holding
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have required the law to adapt at an unprecedented rate. Tort law
has begun to adapt to many of these product challenges, yet guns
have been left behind. It is time for courts to meet this challenge by
imposing liability on gun manufacturers in appropriate circumstances.
This Article begins with a discussion of the exigencies behind the
need for tort law to accommodate gun violence victims. Part I
discusses the trend toward increased lethality in the design of firearms
and ammunition and the inadequacy of existing regulation. Part II
examines existing legal obstacles to recovery by victims of gun
violence against gun manufacturers under theories of strict liability
and negligence. Particular attention is given to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which refused to extend strict
product liability doctrine to uniquely lethal products, such as guns,
absent some indication that the product malfunctioned. Part III is a
cautionary reminder that analogies of guns to other products, while
potentially instructive, should be approached warily. Part IV is a
discussion of various judicial opinions that have gone against the tide
and argued in favor of tort liability as an appropriate remedy for
victims of gun violence. The final two parts of this Article develop a
proposal for extending tort liability to gun manufacturers grounded
solidly in public policy and existing tort doctrine.
I. THE NEED FOR A TORT LAW SOLUTION TO GUN VIOLENCE
Courts are reluctant to fashion a tort remedy for private injury
against gun manufacturers, absent a malfunction of the gun,18 in part
because the manufacture, distribution, and sale of guns are legally
sanctioned.19 The New York Court of Appeals stated this view
succinctly: "While common law principles can supplement a
manufacturer's statutory duties, we should be cautious in imposing
novel theories of tort liability while the difficult problem of illegal gun
sales in the United States remains the focus of a national policy
prescription drug manufacturers immune from design defect claims under the unavoidably
unsafe product doctrine).
18. See, e.g., Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397 (I11. 990) (holding that
the explosion of a shotgun barrel presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the
gun was negligently manufactured); infra Part II.A.1. (discussing cases rejecting gun
manufacturer liability without evidence of malfunction).
19. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) ("New York
courts do not impose a legal duty on manufacturers to control the distribution of
potentially dangerous products such as ammunition."); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469
N.E.2d 339, 340 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) ("No Illinois decision has imposed a duty upon the
manufacturer of a non-defective firearm to control the distribution of that product to the
general public, such regulation having been undertaken by Congress, the Illinois General
Assembly and several local legislative bodies.").
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debate .... ",20 Yet guns are consumer products, and a gun sold
legitimately may cause as much serious injury or death as one sold
illegally.2
The federal government and the states have enacted an array of
legislation directed at maintaining the legitimacy of gun sales while
simultaneously imposing certain safety-minded restrictions. For
example, existing laws prohibit the sale of certain weapons,2" require
background checks on prospective gun purchasers, 23 impose waiting
periods,2 4 or disqualify certain persons from purchasing guns.25  But
such legislation-as is much of the legislative and regulatory
process-is reactive, responsive to the loudest voice at a particular
moment despite other equally troublesome hazards. 26  Nevertheless,
20. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066 (N.Y. 2001). The use of
the term "novel theories" is interesting in itself. The court discussed negligence-hardly a
novel theory. There is a significant distinction between application of negligent marketing
to gun manufacturers and characterization of negligence theory as novel. The court
seemed to have the application issue in mind.
21. The question whether guns sold illegally cause more injuries and deaths than
those sold legally has been vigorously debated, and the answer is far from conclusive. See
MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, GUNS USED IN CRIME 3 (1995). No
direct, reliable statistics are available on whether guns sold illegally have caused more
injuries and deaths. Some studies have compiled data on illegal gun acquisitions by
criminals, and others have demonstrated that criminals prefer large-caliber handguns
generally. Id. at 2-3. But no comprehensive study examining the relationship between
illegally acquired firearms and the commission of crimes had been conducted. See id. at 1
(stating that "[n]o national collection of data contains detailed information about all of the
guns used in crimes"). The available data are subject to various interpretations. See also
Fox Butterfield, Law Bars a National System for Tracing Bullets and Shells, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2002, at A12 (reporting that despite available technology, Congress has prohibited
a national ballistic fingerprint system that would allow officials to trace bullets to specific
guns).
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1) (2000) (prohibiting manufacture and sale of
semiautomatic assault weapons); N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C:39-5(f) (West Supp. 2002)
(prohibiting assault weapons).
23. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12071(b)(3)(A), 12072(c)(1), 12076(d)-(e),
12084(d)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring a background check for acquisition, loan and
purchase of firearms); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.110(5) (West 1998) (requiring
fingerprinting and background check).
24. See, e.g, N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C:58-2(a)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2002) (prohibiting
delivery of a handgun without a valid permit to purchase and a seven-day waiting period);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.110(5) (allowing thirty days to determine whether to
grant a license).
25. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105 (West 2000) (disqualifying persons
convicted of certain crimes); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41t.040 (disqualifying various
categories of persons).
26. One example is the reactive legislation that has been enacted to prevent certain
specific kinds of suits against gun manufacturers. When the Maryland Supreme Court
ruled that strict product liability could apply to impose liability on manufacturers of
Saturday night specials-but not other guns, see Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143,
1153 (Md. 1985)-the legislature responded by banning such suits. See MD. ANN. CODE,
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some commentators insist that courts should defer to the legislative
forum on the subject of guns.217  The reality is that the mantle of
federal and state gun laws barely conceals a significant vacuum in
effective regulation of an inherently lethal product. And that vacuum
is unlikely to be filled any time soon.
A. Guns as Inherently Lethal Products
Guns are designed to kill, and their use in doing so is well
supported by survey data. Moreover, the statistics demonstrate a gun
market flooded with products of increasing lethality. Although the
published statistical data lag in time, a disturbing picture of a
hazardous product and a weakly regulated industry emerges. More
than thirty-two thousand Americans suffered fatal gunshot wounds in
1997, including homicides, accidental shootings, and suicides. 28  An
additional sixty-four thousand non-fatal shootings occurred the same
year.29 Data compiled for 1994 demonstrated that forty-four million
Americans owned 192 million firearms; sixty-five million of those
weapons were handguns.3" Studies have estimated that during this
time, anywhere from thirty-five percent to forty-three percent of
art. 27, § 36-I (Supp. 2002). See infra note 245 for the definition of "Saturday night
specials." This law, enacted in reaction to the concerns of the gun lobby, did nothing to
solve the public health problem of gun violence in general or Saturday night specials in
particular. Justice Stephen Breyer, in a book written prior to his appointment to the
United States Supreme Court, provided numerous examples of similar inconsistencies in
the regulatory process. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 21-29
(1993). He noted, for example, certain proposed regulations designed to facilitate the
disposal of sewage sludge through an incineration process that actually presented a greater
health hazard to the public than the sludge itself. Id. at 22.
27. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-
Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms
Industry, 65 Mo. L. REV. 1, 52-54 (2000) [hereinafter Lytton, Tort Claims] (arguing that
tort claims against gun manufacturers can complement legislative efforts to regulate the
firearms industry); Richard A. Epstein, Lawsuits Aimed at Guns Probably Won't Hit
Crime, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A26 ("Good political results require sound political
process.").
28. Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data for 1997, 47 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP.
19, 68 tbl. 16 (1999).
29. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Nonfatal and Fatal Firearm-Related Injuries-United States, 1993-1997, 48
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1029, 1031 (1999). For updates on these
statistics, the website of The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is a reliable
source. See National Center for Health Statistics, Firearm Mortality, at http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/fastats/firearms.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
30. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA:
NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 5 (1997).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
American households contained guns.31 Since 1980, ownership of
semiautomatic handguns-featuring substantial firepower and easy
concealability-has risen, swelling from thirty-two percent of all guns
produced in the United States in 1980 to seventy-five percent in
1999.32 In general, public demand for guns of higher caliber and with
larger magazines has been on the rise since 1993.33 In response to this
demand, manufacturers have provided gun designs of increased
lethality, even where safer alternative designs were readily available.34
Apart from the statistical evidence demonstrating the escalation
of lethality in the gun market, some manufacturers have designed
31. See id. at 1. The report stated that the 35% figure actually represented a lower
estimate of household ownership of guns than the 50% figure floated since the 1950s. Id.
The reporters admit that the 35% figure is likely to be "off the mark" somewhat, and they
cite other studies conducted during the early 1990s that estimate household ownership at
38% to 43%. Id. (citing Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense With a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150
(1995)). These somewhat shaky statistics may or may not indicate that the number of
households owning guns has declined over the second half of the twentieth century. It is
difficult to determine the degree to which members of the public may have been
forthcoming about their gun ownership in survey information collection. This may be
particularly true of persons with criminal records, persons who used guns to commit
crimes in the past, whether or not they entered the criminal justice system, and persons
engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity at the time of the survey. The Justice
Department survey, using a random-digit-dial telephone sampling, id. at 4, yielded data
that showed that 37% of persons who had been arrested for non-traffic violations owned
firearms in comparison to 25% of the general population. Id. at 3. Because of the
likelihood that these persons may have been reporting at a lower rate than other
persons-and certainly because of the likelihood that persons engaging in or about to
engage in such activity would be nonresponsive to such a survey-accurate data regarding
household gun ownership may be impossible to obtain. The Justice Department survey
provides some indication of the data that are missing.
32. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, Facts on Firearms, at http://www.vpc.org/factsht/
firearm.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(presenting data obtained from BATF with percentages calculated by the Violence Policy
Center).
33. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 5.
34. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating
Firearms as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (2000). Statistical
comparisons between production of semiautomatic pistols and revolvers are most
instructive. In 1985, for example, gun manufacturers produced 844,000 revolvers and
707,000 semiautomatic pistols. In 1993, those figures had shifted to 2.2 million
semiautomatic pistols, compared to 550,000 revolvers. Id. at 1198 n.27 (citing BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURERS AND
EXPORT REPORT (1994)). Both the absolute numbers and the ratio of semiautomatic
pistols to revolvers are worth noting here. In 1985, slightly more than 1.5 million revolvers
and semiautomatic pistols were manufactured in this country; less than a decade later, the
combined numbers grew to approximately 2.75 million. Id. These statistics do not take
into consideration other types of firearms produced. The production ratio of these two
types of firearms was 8.44 revolvers to 7.07 semiautomatic pistols in 1985; but by 1993, the
ratio had shifted dramatically to 22 semiautomatic pistols to 5.5 revolvers produced. Id.
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certain guns with features that appeal to criminals. For example,
Navegar, Inc.'s TEC-9 and TEC-DC9 semiautomatic assault weapons
were the subject of a lawsuit against the company by representatives
and survivors of persons who died during an assault in a San
Francisco office building." Extensive discovery in the case revealed
that the two guns were designed after military and police assault
weapons and that they were useless for hunting, other kinds of
recreational shooting, or self-defense because of their inaccuracy and
danger to the shooter.3 6 The design of the guns facilitated rapid firing
(in particular, spray-firing), firing with higher velocity, firing at
greater distances, and breakdown into smaller, concealable parts.37
The guns could be modified to be fully automatic.38 The TEC-DC9
was designed with a "combat sling" feature, which permitted the
rapid firing of two such firearms simultaneously.39 One witness in the
case, a police chief who was a nationally recognized firearms expert,
characterized these firearms as " 'mass produced mayhem.' ,40
Furthermore, in promotional materials available to the general
public, the manufacturer emphasized that the gun's surface had
"excellent resistance to fingerprints."'"
The TEC-9 and TEC-DC9 were marketed to the general public,
with the target market group admittedly being " 'militaristic people,'
including the 'survivalist community,' as well as 'Walter Mittyish'
35. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd,
28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). The TEC-DC9 gained further notoriety when it was used by the
killers in the Littleton, Colorado, shootings in 1999. See Michael Janofsky, Both Sides See
Momentum in Congress for Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at A18. The guns, as
well as the others used in the shootings, were bought at gun shows where no background
checks were required. Id.
36. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-55. The court stated that the TEC-DC9 was a
successor to the TEC-9 model, and noted that the minor modifications in the successor
were designed to avoid a ban of the TEC-9 in the District of Columbia, but that the two
models were "materially indistinguishable." Id. at 152 n.3; see infra note 285 (discussing
the lack of social utility of assault weapons).
37. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 155. The witness also testified that the TEC-9 was " 'far and away' the
leading assault weapon seized by law enforcement agencies in [large American] cities in
1990 and 1991, 'accounting for 24% of all assault weapons seized, and 42% of all assault
pistols seized.' " Id. The witness's testimony was generally undisputed. Id. at 154.
41. Id. at 157. Testimony on behalf of Navegar from a forensic firearms criminalist
indicated that the gun's special surface was not actually capable of preventing detection of
fingerprints. Id. at 158-59. Nevertheless, a member of the public could be persuaded by
the promotional statement to think otherwise.
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individuals, who 'play military.' "42 Although criminals are not on this
list, criminals nevertheless got the message. The court reported:
Just ten models account for 90 percent of the crimes in
which assault weapons are used, and one out of every five
was a TEC-9, putting it at the top of the list. According to
the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] Tracing
Center, the TEC-9 or TEC-DC9 accounted for 3,710 of the
firearms traced to crime by law enforcement officials
nationwide during 1990-1993, mainly cases involving
narcotics, murder and assault, and these weapons were in
the top ten firearms traced.43
It is reasonable to conclude from the available evidence that the
appeal of these firearms to criminals was a product of both design
features and marketing decisions, and that the attraction of criminals
to these products was intense, inevitable, and well within the
manufacturer's expectations. It is not unreasonable to require
manufacturers to keep informed of the uses of their products,
particularly when this information is compiled in government
documents. Even if the manufacturers did not plan their designs to
appeal to criminals, they would easily have known the gun features
would be attractive to them.
Similarly, guns that can be easily assembled from mail-order gun
kits offer another instance of rising danger in gun design and
marketing. In the late 1990s, a case reached a jury on claims that a
gun manufacturer had negligently marketed the Cobray M-11/9 as
parts in a mail-order assembly kit, causing the death of the plaintiffs'
decedent.' Guns sold in this fashion skirted federal and state
42. Id. at 156 (quoting testimony of Navegar's national sales and marketing director
from 1989 to 1993).
43. Id. at 155 (discussing Cox Newspaper report, BA'rF tracing data, and testimony of
an expert in firearms). Although Navegar's expert challenged this statistical information,
id. at 158-59, the court rejected the challenge and found the data persuasive. See id. at
166.
44. Timothy D. Lytton, Negligent Marketing. Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain
Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 681, 686 (1998) [hereinafter Lytton, Negligent Marketing]. Ultimately, the jury
found that the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to support the negligent marketing
claims. Id. at 681. As Professor Lytton points out, the case provided little precedential
value due to the combined effect of the insufficiency finding and the fact that the case did
not result in a written opinion. Id. at 685. Of additional note is the fact that the case was
before the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York, the judge
who had also found merit in the negligent marketing claim in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935
F. Supp. 1307, 1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The Hamilton decision was effectively reversed
when the New York Court of Appeals issued its 2001 decision, on certified questions, that
the negligent marketing claim against the gun manufacturer would not be recognized
under New York law. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001)
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regulations;45 in addition, the absence of a serial number on the
firearm46 rendered it essentially untraceable.47 Moreover, according
to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint, ads for the gun-some of
which displayed a cartoon gangster figure-referred to it as "The Gun
that Made the '80s Roar" and included language referring to "the
controversial 'Drug Lord' choice of COBRAY firearms throughout
the '80s. ''48 Again, it is reasonable to view this firearm, in both its
design and marketing, as one that would be attractive to criminals.
Manufacturers now have the technology to produce smaller guns
with greater firepower than ever before. 49  These guns, sometimes
referred to as "pocket rockets," fit into the palm of the hand, making
them concealable even in plain sight, and advertising has taken
advantage of this feature. 0 Some manufacturers have also designed
''compact" or "subcompact" models of their larger pistols or
streamlined their guns to improve concealability.5s
Furthermore, guns are easily accessible, even to children. More
than half the persons in one survey of students in grades seven
(holding that victims of gun violence do not have a cause of action for negligent marketing
against gun manufacturers).
45. Because this gun was sold in parts, it was not subject to the same regulations as
fully assembled guns. Lytton, Negligent Marketing, supra note 44, at 688. See generally
ERIK LARSON, LETHAL PASSAGE: THE STORY OF A GUN 74-82 (1994) (describing a
manufacturer's efforts to market machine-gun kits and silencer kits with virtual impunity).
46. The part that would become the gun frame-and thus require a serial number-
was sold in the kit as a sheet metal flat, thus avoiding the serial number requirement.
Lytton, Negligent Marketing, supra note 44, at 695.
47. Id. at 688.
48. Id. (citing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at Exh. H, I); see also LARSON,
supra note 45, at 60, 74 (stating that "[t]he Cobray and its ancestors became the favorites
of drug rings, street gangs, and assorted killers throughout the 1980s").
49. See Garen J. Wintemute, The Relationship Between Firearm Design and Firearm
Violence, 275 J.A.M.A. 1749, 1751-52 (June 12, 1996). "Technology and opportunity are
now coming together. A rapidly growing number of manufacturers have introduced
lightweight, easily concealable, double-action or double-action-only, medium- or large-
caliber pistols; some smaller companies produce nothing else." Id. at 1752.
50. Id. at 1752. "The trend has given rise to a resurgence of what might be called
'palmshot' advertising in gun consumer magazines, in which manufacturers emphasize
photographically that their pistols can be hidden entirely behind the hand." Id. For
descriptions of various models of "pocket rockets" and photographs of manufacturer
advertisements, see VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, POCKET ROCKETS, at http://www.vpc.
org/studies/pockone.htm (last visited June 13, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
51. Wintemute, supra note 49, at 1752. Some jurisdictions have encouraged this trend
by permitting the carrying of concealed weapons. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06
(West 2000); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.172 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Even in
jurisdictions having strict bans, criminals would derive a significant advantage from guns
designed to be easily concealed-and thus used-in plain sight.
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through twelve admitted that they could gain access to guns." In
general, research surveys indicate that theft of firearms has played a
significant role in much violent criminal activity. A recent Justice
Department report noted that in 1986, thirty-two percent of
incarcerated felons surveyed admitted that theft had been the source
of their most recently obtained handgun. 3 A separate study in 1994
revealed that approximately 593,000 guns were stolen
noncommercially during that year.5 4 The virtual omnipresence of
guns, combined with the increased lethality of gun designs, creates a
picture of a society in urgent need of gun control.
The ability to evade gun regulations has manifested itself in other
ways. In 1994, approximately sixty percent of firearm acquisitions in
this country were from federally licensed firearm dealers.5  Hence,
the remaining forty percent involved transactions made on the
secondary market, without record-keeping and other requirements. 6
In 1994, there were approximately two million such secondary
transactions.57  Situations giving rise to undocumented firearm
acquisitions on the secondary market include gun shows, transfers or
inheritance from family members, and transfers from acquaintances. 8
B. The Regulatory Vacuum
Current firearm regulation focuses mainly on parties other than
manufacturers. An array of laws reaches various uses and abuses of
firearms; but while the sale of some guns is prohibited,59 most laws do
not reach the manufacturers directly. In general, the patchwork of
laws on the federal, state, and local levels fails to limit many of the
acts and transactions that lead directly to gun violence.
On the federal level, no agency has comprehensive authority to
address gun issues. The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, as
amended by the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act ("Brady
52. Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59,
62 (1995) (citing Louis HARRIS, A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND
APPREHENSIONS ABOUT GUNS AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE IN AMERICA (1993)). This
number grew to sixty-two percent among the surveyed persons living in central cities. Id.
53. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 7 (citing J.D. WRIGHT & P. ROSSI, ARMED
AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS 183 (1986)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 5, 7.
57. Id. at 7.
58. See id. at 6 exh. 5.
59. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4) (2000) (banning sale of destructive devices, machine
guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02
(McKinney Supp. 2002) (prohibiting assault weapons).
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Act"),6° places certain limitations on gun transactions. Thus, the
Brady Act prohibits the importation of handguns unless they are
"suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes. 61  But
domestically manufactured handguns do not receive the same
treatment. The Brady amendments do, however, specifically ban
semiautomatic assault weapons62 and large capacity ammunition
magazines. 63  The primary focus of the Brady Act is on dealer
licensing. The act requires that a person "engaged in the business" of
making or selling firearms be licensed according to the provisions of
the act,64 and limits gun transactions to those between licensed dealers
and residents of the dealer's state.65  The act requires background
checks on gun purchasers66 and prohibits sales to certain categories of
persons, such as convicted or indicted felons.67 Age restrictions apply
as well; the Brady Act prohibits the sale of all firearms to persons
under the age of eighteen and the sale of handguns to persons under
the age of twenty-one.68
The Brady Act provides no regulation for the secondary market
in firearms, however. While some intrastate transfer requirements
affect these transactions,69 a gun transfer becomes unregulated by the
act once the gun has left the hands of a licensed dealer. Data on
secondary market gun transfers are scant and inconclusive.0 Some
data suggest that annually there may be an even split between the
number of gun transactions on the primary market and those on the
secondary market.71 A combination of data and logic leads one to
surmise, as a recent research study did, that "[y]ouths and criminals
tend to obtain their guns outside the regulated sector of licensed
dealers. 7 2 In any event, it is clear that thousands of firearms are
transferred annually on the unregulated secondary market, and a
60. Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3).
62. Id. § 922(v)(1) (banning some firearms by name and others by design
characteristics).
63. Id. § 922(w)(1).
64. Id. § 923.
65. Id. § 922(a)(5), (b)(3).
66. Id. § 922(s), (t).
67. See id. § 922(g)(1)-(8).
68. Id. § 922(b)(1).
69. See id. § 922(a)(3), (5).
70. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 69.
71. Id. at 70 (acknowledging a certain amount of extrapolation from data to reach this
conclusion).
72. Id.
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substantial segment of those may be used in the commission of
crimes.
Additionally, the Brady Act establishes the authority of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") to implement
certain provisions.73 Although the general public may have the
impression that BATF has broad jurisdiction to address all gun
transactions, BATF's jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed. BATF's
authority is limited to certain licensing activities, taxing, and exports;74
it has no general authority to regulate firearms in the United States.
Likewise, the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC")
lacks authority over firearms, even though firearms are quite plainly
consumer products. Specifically, Congress has explicitly provided
that the CPSC "shall make no ruling or order that restricts the
manufacture or sale of firearms" or ammunition.75 As written, this
provision disables the CPSC from removing guns with known defects
from the market, even where such defects imperil the gun's user.
Thus, the federal scheme is a picture of loose regulation that focuses
primarily on the obligations of federally licensed dealers.
State regulation paints a different kind of picture, but one that is
equally deficient. While a small minority of states, as well as the
District of Columbia, ban certain specified guns,76 most states impose
no restrictions on the kinds of guns citizens are allowed to possess.
Most of these bans, where they exist, generally duplicate the ban
imposed by the Brady Act. Some extend to "Saturday night specials,"
also referred to colloquially as "junk guns."77 But in general, as with
73. See 27 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-275.228 (2002).
74. Id. §§ 47 & 53.
75. Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (1976). The exclusion of guns from CPSC jurisdiction makes
it especially appropriate and necessary for tort law to step in and provide supplemental
remedies.
76. For example, some states prohibit "assault weapons." See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2c:39-5(f) (West Supp. 2002) (declaring that anyone knowingly in possession of an
assault firearm is guilty of a crime of the third degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02
(McKinney Supp. 2002) (making it a felony to possess any machine-gun-like weapon); cf.,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.10(1) (Consol. 2001) (making the manufacture of assault
weapons, machine guns, large capacity ammunition feeding devices, and disguised guns a
felony). The District of Columbia bans sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, short-barreled
rifles, and new acquisitions of handguns since the effective date of the law. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 7-2502.02 (2001).
77. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-1(a)-(b) (Supp. 2002) (prohibiting
manufacture or sale of handguns not listed on state handgun roster); MINN. STAT.
§ 624.716 (2001) (declaring that any firearms dealer who sells or manufactures a "Saturday
Night Special Pistol" shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor). The Maryland Code of
Regulations lists the criteria to be used by the handgun roster board in determining
whether to place a handgun on the roster. The criteria include, among other things,
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the federal Act, state regulation has focused mostly on gun purchase
and use, not manufacture and marketing. Thus, for example, various
states have imposed their own waiting periods for purchases of
firearms,7" required firearm owner identification cards,79 or required
the reporting of gun sales records to state or local government
officials. 80 States also have addressed the permissibility of carrying a
firearm on one's person or in a vehicle. Many states allow their
citizens to carry concealed firearms with properly issued permits,81
while others prohibit concealed firearms, with some exceptions.82
Notwithstanding this loose collection of state and federal
legislation on the topic of guns, any sense that the firearm industry is
substantially regulated is illusory.83 The differences among the states'
concealability, quality of materials and manufacture, and safety. See MD. REGS. CODE tit.
29, § 03.03.10 (2001).
78. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12071(b)(3)(A), 12072(c)(1), 12076(d)-(e),
12084(d)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2002) (imposing a ten-day waiting period and a background
check prior to obtaining handguns); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2(a)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2002)
(imposing a seven-day waiting period for the purchase of a handgun running from the date
of application for a handgun permit).
79. See, e.g., 2001 Ill. Legis. Serv. 92-442(3)(a) (West) (codified at scattered sections of
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/ (West Supp. 2002)) (requiring firearm identification cards);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129C (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Supp. 2002) (same).
80. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-79 (1994) (requiring the reporting of gun sales to
state officials); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 29, § 03.01.09(A) (2001) (same); cf N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-2(b) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring retailer to keep detailed records of gun sales
and to make them available for inspection by law enforcement officers).
81. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 7-8; see also Jens Ludwig, Concealed-
Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence From State Panel Data, 18 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 239, 240 (1998). Some states, while detailing certain convictions and other
limits (in some cases, demonstrated training in firearm use) on obtaining a permit, are
relatively permissive regarding concealed carrying. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06
(West 2000) (authorizing the Department of State to issue licenses to carry concealed
firearms to persons qualified as provided in the section); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109
(West 2000) (allowing the issuance of a license to carry a concealed firearm after an
investigation by the sheriff to whom the application is made); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 411.172 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (delineating the requirements for eligibility for a license to
carry a concealed handgun). Colorado permits concealed carrying of firearms, but grants
governmental authorities substantial discretion to limit that right. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-12-105.1(2) (2002) ("A sheriff or chief of police shall make an inquiry ... to
determine if the applicant would present a danger to others or to himself or herself if the
applicant is granted a permit.").
82. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/24-1(a)(4) (West Supp. 2002) (allowing
possession of a concealed weapon where weapon not immediately accessible, among other
circumstances); MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.030.1(1) (Supp. 2002) (strict ban); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.12(C) (Anderson 2002) (allowing possession of a concealed weapon
for certain defensive purposes, among other circumstances).
83. Gun industry advocates have long argued that the unregulated manufacture,
distribution, and ownership of guns in this country are protected by the Constitution.
They interpret the Second Amendment as extending rights to individual citizens to acquire
and own guns. Gun control advocates insist that the right expressed in the amendment
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approaches to gun regulation have created a patchwork with
inconsistent patterns and many gaps. Given the unimpeded
movement of guns across state lines, federal regulation in this area
seems especially deficient. The need for states' intervention speaks
loudly about the current silence at the federal level. In this country,
the design, manufacture, and marketing of many guns with little or no
sporting utility remain unregulated. The lack of effective regulation
and the reasons for legislative inaction strengthen the argument for
using tort law as a means of holding gun manufacturers responsible
for the costs their products impose.
was intended to extend only to the militias about which it was written and at most could be
applied to the military and law enforcement bodies. For a brief overview of this debate,
see Steven H. Gunn, A Lawyers Guide to the Second Amendment, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 35.
The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II. The United States Supreme Court has decided few cases involving the
Second Amendment. It is clear from those cases, however, that the Second Amendment
does not restrict either the federal government or the states from enacting gun control
legislation. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the federal
government has the right to regulate firearms); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 539 (1894)
(holding that a statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons did not violate the
Second Amendment); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (upholding a state law
forbidding unauthorized military groups from organizing and drilling or parading with
arms); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (noting that the Second
Amendment only restricts infringement by Congress). Recently, the Bush Justice
Department has taken a position contrary to the Supreme Court decisions. In two briefs
filed by the Government in recent Supreme Court cases, footnotes indicated the
Government's broad position that the Second Amendment protects the rights of
individual citizens to own and carry firearms. The footnotes attached a letter written by
Attorney General Ashcroft during the fall of 2001 to the National Rifle Association,
expressing the same views. See Linda Greenhouse, U.S., in a Shift, Tells Justices Citizens
Have a Right to Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at Al. The letter and footnotes make
clear that the Bush Administration is making a bold move toward trying to overturn
decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the interpretation of the Second Amendment.
Opportunistic litigation has followed. For example, defense attorneys in the District of
Columbia are currently attempting to take advantage of the Justice Department's position
in cases against their clients based upon illegal possession of weapons. They have
peppered the D.C. Superior Court with motions to dismiss the charges against their clients
on the theory that D.C. gun laws violate the Second Amendment. See Arthur Santana &
Neely Tucker, Cases Take Aim at District's Gun Law, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A20.
In at least one case, the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel has moved to intervene in
support of the District's gun law. Id. This effort has been reflected across the nation in
dozens of gun-possession cases. See Adam Liptak, Defendants Fighting Gun Charges Cite
New View of 2nd Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at Al. Even in the unlikely
event that the Supreme Court were to change its consistent position that the Second
Amendment does not prohibit the regulation of guns, courts would still have the power,
and the responsibility, to impose liability on gun manufacturers for injuries caused by their
products. Tort liability is not regulation. This point is discussed more fully in Part V.B.
infra.
SUITS AGAINST GUN MANUFACTURERS
II. OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST GUN
MANUFACTURERS
Guns and ammunition are indisputably dangerous products. Few
would doubt that the manufacturers of these products are aware that
they are used for the commission of violent crimes and can easily be
misused. The common law, however, has refused to provide a
remedy for the harms caused by these dangerous products, preferring
instead to pass off responsibility to the legislatures and administrative
agencies. Product liability law has been especially dilatory in this
regard.
A. Guns and the Failure of Traditional Strict Product Liability
Doctrine
Product liability law, particularly strict product liability doctrine,
has been a relatively late arrival on the tort scene. It was the result of
a long evolution that began with the effects of the Industrial
Revolution, when products became increasingly mass-produced and
consumers grew increasingly distanced from the manufacturers. The
reluctance with which courts14 and commentators8 5 treated the arrival
of product liability law reflected a deep-seated concern that sellers
might be forced to become virtual insurers of the products they
market and would consequently either voluntarily or involuntarily
leave the industry. In the mid-twentieth century, as product liability
law was belatedly developing, products were becoming highly
technological, increasingly dangerous, and often incomprehensible to
the average consumer. Yet, some dangerous products that have
84. An instructive example of the reluctant awakening of courts to the merits of strict
product liability law can be seen in the case of asbestos. See generally PAUL BRODEUR,
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985) (detailing early history of asbestos litigation with
emphasis on obstacles faced by plaintiffs in the civil justice system). In one case typical of
early asbestos personal injury cases, a worker exposed to asbestos dust in the workplace
sued the manufacturers of the asbestos products to which he was exposed on a strict
product liability theory based in failure to warn. The court dismissed the action because,
inter alia, it did not construe product liability law as applicable to products causing
occupational diseases, even though the claim against the manufacturers was not covered
by state workers' compensation law. Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F.
Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.N.M. 1971). The dramatic shift in asbestos litigation occurred not
long after Bassham when the Fifth Circuit, construing Texas law, held that neither the
workplace environment nor the plaintiff's latent illness was an impediment to the
application of strict product liability to asbestos worker personal injury cases. See Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092, 1101 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974). Following the Borel case, jurisdictions around the nation embraced the
use of strict product liability doctrine in the context of asbestos worker personal injury
litigation.
85. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799 (1966).
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become entrenched in our social fabric retained a substantial
immunity from both liability 6 and regulation.87 Thus, manufacturers
of tobacco, alcohol, and guns have benefited from a freedom from the
consequences of their hazardous products that other product
manufacturers have not enjoyed.8
Nearly fifty years ago, Dean Prosser wrote a memorable criticism
of the emerging doctrine of strict product liability:
[T]he question remains whether our courts, our legislators,
and public sentiment in general, are yet ready to adopt so
sweeping a legal philosophy, and to impose so heavy a
burden abruptly and all at once upon all producers. Thus far
there has been relatively little indication that the time is yet
ripe for what may very possibly be the law of fifty years
ahead .... [T]here are too many vested interests in the way,
and the sudden change is likely to be regarded as too radical
and disruptive; and progress in the direction of any such
broad general rule cannot be expected to be rapid.89
In retrospect, Prosser was half correct. The ink was scarcely dry on
his article when the California Supreme Court decided Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products Inc.,90 adopting a theory of strict liability for
defective products and ushering in the strict liability era. Thus, as to
the question whether the tort system was ready to adopt the new
theory, Prosser was, by all accounts, wrong. His comments
86. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that defendant's cigarettes were not, as a matter of law, defective because they
were not dangerous beyond what an average consumer would contemplate); Maguire v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Iowa 1986) (holding that the plaintiff injured
in automobile accident had no failure-to-warn claim against the manufacturer of alcoholic
beverage consumed by the driver of the other car). Notwithstanding the relative immunity
that the tobacco industry has enjoyed for decades, the tide may be turning. See R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The Engle
class action ultimately resulted in a multi-billion dollar verdict. See Rick Bragg, Tobacco
Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al.
87. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 passim (2000)
(holding that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate cigarettes pursuant to the
federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act).
88. This immunity is justified in the Second Restatement by the consumer
contemplation test. Because products such as tobacco, alcohol, and guns have known
hazards, they would not be defective under the consumer contemplation test because their
dangers are obvious. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965)
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT] (presenting alcoholic beverages and products
containing saturated fats as an example of products for which no warning is necessary
because they are only dangerous when consumed excessively or over long periods of
time).
89. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120-21 (1960).
90. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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concerning the role of vested interests, however, ring hauntingly true.
Prosser correctly predicted that the time was not ripe for a
comprehensive doctrine encompassing all dangerous products. The
"vested interests" to which Dean Prosser referred include economic
interests that have become entrenched in our political process and
have an unprecedented financial power to shape the law. Gun
interests are just such a force.
In 1960, when Prosser wrote his memorable article, courts were
still struggling with a concept of liability for product sellers unfettered
by the rules of negligence.9 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
("Second Restatement"), with its bold advocacy of strict product
liability, had not yet made its appearance. Indeed, even the
California Supreme Court's seminal decision in Greenman had not
been handed down. Yet, the legal system was unmistakably poised to
address an onslaught of cases under the new doctrine of strict product
liability. Now, past the turn of the new millennium, new issues
beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the Second Restatement
are plaguing the courts.
To twenty-first century sensibilities, the Second Restatement has
a certain quaint, old-fashioned ring to it.92 Its attitude toward many
91. An early warning of the struggle appeared in Justice Traynor's concurrence in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring),
in which he argued that the court should dispense with clumsy theories of warranty and res
ipsa loquitur and straightforwardly acknowledge strict liability in tort. The concept of
product warranty is now understood as a transitional stage of development in product
liability law, bridging the doctrinal gap from negligence to strict liability in tort. See DAN
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 972-75 (2000). The states recognized both express
warranties and implied warranties of quality, based on a theory of privity of contract
between buyer and seller. These warranties are currently set forth in the Uniform
Commercial Code, as adopted by the various states. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1998) (express
warranty); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2-315 (implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose). Until 1960, warranty was a clumsy concept because of
the requirement of vertical privity; thus, although liability was strict, the privity
requirement remained, meaning that an injured buyer could sue only the immediate seller.
The situation changed forever in 1960, when the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 81-83 (N.J. 1960), abolishing the
vertical privity requirement in warranty cases. But problems of horizontal privity persist.
The scope of persons allowed to bring warranty claims is now governed by each particular
state's adoption of one of the alternatives set forth in section 2-318 of the UCC. Warranty
claims are not typically invoked in suits by gun violence victims because the warranties go
directly and explicitly to the function of the gun and because, more generally, the rise of
strict liability has made warranty claims less inviting. .
92. For example, comment i states: "Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because.., it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad
butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous." SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 402A cmt i. While the concept of contamination is
sound, the threat seems quaintly remote.
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hazardous products, such as tobacco, is curiously permissive and
archaic. For example, the Second Restatement eschews liability for
"good tobacco," but allows liability where the tobacco contains
marijuana.93 The law has been slow to acknowledge the reality of
modern society in which the dangers posed by many previously
tolerated products are increasing daily. Indeed the recently drafted
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Third
Restatement") retains, at least implicitly, many of these attitudes.94
The tenacity of such outmoded views of liability is reflected in the
courts' reticence to impose liability on gun manufacturers for injuries
associated with their products.
The concept of strict liability allows for seller liability when its
defective product injures the ultimate user or consumer. Gun
manufacturers design and market their products to shoot and, where
necessary, to injure or kill human beings. Thus, the argument
continues, guns are not defective when they are so used, for the
product is functioning exactly as intended. Courts have generally not
imposed liability on classes of products that are inherently dangerous
such as guns. Additionally, guns have created problems for the
application of strict product liability law because injuries arising from
criminal and accidental activity typically involve a third person who
pulls the trigger. We will discuss each of these points in turn.
1. Establishing a Product Defect
The Second Restatement defined an abnormally dangerous
product as one that is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it."95 The level of knowledge attributed to the ordinary consumer is
the common knowledge of the community.96  Thus, a highly
dangerous product, the hazards of which are generally known to the
public, would not meet the definition of product defect as
contemplated by the Second Restatement. The dangerous design of
guns, for example, is widely known and publicized, and the
"ordinary" consumers of guns would be aware of their ability to be
used as weapons in criminal acts, as well as the dangers of accidental
shootings. According to this argument, there would be no strict
liability for guns as properly designed. Some jurisdictions refused to
93. Id. Similarly, comment i states that "good whiskey" is defective if it contains fusel
oil, but not if it causes drunkenness. Id.
94. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
95. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 402A cmt. i.
96. Id.
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follow strictly the Second Restatement's consumer expectation test,
preferring instead to employ a risk-utility standard for determining
whether a product's design is defective.9 7 The risk-utility test assigned
a lesser role to consumer contemplation of danger, thus making room
for the possibility of manufacturer liability for inherently dangerous
products.
In accordance with this trend, the Third Restatement, which
appeared officially in 1998, rejected consumer expectation as the test
of product defect, preferring instead the risk-utility test for claims of
defective product design.98  Thus, if a product's foreseeable risks
outweigh its social utility, the product seller may be liable for a design
defect, provided that a safer alternative design, which would have
reduced or eliminated the hazards, could have been adopted.99
Accordingly, at least some products with egregious defects obvious to
the user or consumer could be deemed defective under the Third
Restatement's test.100 Notwithstanding this broader definition of
design defect, the Third Restatement continued to require that the
product be defective in the traditionally contemplated way.101
97. See, e.g., Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983)
(including reasonable alternative design in risk-utility analysis); Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc.,
324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982) (adopting the risk-utility test for design defects).
98. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2(b).
99. Id.
100. Compare Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230
N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (Wis. 1975) (finding a swimming pool gate not defective under the
consumer contemplation test because the hazard was obvious to the purchaser) with
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1038-39 (Or. 1974) (finding a fiberboard
sanding machine defective under the risk-utility test).
101. As we discuss later in this Article, the drafters of the Third Restatement did
acknowledge the possibility of liability for a manifestly unreasonable product, but only in
extreme cases, such as (and maybe only) that of an injury-causing exploding cigar. Other
products arguably fitting that category, including "alcoholic beverages, firearms, and
above-ground swimming pools," would not qualify as manifestly unreasonable. THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2, cmt. d. In the ALI's view, "legislatures and
administrative agencies can, more appropriately than courts, consider the desirability of
commercial distribution of some categories of widely used and consumed, but nevertheless
dangerous, products." Id. One item omitted from the above list-but present in earlier
drafts of the Third Restatement-was tobacco. See David G. Owen, Defectiveness
Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 778
n.153 (listing products originally included under comment d: "alcoholic beverages,
tobacco, firearms, above-ground swimming pools"). Tobacco was stricken from the final
version of the comment because it had by then become clear that courts had, in fact,
gotten involved in determining that cigarette manufacturers could be liable for the sale
and marketing of their products. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
May 10, 1997, at 209-11 (Comments of Jay Dratler, preceding vote to strike tobacco from
the list). As we discuss'in Part III.A., the courts' changing views on the liability of tobacco
manufacturers is due in part to the recent revelations that the manufacturers knew that
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Hazards designed into the product that go to the essence of the
product's utility would not be deemed product defects.
The reporters for the Third Restatement, in their Notes,
expressly rejected the application of strict liability to "nondefective
products that are nevertheless egregiously dangerous, ' 102 such as
guns. The reporters noted that a clear majority of courts that have
dealt with products falling into this category have held that strict
liability does not apply. This view presents some inconsistencies.
Inasmuch as the Third Restatement specifically endorses a risk-utility
analysis to determine the existence of a product design defect (along
with the availability of a safer alternative design), application of strict
liability to inherently dangerous products appears to be warranted. 103
If a product is defective where its risk outweighs its utility and where
a safer alternative design is generally available and practicable, then
an inherently lethal product should fit within the paradigm.
Nevertheless, the Third Restatement observes that "[a]bsent proof of
defect.. . , courts have not imposed liability for categories of products
that are generally available and widely used and consumed, even if
they pose substantial risks of harm."1" Rather, the reporters declare
that these matters are more appropriately handled by legislatures and
administrative agencies." 5 Traditionally, such products have included
alcohol, tobacco, and firearms.106 Significantly, these products are
their product was addictive, but concealed that information. The issue of knowledge, we
argue, is also relevant in gun cases.
102. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2, rptrs' note IV.D.
103. The Third Restatement states that a product "is defective in design when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe .... " Id. § 2(b).
104. Id. § 2 cmt. d. The real questions raised here are specifically what the reporters
intended by "defect," and, more generally, how defect should be defined. Courts refusing
to hold gun manufacturers liable typically have defined "defect" narrowly.
105. Id.
106. See generally id. (discussing alcoholic beverages, firearms, and above-ground
swimming pools in this context); id., rptrs' note IV.D (referencing tobacco products).
These views are perhaps defensible if one views the Third Restatement as exactly that-a
restatement of existing law. But as to current issues involving substantial policy questions,
the reporters had to step outside the role of restaters and take a position. They explicitly
set forth this position prior to the official issuance of the Third Restatement. See James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:
The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1266 (1991) ("In our
view, American products liability law has reached a point from which further meaningful
development is not only socially undesirable but also institutionally unworkable.").
Moreover, courts and commentators have justly criticized the Third Restatement for
setting forth provisions that are actually contrary to existing law. See, e.g., Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 & n.l (Conn. 1997) (also providing
summary of commentary on the issue); John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The
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precisely the kinds of products for which adequate government
regulation is lacking.
Under the Third Restatement, a gun would not be considered
defectively designed unless it were to misfire or exhibit some other
malfunction. This position conforms to the view of cases such as
DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., 107 in which the court stated that the
"very purpose [of a handgun] is to cause injury-to kill and to
wound."'18 In Richardson v. Holland,"°9 the court expanded on this
common theory, stating that "[f]or a handgun to be defective, there
would have to be a problem in its manufacture or design, such as a
weak or improperly placed part, that would cause it to fire
unexpectedly or otherwise malfunction."' 0 Similarly, in Forni v.
Ferguson,1' the court stated: "As a matter of law, a product's defect
"1112is related to its condition, not its intrinsic function ....
In McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,"3 the court applied similar reasoning
to a case involving "Black Talon" bullets. The Black Talon is a bullet
American Law Institute Adorns a 'New Cloth' for Section 402A Products Liability Design
Defects-Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 501
(1996) (analyzing the common law, statutes, and pattern jury instructions for the standard
for design defects in all fifty states). The Potter court stated that "[c]ontrary to the rule
promulgated in the Draft Restatement (Third), our independent review of the prevailing
common law reveals that the majority of jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an
absolute requirement to prove a feasible alternative design." Potter, 694 A.2d at 1331.
The court also noted that only eight states require a plaintiff to prove reasonable
alternative design, and five of these do so by statute, not decisional law. Id. n.ll (listing,
by category of rule, all states that have considered the issue). For an interesting view of
Potter's quick disavowal of the Restatement Third's definition of design defect by a
dissenting member of the ALT, see Marshal S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 761 (1998).
107. 509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
108. Id. at 767.
109. 741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). The plaintiffs alleged that the gun in
question was a Saturday night special. Id. at 753.
110. Id. at 754.
111. 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
112. Id. at 74; accord, e.g., Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that a handgun that performs as intended is not defectively designed);
Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that
there was no claim against gun manufacturers under theories of strict product liability or
negligence and that the ultrahazardous doctrine did not apply to guns); Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1272 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that there must be a showing of a
functional problem with a handgun to prove a defect); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp.
1307, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The mere act of manufacturing and selling a handgun does
not give rise to liability absent a defect in the manufacture or design of the product
itself."); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987) (rejecting "strict
products liability as a theory for holding handgun manufacturers liable for the criminal
misuse of their products").
113. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997). McCarthy arose out of the 1993 Long Island Railroad
shooting in which Colin Ferguson boarded a commuter train in New York City and
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designed to enhance the tearing, and thus wounding, power of the
bullet."' It was designed by Olin Corporation for use by law
enforcement personnel, but Olin also marketed the Black Talon
bullet to the general public."5 Among other claims, the McCarthy
plaintiffs alleged a strict liability claim against Olin based upon design
defect. The district court had ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a
strict liability claim because the nature of the risk was in the function
of the bullets and was not created by a defect. 6 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the district court and stated:
[T]he risk of injury to be balanced with the utility is a risk
not intended as the primary function of the product. Here,
the primary function of the Black Talon bullets was to kill or
cause serious injury. There is no reason to search for an
alternative safer design where the product's sole utility is to
kill and maim." 7
Thus, the court took a rather narrow, but traditional, approach to the
concept of product defect. Since the purpose of the bullet was to tear
through flesh and bone to enhance wounding power, no safer
alternative design would have been feasible without denying the
product its essential function. Accordingly, the Black Talons could
not be deemed to be defectively designed because they had
performed according to their intended purpose. The court so ruled
notwithstanding the extreme hazard of the product.
While some products must be designed as unreasonably
dangerous to function properly-knives and guns among them-the
question remains whether the law will tolerate the harm these
products cause. The same question arises in situations in which
opened fire on the passengers, using a 9mm semiautomatic handgun loaded with
Winchester "Black Talon" bullets. Id. at 151.
114. Id. at 152. "The Black Talon is a hollowpoint bullet designed to bend upon impact
into six ninety-degree angle razor-sharp petals or 'talons' that increase the wounding
power of the bullet by stretching, cutting and tearing tissue and bone as it travels through
the victim." Id.
115. Originally marketed in 1992, Olin received public criticism and ceased marketing
the bullet to the general public approximately one month prior to the Long Island
Railroad incident. The evidence showed that Ferguson had purchased the Black Talons
used in the shooting prior to withdrawal of the bullets from the public market. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 155. The plaintiffs originally brought suit in New York state court and
named two additional defendants in the lawsuit-Sturm, Ruger & Company, the
manufacturer of the handgun, and Ram-Line Inc., the manufacturer of the handgun's
magazine. Following the defendants' removal of the action to federal district court, the
claims against those two defendants were dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 152. In addition
to the strict liability design defect claim, the plaintiffs alleged claims against Olin based
upon negligence theories. See id. at 156-57.
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marketing strategies target high-risk consumers-such as criminals or
the public in general-when the product should be limited to military
or law enforcement use.
The rule of McCarthy is counterintuitive. The Second Circuit has
clearly stated that the only risks appropriate for consideration in a
risk-utility analysis are those unassociated with the "primary
function" of the product. Because the risk that a criminal would use
the bullets in a devastating shooting spree in which people were killed
and seriously injured-a result enhanced by the essential function of
the Black Talons-is within the "primary function" of the Black
Talons, the manufacturer simply escapes liability. Thus, the more
dangerous the function of the product, the broader the range of
injuries from which the manufacturer will be immunized. Such a rule
runs a serious risk of underdeterrence by encouraging gun
manufacturers to design their products with excessively dangerous
features. The McCarthy court's definition of a product defect thus
omits from liability some of the most dangerous products on the
market.
2. The Third-Party Tortfeasor Issue
A further argument advanced to defeat strict product liability
claims against gun manufacturers is that the manufacturers should not
be held liable for criminal misuse of their products. Courts are
concerned that to hold to the contrary would require manufacturers
to be insurers of their products. Thus, in DeRosa v. Remington Arms
Co.," 8 the court stated that "[a] manufacturer in New York is not...
required ... to protect against every conceivable misuse by its design
choices."" 9 Accordingly, the court declined to impose liability on the
gun manufacturer, notwithstanding long-established law in New York
that intervening acts do not generally relieve a tortfeasor of liability
for the ultimate harm that occurs from a third party's use of its
product if the third party's actions were foreseeable.120 The court
applied its pronouncement to claims founded in both strict product
liability and negligence.' 2 '
The DeRosa court's approach is puzzling. As discussed below,2
well-understood principles of tort law call for the imposition of
liability even where the intervening act was intentional, so long as the
118. 509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
119. Id. at 768.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See infra notes 400-06 and accompanying text.
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defendant "at the-time of his negligent conduct realized or should
have realized the likelihood that [a future action] might [occur], and
that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit
... a tort or crime."'23 Gun manufacturers clearly fit this profile for
liability.
As a public policy matter, courts and commentators who espouse
the majority view accept the result that manufacturers of guns that
are foreseeably used for illegal purposes may escape liability for the
injuries caused by their products. "' But they have failed to offer any
clear explanation as to why this position is desirable from a public
policy standpoint, much less any explanation as to how it can be
reconciled with general rules of causation. Indeed, under these
circumstances, courts would be more faithful to these general rules by
coming down on the side of manufacturer liability, at least with
regard to guns promoted and used frequently in violent crimes.'
B. Retrogressive Negligence Rulings: Protecting Gun Manufacturers
Victims and their families have also advanced various negligence
claims against gun manufacturers. The most prevalent theory is
negligent marketing. This theory is based upon the manufacturer's
knowledge that its gun would be prone to criminal misuse resulting in
the injury or death of others. Thus, the argument continues, the
manufacturer should be held liable just as a retail seller would be held
liable under the circumstances. These claims have been based on
such manufacturer practices as advertising the guns in publications
known to be popular with criminals (but not legitimate gun users),
packaging and distributing guns in a kit format to evade federal and
local regulation, and failing to exert control over the distribution of
the guns into the criminal market.'26
123. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 448.
124. See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (holding that illegal use of handgun is not subject to risk/utility test). But see Windle
Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 41,
60-61 (1982) (advocating manufacturer liability for foreseeable and predictable illegal use
of their handguns).
125. For a fuller discussion of the policy justifications for allowing liability under these
circumstances see infra notes 308-26 and accompanying text, in which we demonstrate
that the policies of tort law are better served by holding gun manufacturers liable in cases
in which the foreseeability of harm is great and the social utility of the particular gun is
low.
126. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001). The New
York Court of Appeals summarized the Hamilton plaintiffs' negligent marketing claims as
follows:
According to the plaintiffs, handguns move into the underground market in New
York through several well-known and documented means, including straw
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The court in First Commercial Trust v. Lorcin Engineering,
Inc.,'127 addressed this issue in affirming summary judgment for the
defendant gun manufacturer. 128  The court relied on the fact that
under Arkansas law, and the law of many states, liability may only be
found if a special relationship exists between the victim and the
defendant.'29  The court then determined that the relationship
between a gun manufacturer and the victim of criminal activity was
too remote to establish the necessary special relationship.3 ° The
court in Delahanty v. Hinckley,"' concurring on this point, 32 noted
that gun manufacturers are not in a position to prevent the criminal
misuse of the guns they market, through screening or otherwise. 3'
The reasoning of these courts begins to unravel when one examines
marketing information demonstrating that some manufacturers
deliberately promote their guns-usually guns with no real utility in
law enforcement or sporting-in ways that are sure to capture the
attention of criminals and other persons who may use them in a less
than socially conscientious manner. These manufacturers certainly
are in a position to market their products in a more socially
responsible manner, thus at least reducing the harm they foster.
Allowing the manufacturers to escape liability altogether would
create a curiously perverse result.
purchases . . . , sales at gun shows, misuse of Federal firearms licenses and sales
by non-stocking dealers .... Plaintiffs further assert that gun manufacturers
have oversaturated markets in states with weak gun control laws (primarily in the
Southeast), knowing those "excess guns" will make their way into the hands of
criminals in states with stricter laws such as New York, thus "profiting" from
indiscriminate sales in weak gun states. Plaintiffs contend that defendants
control their distributors' conduct with respect to pricing, advertising and display,
yet refuse to institute practices such as requiring distribution contracts that limit
sales to stocking gun dealers, training salespeople in safe sales practices ....
establishing electronic monitoring of their products, limiting the numbers of
distributors, limiting multiple purchases and franchising their retail outlets.
Id. at 1059-60.
127. 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995).
128. Id. at 205.
129. Id. at 204. Such special relationships have been found between landlord and
tenant, employer and employee, hospital and patient, and school and student. Delahanty
v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. 1989) (citing Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1970); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 32
(D.C. 1987)). These relationships, while not necessarily of a one-on-one nature, are not as
attenuated as the relationship between gun manufacturer and ultimate victim.
130. 900 S.W.2d at 204.
131. 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989).
132. Id. at 762 ("In general no liability exists in tort for harm resulting from the
criminal acts of third parties, although liability for such harms sometimes may be imposed
on the basis of some special relationship between the parties.").
133. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
More recently, the New York Court of Appeals followed the
special-relationship rule in Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,' a case
heard on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. 135 Hamilton began in 1995, when the families
of persons killed by handguns brought an action in federal court
against forty-nine handgun manufacturers on a variety of claims,
including negligent marketing.'36 A jury trial on the negligent
marketing claim resulted in an award of damages against three of the
manufacturers, with liability apportioned according to the
manufacturers' respective market shares in the national handgun
market.'37 The relevant question certified by the Second Circuit was
"[w]hether the defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of the handguns
they manufacture."' 38
The court of appeals followed the general rule that defendants
ordinarily do not have a duty to control the actions of third parties. 39
Acknowledging that exceptions to this rule have been recognized for
certain special relationships that did not appear in this case, the court
refused to find a duty.14 The general thrust of the court's opinion was
that "[f]oreseeability, alone, does not define duty,' 14' thus minimizing
the significance of the defendants' knowledge that many of their guns
would be used in criminal activities and would be sold in an illegal
market. Absent proof that the negligent marketing itself caused the
plaintiffs' decedents' injuries, no duty will attach.'42
134. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
135. Id. at 1059.
136. Id. at 1058.
137. Id. at 1059. The three defendants ordered to pay damages were American Arms,
Beretta U.S.A., and Taurus International Manufacturing. Id. Their market shares were
determined to be 0.23%, 6.03%, and 6.80%, respectively. Id. Judge Weinstein of the
Eastern District of New York had previously ruled that a market share liability theory
could apply to the case, "[i]f the underlying cause of the injuries is the unchecked growth
of the underground handgun market," rather than a particular individual sale, or if the
manufacturer is unknown. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1331 (E.D.N.Y.
1996). Examining New York law, the district court stated at the time that "it would be
premature to conclude that the New York Court of Appeals would decline to adopt any
theory of collective liability in this case." Id. The court of appeals later did just that,
stating that "plaintiffs here have not shown a set of compelling circumstances akin to those
in [DES cases] justifying a departure from traditional common law principles of
causation." Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1068.
138. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1059.
139. Id. at 1061.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1060.
142. Id. at 1062.
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The court noted that the plaintiffs submitted no evidence that
different marketing strategies by the defendants would have
prevented or mitigated the injuries.143 The court suggested that the
plaintiffs relied instead on the argument that guns in general-rather
than just those guns marketed negligently-create a risk to the
public.'" Thus, the focus of the court's inquiry was on the extent to
which the negligent marketing was the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.
The plaintiffs could not present any argument that would have
surmounted the obstacles imposed by the special relationship rule,
notwithstanding the foreseeability of the use of the guns by criminals.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the gun
manufacturers had a general duty of care toward the public because
they were in a unique position to control the risk through prudent
marketing. 45 In rejecting this theory of liability, the court expressed
concern that recognition of such a duty would create "indeterminate"
classes of plaintiffs and defendants, 46 thus offering another version of
the timeworn Pandora's box scenario.
An alternative, but closely related, theory advanced by gun
plaintiffs has been negligent entrustment. The basis for this theory
can be found in section 390 of the Second Restatement:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a
chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or
has reason to know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving
unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others
whom the supplier should expect to share in or be
endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm
resulting to them.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1063.
146. Id. Elsewhere, the court stated that concern for the future requires that litigation
be kept within manageable bounds. Id. at 1060. In another part of the opinion, the court
rejected the theory of market share liability, which had been accepted by the district court
as a means of permitting suits when the plaintiffs cannot identify the precise manufacturer
of the gun (which may not have been recovered at the crime scene). The court stated that
the specific circumstances that gave rise to market share liability in New York in the
context of the DES personal injury cases were not present in this case. The court stated:
"Notably, courts in New York and other jurisdictions have refused to extend the market
share theory where products were not fungible and differing degrees of risk were created."
Id. at 1068. For an articulation of the market share theory under New York law, see
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y.), cert. denied sub nom. Rexall
Drug Co. v. Tigue, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
147. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 390.
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Another Restatement section reinforces this duty in situations in
which third persons commit criminal acts with the chattel., Section
302B of the Second Restatement provides: "An act or omission may
be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of ... a
third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such
conduct is criminal." '148 Thus, a gun manufacturer's knowledge that its
guns are likely to be used by criminals to harm members of the public
arguably falls within the scope of the duty defined in these sections.
The New York Court of Appeals considered this theory in
Hamilton, at least under the facts presented there. 49  The court
acknowledged that the negligent entrustment theory had been
successfully applied to gun sales in some cases150 and that the "duty
may extend through successive, reasonably anticipated entrustees."151
But the court confined the doctrine to situations in which the
manufacturer had actual knowledge of the specific individual's
potential for harm.152  Although the court conceded that the
manufacturer may have a duty to refuse to deal with distributors who
the manufacturer knows or reasonably should know have been
engaged in "substantial sales of guns into the gun-trafficking market
on a consistent basis," '153 the court declined to impose on
manufacturers an affirmative duty "to investigate and identify corrupt
dealers." '154 The court noted that gun manufacturers are not able to
effectively trace guns used in crimes to specific dealers without the
assistance of law enforcement bodies. Because that task has been
assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which does
not disclose such information, imposing a duty to investigate on the
manufacturers would be oppressive.' Moreover, the court said, an
148. Id. § 302B.
149. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1066.
150. See, e.g., Cullum & Boren-McCain Mall, Inc. v. Peacock, 592 S.W.2d 442, 444
(Ark. 1980) (holding that common law negligence applies to sale of guns); Semeniuk v.
Chentis, 117 N.E.2d 883, 884-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954) (holding that a seller of a gun who
knows the product will be used by a minor can be subject to a negligence claim); Splawnik
v. DiCaprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a claim of
negligent entrustment of a gun is a sufficient cause of action to defeat a motion to dismiss).
151. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1064 (cautioning against imposing theories of tort liability
while the issue of illegal gun sales remains the focus of national policy debate).
152. The court cited a case in which a negligent entrustment claim involving a BB gun
had been dismissed: "[A] dealer's knowledge of the individual's ability to use the gun
safely could not be imputed to the manufacturer." Id. (citing Earsing v. Nelson, 629
N.Y.S.2d 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)).
153. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1064.
154. Id. at 1065.
155. Id. at 1065 n.7.
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independent manufacturer investigation could impede BATF's
investigation.'56
The Hamilton case is consistent with most decisions on these
negligence theories. Unlike Hamilton, however, most courts
addressing this issue have offered little in the way of explanation.
15 7
The sum total of the court's analysis of the negligence claim alleged in
Forni v. Ferguson 5 8 consisted of boilerplate language tracking the
requirements of duty, breach, and proximate cause, followed by a
summary conclusion that these requirements were not met.'59 In
Hilberg v. F.W Woolworth Co.,1 60 the court cited the special
relationship doctrine, mentioned an earlier Colorado case involving
injuries from a trampoline, and rapidly concluded that the trial court
had been correct in dismissing the negligence claims against the gun
manufacturer. 6 ' Similarly, the court in Delahanty v. Hinckley'62
merely stated that the plaintiffs "have alleged no special relationship
with the gun manufacturers and have suggested no reasonable way
156. Id. at 1065.
157. See, e.g., Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987) ("In the
absence of any legislative action, or specific guidance from the New Mexico courts, this
Court will not impose a 'duty' upon manufacturers of firearms not to sell their products,
merely because such products have the potential to be misused for purposes of criminal
activity."); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("The
manufacturers in this case certainly had no control over the criminal conduct of a third
party.").
158. 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
159. Id.; accord, e.g., Armijo, 656 F. Supp. at 775 (D.N.M. 1987) (holding that the
elements of negligence were not met); Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 536
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (same); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (same); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Mich.
App. 1997) (same), appeal denied, 586 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. 1998).
160. 761 P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1988), overruled by Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352
(Colo. 1992).
161. Id. at 239-40. The Hilberg plaintiffs also brought several negligence claims against
F.W. Woolworth Co., the retailer that sold the gun in question. The injured minor was
accidentally shot by a friend who was using a rifle purchased by his father for him. Id. at
238. One of the claims alleged negligent entrustment in the selling of the rifle because the
Woolworth employee allegedly knew that the purchaser intended to give the rifle to his
minor son. Id. The court stated that "the supplier of the instrumentality entrusted must
have actual knowledge either of the user's propensity to misuse the instrumentality or of
the facts from which such knowledge could reasonably beinferred." Id. The court also
required that the supplier "have some ability subsequently to control the user of the
manner in which the instrumentality is used." Id. Here, the Woolworth employee had no
such knowledge or control. Id. at 239. Hilberg was overruled by the Colorado Supreme
Court on the point of subsequent control in Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 360 (Colo.
1992) (stating "we reject subsequent control as an essential element of negligent
entrustment. To the extent that ... Hilberg require[s] subsequent control, we overrule
[it].").
162. 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989).
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that gun manufacturers could screen the purchasers of their guns to
prevent criminal misuse."'63 Even in McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,"6 the
Second Circuit's explanation was essentially a longer version of the
abbreviated conclusion that gun manufacturers cannot be expected to
exert control over the activities of the persons in whose hands their
products land.'
Indeed, the separate claims of negligent marketing and negligent
entrustment seem to fuse into a single negligence claim in the cases
against gun manufacturers. While negligent marketing is essentially
broader than negligent entrustment, the courts' discomfort with these
gun claims boils down to one issue-the fact that the manufacturer
and the perpetrator of the violence are not directly involved with each
other. In the Second Restatement, this rule is embodied in section
315, which, on its face, provides that a person has no duty to control
the conduct of third parties without a special relationship. 66
The special relationship requirement is inappropriate in cases
against gun manufacturers. As the court in Weirum v. RKO General
Inc.167 pointed out, section 315 was intended to apply only to conduct
that constitutes nonfeasance, not to conduct that constitutes
misfeasance. 68 The court stated that the special relationship rule thus
"has no application if the plaintiff's complaint ... is grounded upon
an affirmative act of defendant which created an undue risk of
harm.' 69  In many gun personal injury torts, the plaintiffs' claims
163. Id. at 762.
164. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
165. Id. at 156-57. The court stated:
New York courts do not impose a legal duty on manufacturers to control the
distribution of potentially dangerous products such as ammunition ... . "[]t is
unreasonable to impose [a] duty where the realities of every day experience show
us that, regardless of the measures taken, there is little expectation that the one
made responsible could prevent the.., conduct [of another]."
Id. at 157 (quoting Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976)).
166. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 315.
167. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
168. Id. at 41. The court interpreted section 315 as an adjunct to section 314, which
provides that no duty exists for a person to be a "good samaritan." Id. Weirum involved
an automobile accident caused by a car chasing a radio station car during a radio game for
a cash prize. The chasing car collided with the decedent's car, and his survivors sued the
radio station. Id. at 38-39. For a recent article focusing on the special relationship rule in
the context of gun distribution, see Rachana Bhowmik et al., A Sense of Duty: Retiring the
"Special Relationship" Rule and Holding Gun Manufacturers Liable for Negligently
Distributing Guns, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 42, 51-77 (2000) (arguing that
abrogation of the special relationship rule is warranted in gun cases).
169. 539 P.2d at 41. The court held that the special relationship rule did not apply to
the plaintiffs' claim against the radio station. The California Supreme Court recently
applied Weirum in a case where the California Highway Patrol ("CHP") required the car
in which the plaintiffs were traveling to pull into the center median of a highway, rather
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against gun manufacturers are grounded in such allegations. The
plaintiffs do not claim that the manufacturers did nothing; rather,
they claim that the manufacturers affirmatively placed unnecessarily
dangerous and socially useless guns on the market knowing that they
would get into the hands of criminals who were likely to use them to
injure or kill people. 7 ° The special relationship rule does not shield
gun manufacturers from such claims of misfeasance.
Furthermore, the special relationship rule does not reflect the
realities of contemporary society, where manufacturers place
thousands of hazardous products into the hands of the public through
a chain of distributors and retailers. The courts' tendency to issue
blanket dismissals of claims involving manufacturers sued for the
actions of remote users of their products is coupled with refusals to
scrutinize the ability of the manufacturers to exert some control over
the hazards their products impose. For example, gun manufacturers
are in a position to investigate, ex ante, the retailers who sell their
guns to determine if the practices of those retailers in complying with
federal and local law and refusing gun sales to persons likely to
commit crimes are in order. 7' From a public policy standpoint,
imposing a duty on manufacturers to investigate is designed to
prevent future harms that could result from their products. Yet
courts have been unwilling to engage this issue in a serious,
deliberative way.
As Professor Robert L. Rabin has aptly noted, negligence
doctrine has been evolving toward a broader concept of proximate
cause in categories of cases that have close similarities to the gun
cases, particularly those involving liability for the intervening acts of
than off to the side. Lugto v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 256-57 (Cal. 2001). CHP
had convinced the trial court that it should be granted summary judgment, in part because
it owed no affirmative duty to protect the car's occupants from harm. The Court of
Appeal and the California Supreme Court disagreed; according to the high court, this case,
like Weirum, was an instance of misfeasance, which exists when "the defendant is
responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse; i.e., defendant has created a risk."
Id. at 256-57 (quoting Weirum, 539 P.2d at 49).
170. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 2001).
171. This has become an issue in the lawsuit brought by twelve California cities and
counties against gun manufacturers. The cities have sought to introduce evidence at trial
indicating that one manufacturer failed to comply with a request from BATF to
investigate the illegal use of its guns. Fox Butterfield, Letter is Crucial in Lawsuit on
Liability of Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at All. Among other things, the
cities have contended that the manufacturer could use such information, along with BATF
information tracing guns used in certain crimes, to refuse to sell its products to dealers
associated with guns used in crime. Id.
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others.'7 2 Accompanying this evolution has been a transformation in
at least moral duty concepts, if not legal duty concepts. Rabin has
stated: "In an important sense, the erosion of the proximate cause
limitation for intervening acts can be regarded as a temporal shift in
moral sensibilities from a more individualistic era to one in which tort
law ... increasingly reflects more expansive notions of responsibility
for the conduct of others."'73 As we demonstrate in Part VI, gun
manufacturer liability is a logical extension of this evolution in
negligence law.
C. Guns and the Abnormally Dangerous Activities Doctrine: An
Off-Target Theory
Another theory frequently-and, once again, unsuccessfully-
alleged in personal injury suits against gun manufacturers states that
the manufacturing and marketing of guns are abnormally dangerous
activities for which strict liability should be imposed. Most courts
recognizing the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities follow sections 519 and 520 of the Second Restatement, 74 at
least in substance, if not explicitly. 75 Section 519 provides: "One who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm. ' 176 Section 520 lists several factors177 for courts to consider in
172. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 441-42 (1999).
For example, Rabin discusses the development of the doctrine of social host liability for
alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents as support for his argument that tort doctrine has
moved away from the more restrictive special relationship theories. Id. at 441. In such
cases, the social host is the "enabler" held liable for damages directly caused by the
intervening act of the motorist.
173. Id. at 441-42.
174. This doctrine is under revision in another volume of the Third Restatement, which
is currently in tentative draft form. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) §§ 20, 24 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 28,
2001). The draft does not alter the substance of the doctrine.
175. See DOBBS, supra note 91, at 954.
176. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 519. This doctrine originated in the
case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), which imposed strict liability on
landowners for damage to the land of an adjoining landowner when the defendant's
reservoir flooded the neighboring property.
177. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 520. The factors enumerated in section
520 are:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
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determining whether a particular activity is "abnormally dangerous"
within the meaning of section 519. Comment d to section 519 can be
read to suggest that the marketing of a product does not fall within
the kinds of activities contemplated by the doctrine.'78 The question
posed by gun cases is whether this doctrine may be applied to the
manufacture and marketing of guns on the theory that those
particular activities pose the kinds of risks intended to fall within the
scope of the doctrine.
Courts have refused to apply this doctrine to gun cases for a
variety of reasons. Perhaps the most frequently cited reason is that
the doctrine is perceived as remedying injuries from hazardous
activities, not from products. Even if it were intended to apply to
products, the argument continues, the doctrine would apply only to
the use of the product and not to its manufacture or sale. Thus, in
Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,'79 the court observed that the
plaintiff's injuries resulted from the use of the gun to shoot her, not
from Smith & Wesson's manufacture of the gun.'8 0 Similarly, the
court in Hammond v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.'81 stated that
"[t]he marketing of a gun is not dangerous in and of itself since when
injury occurs it is not the result of the sale itself, but the result of
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
178. Id. § 519 cmt. d. Comment d provides that "liability arises out of the abnormal
danger of the activity itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity."
Id. Thus, courts have accepted the argument that the manufacture and/or marketing of a
gun are not themselves dangerous; rather, the abnormally dangerous activity is the action
of the third party pulling the trigger. See, e.g., Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d
118, 119-21 (Or. 1985) (holding that the manufacture of a handgun does not constitute an
abnormally dangerous activity). The position set forth in this Article is that the
manufacture and sale of certain guns is an activity that does create a substantial and
unwarranted risk to the public.
179. 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998).
180. Id. at 836. The court objected to the plaintiff's argument because in categorizing
all firearms as abnormally dangerous, the plaintiff was denying the uses of guns that would
not, in the court's estimation, be considered abnormally dangerous. These uses included
use by law enforcement entities, and protection of self and home. Id. The court
concluded: "[The plaintiff's] argument, carried to its logical extension, would suggest that
the manufacturing of any product that is significantly misused and has great potential for
injuring or killing persons should be considered an ultrahazardous activity." Id. at 838.
This theory would then logically extend to products such as alcohol, which the Utah
Supreme Court had ruled was not subject to sections 519 and 520. Id. It is important to
recognize that in this case, the plaintiff made no effort to show how this weapon was more
dangerous than necessary to carry out the legitimate functions of a gun.
181. 565 A.2d 558 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
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actions taken by a third party.1182 Some courts have further charged
that plaintiffs invoke the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine
solely to dodge the pitfalls of their product liability claims. In Burkett
v. Freedom Arms, Inc.,83 the court accused the plaintiffs of exactly
this tactic. The court concluded that, even though the plaintiffs
claimed the gun in question was manufactured in a manner that
deliberately made it easily concealable, the manufacture of the gun
was not an abnormally dangerous activity, as it was the use of the gun
that caused the plaintiff's injuries."
Some courts have rejected application of the abnormally
dangerous activities doctrine to the manufacture and marketing of
guns on the ground that the doctrine was intended to be limited to
activities associated with the land. t85 Other courts have determined
that even where the use-as opposed to the manufacture or sale-of
guns is the issue in the case, the factors in section 520 simply do not
fit.'86 This view presupposes that guns have a value to society
182. Id. at 563 (citing Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265 (5th Cir. 1985));
accord Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1215 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that criminal misuse of a handgun breaks the causal connection between the
manufacturer and the injury); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210-11
(D.C. Tex. 1985) (same); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983)
(holding that the state does not find the marketing of handguns to the public
unreasonable); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (finding hazardous the misuse of handguns, not the marketing of the handguns);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
manufacturers of handguns owed no duty to plaintiffs to control distribution of its
handguns); Faiella v. Bangor Punta Corp., 42 Pa. D. & C.3d 534, 537-39 (Pa. Ct. Common
Pleas 1985) (holding that liability results from use, not manufacture, of a nondefective
product); cf. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1267-69 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
Louisiana's version of "ultrahazardous activities" doctrine, but reaching the same
conclusion that the doctrine does not apply to the manufacture and sale of guns).
183. 704 P.2d 118,118-22 (Or. 1985).
184. Id. at 121. The .22-caliber single-action handgun involved in the case was a very
small gun that shot long rifle bullets. The court observed that it was "manufactured so as
to be concealable as a decorative item on the front of a large belt buckle." Id. at 119.
185. Richardson, 741 S.W.2d at 754-55; see also Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268 (applying
Louisiana law). This mistaken view may derive from the doctrine's case of origin, Rylands
v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), which did impose strict liability for certain land-based
activity.
186. See Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 239, 244-45 (I11. App. Ct. 1995),
appeal denied, 657 N.E.2d 625 (Il1. 1995). In Miller, the plaintiff's injury occurred when he
was struck by a bullet that ricocheted from target practice, apparently by law enforcement
officers, in a nearby quarry. Id. at 241. The court framed the issue as whether the use of
firearms could be deemed to be an ultrahazardous activity under Illinois law. Id. at 244.
In applying the section 520 factors, the court determined that: (1) the exercise of
reasonable care could render the activity safe; (2) use of guns is a matter of common
usage, which ordinarily does not create a risk of harm absent misuse; (3) the existence of a
firing range in a quarry is an appropriate location for firearm activity; and (4) target
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generally, and that the risk of harm posed by criminal misuse of guns
does not outweigh their social utility.187
In Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc.,88 the court reasoned
that allowing liability under the abnormally dangerous activities
doctrine for the manufacture or distribution of a product would have
the undesirable effect of making the manufacturer of any dangerous
product an insurer of its safety.'89 Such a policy decision, the court
opined, was for the legislature, not the courts.190 Courts fear that
imposition of a liability that may be construed as absolute would
extend gun manufacturer liability beyond compensation to the victims
of crime. Thus, in Perkins v. F.LE. Corp.,9' the court noted with
disapproval the potential for the doctrine to be applied to compensate
families of suicide victims, persons injured in the course of legitimate
self-defense or home defense, and persons injured in hunting
accidents.'92 Following this logic, courts also fear that if gun
manufacturing and sales were considered abnormally dangerous
activities, the same theory could too easily be applied to the
manufacturing of other dangerous products, such as knives,
automobiles, and alcohol.' 9'
Another obstacle to applying strict liability under the Second
Restatement test is that, as one court has stated, "ultrahazardousness
or abnormal dangerousness is, in the contemplation of the law at
least, a property not of substances, but of activities."'94  Thus,
applying this doctrine without modification to dangerous products,
per se, is problematic. In addition, the doctrine of abnormally
dangerous activities leans more toward absolute liability than
practice is an activity that has social value to the community. Id. at 245. Accordingly, the
use of firearms here was not deemed to be an ultrahazardous activity. Id.
187. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 520.
188. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984).
189. Id. at 1204. Similarly, the court in Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118,
122 (Or. 1985), stated that holding handgun manufacturers liable for engaging in an
abnormally dangerous activity would amount to enterprise liability. The court refused to
endorse this result, stating that it had previously declined to allow enterprise liability to
form the basis of strict liability. Id.
190. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204 (stating that a ruling characterizing the marketing of
handguns as an abnormally dangerous activity "would produce a handgun ban by judicial
fiat").
191. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 1269.
193. Id.
194. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir.
1990).
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anything that has emerged in the product arena.'95 Guns, seen in their
full context from inherently dangerous design through criminal use,
though, are more than products. The abnormally dangerous activities
doctrine has a special relevance to guns because it focuses on the
inherently dangerous nature of the activity. There may be nothing
objectively "wrong" with the activity; but carrying on the activity in a
certain way or in a certain place may present intolerable dangers to
the public. The actor, thus, must pay the costs of the activity. As we
propose later in this Article, certain aspects of the doctrine of
abnormally dangerous activities can be effectively blended with strict
product liability doctrine to assist courts in applying strict product
liability to gun manufacturers in a reasonable and measured way.
1II. ANALOGIES TO OTHER PRODUCTS: AN IMPRECISE FIT
As the discussion in Part II suggests, the initial role of tort law in
providing remedies for victims of gun violence, or their families, has
often been justified by the argument that liability imposed on gun
manufacturers would lead to liability for manufacturers of other
products that are inherently dangerous and widely used. Guns and
ammunition have been compared with many other products including
tobacco, alcohol, saturated fats, prescription drugs, swimming pools,
and automobiles. Critics of product liability have raised the in
terrorem argument that liability for one would lead to liability for all.
"Where will it all end?" they lament.'96 While fear of "too much
liability" may be useful as a rhetorical device, all suits, including those
against gun manufacturers, must be judged on their own merits, in the
specific contexts in which they arise. Comparison of gun claims to
other product liability claims involving difficult issues drives home the
point that courts are in fact capable of deciding difficult liability issues
according to fundamental principles of tort law.'97 This Part considers
two of the analogies frequently made to gun suits-tobacco and
automobiles. In each case, we consider two different contexts in
which the design and use of these products have been the subjects of
litigation. The similarities and differences between these situations
195. The sole exception would be manufacturer liability for manufacturing defects. See
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2(a) & cmt. a.
196. For example, one commentator stated: "What comes next-coffee, soft drinks,
red meat, dairy products, sugar, fast foods, automobiles, sporting goods?" Robert A.
Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601,
648 (1998).
197. As discussed in Part V.B, infra, however, courts have been even more reluctant to
consistently apply established tort law principles in the case of lawsuits against gun
manufacturers than in cases involving other problematic products.
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and gun litigation demonstrate that although guns are uniquely lethal
products that raise special concerns, courts nevertheless can fashion
reasonable rules of liability for guns, just as they do for these other
products.
A. Tobacco
From time to time, both plaintiffs and the gun industry have
compared personal injury lawsuits against gun manufacturers to
similar suits against the tobacco industry. This comparison became
unavoidable when municipalities began suing gun manufacturers for
the public costs of gun violence.19 The comparison became more
198. See David E. Rosenbaum, Echoes of Tobacco Battle in Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1999, at A32. See generally John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining
a Proper Role for Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond
Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 295-318 (2001) (discussing claims brought
by municipalities against gun manufacturers and arguing that public nuisance doctrine is
applicable). Even efforts to analogize the state lawsuits against the tobacco industry to the
municipal lawsuits against the firearms industry are skewed. The states that brought
lawsuits against the tobacco industry sought reimbursement for public monies expended to
treat smoking-related illnesses. The municipal suits against gun manufacturers have
sought reimbursement for law enforcement, fire department, and medical emergency
response efforts associated with gun violence, the costs of increasing these services in
anticipation of future needs, money damages, and injunctive and abative relief. Id. at 305;
Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for Reforming Gun
Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. Rev. 247, 251-53 (1999). In other words,
the municipalities have a litany of very specific complaints involving costs with which they
have dealt on a daily basis with great familiarity. See Culhane & Eggen, supra, at 300
("This seems to be a situation in which the states and cities have divergent interests: the
cities are intimately familiar with the toll exacted by gun violence in a way that the states
may not be."). Ultimately, the major tobacco companies settled the suits brought by the
states, the first few individually and the remainder through a massive settlement plan that
became effective in December 1998, and included the remainder of the states. See Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) (Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.naag.org/tobac/
index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Even
if the gun manufacturers were amenable, a similar result would be virtually impossible in
the context of gun litigation, because of the variation among and the uniqueness of the
municipalities and their losses. See Culhane & Eggen, supra, at 315-18 (discussing, inter
alia, Complaint, 11, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596) (alleging that "[defendant gun
manufacturers'] conduct undermines the City's efforts to protect the public health, safety
and welfare through stringent gun control ordinances which make it illegal to possess most
types of guns in the City")). Another major distinction has been the extent to which the
municipalities have relied upon tort law in their suits against the gun manufacturers.
These claims are diverse, drawing attention once again to the uniqueness of each
municipal lawsuit. These claims have included negligence, product liability, and unfair
and deceptive trade and advertising practices. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
780 A.2d 98, 101-02 (Conn. 2001) (claiming unfair and deceptive trade and advertising
practices); Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 2001)
(claiming negligence and product liability); Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 00-1132 (La.
04/03/01), 785 So. 2d 1, 5 (same), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 346 (2001); Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002) (alleging that firearms manufacturers
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attractive to gun control advocates in recent years because of a
number of high-profile victories by smokers against tobacco
manufacturers with billions of dollars awarded in punitive damages.199
Although tobacco litigation arose in a unique political and social
context that is not readily translatable to other products, including
guns, some of the arguments in favor of cigarette company liability
are useful in arguing for similar treatment of gun sellers.
1. Smoker Litigation
Cigarettes are widely used, inherently dangerous, legal consumer
products that are known to cause substantial harm to users.20
Tobacco products are legally produced and sold in this country by a
large and thriving industry that has been a feature on the American
business horizon for much of the country's history. That industry is
largely unregulated.2"1 The same statements could be made about
firearms. Many courts have been unsympathetic to arguments that
cigarettes should be considered defective for the purpose of strict
product liability doctrine. For example, in Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 2 a case under Ohio product liability law based upon
the Second Restatement, the court held that the risks posed by
cigarettes were inherent characteristics of the product itself, thus
precluding a claim for defective design. 3 Similarly, in Roysdon v.
deceived citizens regarding the safety of guns). The Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse
maintains a frequently updated accounting of the status of these and other suits filed by
municipalities. See Firearms Litigation Reporter, at http://www.firearmslitigation.org/
content/newletter/news.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Thus, concerns that guns and tobacco might be equated are unjustifiable.
199. See, e.g., Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932, 934-44
(Fla. 2000) (reversing appellate court's ruling that statute of limitations barred plaintiff
smoker's claims, and effectively upholding jury verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
2593 (2001); Myron Levin, Jury Awards $145 Billion in Landmark Tobacco Case, L.A.
TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al (discussing verdict in Florida case of Engle v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.).
200. Even Philip Morris, the largest American cigarette manufacturer, has admitted
the health hazards of cigarette smoking. See Health Issues for Smokers, at http://www.
philipmorrisusa.com/displaypagewithtopica378.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) ("We agree with the overwhelming medical and
scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema
and other serious diseases in smokers.").
201. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156-59 (2000)
(holding that FDA does not have authority to regulate tobacco products). The very
limited regulation of tobacco products has come from federal labeling legislation. See, e.g.,
infra note 215.
202. 834 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
203. Id. at 230. The Ohio Product Liability Act excluded from the category of design
defect "an inherent characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product
that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or
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R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 0 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
construing Tennessee law, concluded that in the absence of any
allegations or proof that the cigarettes smoked by the plaintiff were
"improperly manufactured" or "contained impurities," no claim for
product defect could lie.2°5
Smoker litigation and gun litigation also share, at least to an
extent, the feature of plaintiff helplessness. The perceived "choice"
of whether to smoke 20 6 turns out to have been less voluntary than the
manufacturers have long maintained. The addictive properties of
nicotine were concealed from smokers for decades.217  Juries have
responded by awarding smokers large damages verdicts, both
compensatory and punitive.0 8  Until the companies'
misrepresentations on the issue of nicotine's addictive properties
were brought to light, the industry had successfully argued that
smokers had assumed the risk of smoking.209  With regard to guns,
assumption of risk is not even an arguable defense in the typical
personal injury action 210 brought by a victim of gun violence. Thus,
guns present a stronger case for recovery on lack of plaintiff
culpability.
The differences between smoker cases and gun victim cases are
also significant. The dangers presented by the two categories of
desirability and which is recognized by the ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(E) (Anderson 2001).
Because the dangers of smoking had been public knowledge for some time, the Paugh
court held that cigarettes fell directly within the exception outlined in the Act. 834 F.
Supp. at 230.
204. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 236 (quoting Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 692
(Tenn. 1984)). Tennessee law defined a defective product as one in a condition "that
renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-102(2) (2000).
206. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort
Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 130 (Robert L.
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
207. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 551 (3d Cir. 1990)
(addressing the deceptive behavior of cigarette manufacturing firms), rev'd on other
grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1292
(Miss. 1995). The tobacco industry has been aware of the addictive nature of nicotine
since the 1960s. RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 238-39 (1996). Once a smoker is
addicted, recreational voluntariness cedes to physical necessity.
208. See Gordon Fairclough, Tobacco Firms Ordered to Pay Ex-Smoker, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 21, 2000, at. A3.
209. E.g., Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F. Supp. 228, 230 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(favoring an assumption of risk defense for cigarette manufacturers).
210. Assumption of the risk could arise, however, in other kinds of gun injury cases,
such as where the plaintiff is the user of the gun and inflicts a self-injury while handling or
using it.
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products are significantly different, both in kind and consumer
expectation. The hazards of guns are obvious, and are indeed the
motivation for most people purchasing them-whether for sport, law
enforcement, self-defense, or criminal purposes. The hazards of
cigarettes were far more insidious for many decades, the subject of
careful concealment and advertising misdirection for much of that
time.21' It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the true extent of the
hazards of smoking was made public,212 along with the advent of
package and advertising warnings."' Much of the course of cigarette
litigation has been determined by this fact. Early legal issues focused
on whether cigarettes were dangerous, whether the manufacturers
were negligent, and whether smoking caused the plaintiffs' health
injuries. Those injuries involved a long latency period, often
extending for several decades, between the initial smoking experience
and the ultimate diagnosis of smoking-related disease in the
plaintiffs. 214  Later litigation has focused on the addictive nature of
tobacco products, and whether that fact reduces the legal force of the
voluntary nature of smoking. Thus, the legal struggles in the smoking
context were markedly different from anything that would arise in
gun litigation.
Additionally, although the tobacco industry is substantially
unregulated, the primary existing federal legislation of cigarettes-the
statutes known collectively as the cigarette labeling acts215-have
211. KLUGER, supra note 207, at 55-57 & passim.
212. See generally id. (detailing the history of the tobacco industry, including scientific
studies, industry awareness of hazards, and slow availability of information to the public).
213. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92,
§§ 2-5, 79 Stat. 282, 282-84; Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
222, §§ 2-8, 84 Stat. 87, 87-89 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000)).
214. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963)
(upholding a jury verdict for defendant on the basis of lack of causation); KLUGER, supra
note 207 (discussing, for example, a study that demonstrated that persons who had quit
smoking for a decade developed lung cancer at higher rates than persons who had never
smoked).
215. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which became effective in
1966, required packages of cigarettes sold in the United States to display a label with the
following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."
Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283. The 1969 Act changed the wording of the
required warning to declare that cigarette smoking "is dangerous." Pub. L. No. 91-222,
§ 4, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000)). The 1969 Act also
banned electronic advertising of cigarettes. Id. § 6. Both acts contained express
preemption provisions with some ambiguous language and which changed in wording
from the first act to the second act. This led to the Supreme Court ruling that in the 1969
Act, Congress expressed an intent to preempt at least some state tort law claims based
upon smoking and health. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-30
(1992). The preemption provision in the 1969 Act provided: "No requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
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been held to have some preemptive effect on claims brought under
state tort law.216 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,1 7 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the preemption provisions in the
1969 labeling act to preempt some, but not all of the common law
claims brought by the plaintiffs in a smoker personal injury suit.218 As
a consequence, much of the smoker litigation that has confronted the
judicial system in the past decade has been tailored to avoid the
preempted claims and to articulate claims in the categories the Court
held were not preempted or that were not addressed by the Court.2 9
The impact of this phenomenon on tobacco litigation cannot be
overstated. No similar legal battle has been fought in the area of gun
litigation. Nor is it likely to be fought soon, given Congress's failure
to enact legislation in recent years and given current administrative
policy.22
°
2. Environmental Tobacco Smoke
One category of tobacco litigation that provides a closer analogy
to victim personal injury litigation against gun manufacturers is
environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") litigation. Exposure to ETS,
frequently referred to as "passive smoking," differs from smoking
primarily because typically exposure is not even arguably voluntary.
Manufacturer defenses asserted against smokers rarely apply to non-
smokers claiming to have developed smoking-related illness.
Accordingly, assumption of the risk and preemption, previously
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act." Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 88
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000)).
216. See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Sense or Sensibility?: Toxic Product
Liability Under State Law After Cipollone and Medtronic, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 6-18
(1997) (discussing preemption and the cigarette labeling acts and articulating the lessons
of preemption that can be gleaned from tobacco preemption issues).
217. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
218. Id. at 517-18.
219. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994) (holding
smoker claims based on tobacco industry research and testing practices and claims based
on nicotine addiction not preempted by cigarette labeling act), rev'd on other grounds, 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Laschke v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 766 So. 2d 1076
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that smoker's claim based upon strict liability for
design defect was not preempted by cigarette labeling act).
220. See generally David S. Cloud, Justice Department Is Shifting Stance on Gun Rights,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, at A3 (reporting a letter written by Attorney General John
Ashcroft to the National Rifle Association stating his belief that the Second Amendment
protects individual gun owners). With this attitude prevailing in the Bush administration,
it is unlikely Congress will proceed with any new gun safety legislation. The Brady Act
clearly does not preempt tort actions. For a discussion of the Brady Act, see supra notes
60-74 and accompanying text.
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discussed, are irrelevant in the context of ETS litigation. Like gun
victims, non-smokers claim to be victims of a product that is being
used by another for its anticipated purpose. Also like gun victims,
non-smokers have argued that cigarettes have no real social utility,
but create high risks of harm to the general public.2"' In addition,
ETS has been the subject of somewhat decentralized regulation. The
federal government, despite years of tossing the subject among
agencies, has not been able to develop comprehensive health
regulations on ETS that withstand judicial scrutiny.2 2 States and local
municipalities have a multitude of regulations that vary widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.223  This pattern of federal regulatory
inactivity, coupled with an array of conflicting state and local rules, is
not unlike the pattern presented by gun regulation.22 ' Finally,
tobacco regulation, like gun regulation, generally has been the subject
of strong political opinions tied to individual rights, tort reform, and
wealthy and tenacious lobbying organizations. 25
Notwithstanding the ability to build a plausible analogy between
guns and ETS, ETS litigation is also an incomplete model for gun
litigation. First, thorny causation questions abound in ETS litigation.
Persons exposed to ETS have claimed an assortment of illnesses, from
asthma and allergic reactions to lung cancer, heart disease, and other
cancers. 226 The causal ties have not been established between ETS
and many of these illnesses, thus leaving cause-in-fact a major dispute
in the litigation.2217 While issues of causation arise in gun litigation,
they do not involve whether the gunshot caused the victim's injuries.
Rather, they involve the policy-oriented question of the propriety of
holding manufacturers liable for injuries resulting from intervening
criminal acts, expressed as either an issue of duty or legal cause.
221. See Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994)
(addressing flight attendants seeking compensation for a wide variety of injuries related to
exposure to ETS in the workplace).
222. See, e.g., Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C.
1998) (holding that EPA did not follow correct procedure before declaring ETS a human
carcinogen).
223. See generally Robert A. Kagan & David Vogel, The Politics of Smoking
Regulation: Canada, France, the United States, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE 22, 38-40 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993)
(discussing specific restrictions instituted by various state and local governments).
224. For a discussion of gun regulation generally, see Part I supra.
225. Feature: Gun Control in America: Feature Interview: Interview with Michael
Barnes, President, Handgun Control, Inc., 6 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 31, 34 (2000).
226. See Broin, 641 So. 2d at 889.
227. See KLUGER, supra note 207, at 761 (discussing studies).
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Second, most court decisions on ETS have involved claims
arising in the workplace, with persons experiencing severe respiratory
reactions to ETS generated by persons smoking legally in locations
allowed by the employer and applicable law. These cases, which
usually involve state workers' compensation laws2 28 or employer
duties to keep a safe workplace, 229 do not provide a useful comparison
to cases involving the personal injuries of gun violence victims.
Finally, ETS litigation has been the subject of a unique series of
twists and turns related to the tobacco industry's decision to settle
state suits for reimbursement of public funds expended for smoking-
related illnesses. One collateral result of the negotiations was a
tobacco company decision to settle a large class action lawsuit
brought by flight attendants claiming illnesses related to exposure to
ETS in the workplace.230  The flight attendant suit thus provides no
precedent for either ETS cases or cases involving other products.
Accordingly, ETS tort litigation does not present a workable
model for gun litigation. Indeed, ETS litigation is probably more in
its infancy than gun litigation.
B. Automobiles
As with tobacco litigation, any attempt to analogize guns to
automobiles and predict or model the course of the law on that basis
is limited. The automobile analogy, when raised in gun cases,
sometimes reflects a fear of the floodgates opening, that imposing
liability on the gun industry for the harm that results from the use of
its products would mean liability for the makers of other widely used,
legal products.23 1 The automobile analogy has great rhetorical appeal,
perhaps because cars are so pervasive in our culture, and our citizens
are so dependent on their availability. The threat of broad
228. See, e.g., Palmer v. Del Webb's High Sierra, 838 P.2d 435, 435-36 (Nev. 1992)
(affirming the denial of workers' compensation benefits); McCarthy v. Dep't of Soc. &
Health Servs., 759 P.2d 351, 352 (Wash. 1988) (holding that an employee may bring an
action for an employer's breach of the duty to provide a safe work place when workers'
compensation does not apply).
229. See, e.g., Smith v. W. Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that
an employer breached the duty to provide a safe work place by not separating smoking
and non-smoking areas); Shimp v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 409 (N.J. Super. Ch.
Div. 1976) (upholding the employee's right to a safe working environment and ordering
the employer to restrict smoking to separate areas).
230. See Broin, 641 So. 2d at 889 (settling during trial).
231. We have noted this point of view elsewhere, while at the same time using our own
versions of the analogy: "Permitting litigation against gun sellers would supposedly lead
to a parade of horrible lawsuits, in which cars are often the grand marshal." Culhane &
Eggen, supra note 198, at 305.
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
automobile manufacturer liability creates a bevy of fears, from
astronomical increases in the costs of automobiles to paralysis of the
judicial system by massive numbers of product liability lawsuits.
Indeed, critics of gun manufacturer liability-and product liability in
general-have managed to keep such fears in the public
consciousness.232 The analysis that follows demonstrates that these
fears will not be realized by holding gun manufacturers liable, and
those who purvey these concerns are engaging in a deliberate
misdirection exercise. In automobile cases, courts have imposed
liability only under carefully defined circumstances and have been
doing so for some time. It is therefore unlikely that holding gun
manufacturers liable in a completely different set of cases would
make a dent in the conduct of automobile litigation.
Most automobile product liability suits contain legal issues that
are quite different from claims by victims against gun manufacturers.
Nevertheless, examination of some categories of automobile cases
offers useful assistance in thinking about legal liability rules for the
manufacture and sale of guns, either by contrast or by analogy. A
closer look also demonstrates the specious nature of the floodgates
argument.
1. Theft Cases
Once sold, automobiles and guns have in common the fact that
third parties are often involved in harmful use of the product. Many
cases have involved stolen or vandalized motor vehicles, where the
subsequent actions of the thief or vandal then cause harm to another
person.233 While these cases have been cited only rarely in gun
232. For a sampling of media articles that voice this fear, see Marc Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 3-5 (1986). Professor Richard Abel
points out that courts have long stated that limitations on liability must be imposed, but
have often failed to offer an argument in support of this position. Richard Abel,
Symposium: What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil Justice on the
American Economy and Polity: Judges Write the Darndest Things: Judicial Mystification
of Limitations on Tort Liability, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1547, 1549-50 (2002).
233. See, e.g., Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, Inc., 681 P.2d 893, 901 (Cal. 1984)
(finding triable issues of fact where the defendant left a commercial truck unlocked with
the keys inside, in a high crime area, allowing it to be stolen and ultimately cause the
plaintiff's injuries); Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 24-25 (Cal. 1954) (finding a violation
of an ordinance prohibiting individuals from leaving an ignition key in an unlocked car
inadmissible for purposes of establishing a negligence claim); Foreign Auto Preparation
Serv., Inc. v. Vicon Constr. Co., 474 A.2d 1088, 1089-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)
(holding that a jury could find damage reasonably foreseeable where the defendant did
not protect a bulldozer from vandalism despite defendant's knowledge of recent incidents
of vandalism and trespassing); Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252,
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decisions,234 commentators, ourselves included, have found various
auto theft scenarios instructive in addressing certain negligence issues
related to guns.235 While the comparison is sometimes helpful, 36 the
distinctions between guns and cars also must be considered in
applying the results of automobile theft cases in gun personal injury
litigation.
The automobile suits typically name as the defendant the owner
of the vehicle, rather than the manufacturer, because the owner's
identity can easily be ascertained. The system of vehicle registration
and insurance requirements in place in each state make identification
of the owner likely. Moreover, automobiles are large and difficult to
conceal; when involved in accidents, they become easier to identify
due to damage and often cannot be driven from the scene. Guns are
more lethal, more concealable, more mobile, and less likely to be
traceable to an owner. They are less regulated than automobiles, and
far less likely to carry liability insurance.
The car theft cases typically involve some action on the part of
the automobile owner, such as leaving the vehicle unlocked or the
keys in the ignition, that contributes to the damage alleged. In
appropriate cases, courts have imposed liability upon the person who
facilitated the injury suffered by the plaintiff by setting in motion the
course of events leading to the intervening party's actions.237 But this
result is more difficult to envision if the manufacturer of the
automobile is sued because-to use one common example-the
owner negligently left the keys in the ignition and an intervening
party drove the car into the plaintiff.238 Even there, however, liability
1253 (Utah 1996) (finding that a car dealer who left the ignition key in an unlocked car
may be liable for damages caused by the subsequent foreseeable actions of a thief).
234. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd,
28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
235. See Culhane & Eggen, supra note 198, at 305-07; Lytton, Tort Claims, supra note
27, at 63; Rabin, supra note 172, at 440-44.
236. We found these cases useful in demonstrating the point at which negligent
conduct may become a public nuisance actionable in a suit by a public entity against the
manufacturer of the product. See Culhane & Eggen, supra note 198, at 305-07 (noting
that some conduct by the manufacturer "both grounds the tort suit by the injured party
and creates the public nuisance because the otherwise lawful product is being used in a
way that poses a substantial and unwarranted threat to public health and safety").
237. See, e.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (holding that the owner of
a truck left with the key in the ignition, in violation of a local ordinance, was liable for
injuries inflicted by the unknown driver); Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909
P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim against defendant automobile
dealer who left keys in ignition).
238. For a discussion of some of these issues in the context of municipal suits against
gun manufacturers, see Culhane & Eggen, supra note 198, at 305-11.
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should not be automatically disallowed. The manufacturer who
declined to implement a simple design modification that would have
made the car door locks tamper-proof might also be found
responsible for the subsequent, foreseeable acts of third parties.239 If
anything, the car theft cases exemplify a larger trend toward "more
expansive notions of responsibility for the conduct of others." 4' As
long as the distinctions between automobile and gun cases are kept
firmly in mind, this trend toward imposing responsibility for third-
party conduct should be followed in gun litigation.
2. Crashworthiness
The analogy to crashworthiness may be stronger. Cars that are
designed with inadequate protection in the highly foreseeable event
of collision are deemed defective. The cases are sympathetic to
plaintiffs "mainly because of the helplessness of the ... consumer. "241
In many cases, the owner or operator of an insufficiently crashworthy
car bears no fault for the accident in which he or she is involved.2 42
Even when the accident is partially the fault of the plaintiff driving
the unsafe car, however, the car's inability to protect its occupant
should not be excused. Typically, the driver is unaware of the defect.
In most, perhaps all, cases involving uncrashworthy cars, the
manufacturer is better-positioned than both the vehicle owner and
driver to prevent the crash in the first instance and avoid future
crashes. Further, when plaintiffs are passengers in cars that they do
not own, their cases emphasize the injured party's lack of power even
more effectively.
Similarly, the victim of gun violence is typically in no position to
protect himself or herself against the effects of the deadly weapon. If
anything, persons killed or injured by gun violence have less of an
opportunity to protect themselves than the occupants of defective
cars. Therefore, just as the intervening act of a third party does not
necessarily cut off manufacturer liability in the crashworthiness cases,
239. See id. at 306 (noting that this argument would increase in strength if a particular
kind of car was often stolen).
240. Rabin, supra note 172, at 442.
241. John G. Culhane, The Limits of Product Liability Reform Within a Consumer
Expectation Model: A Comparison of Approaches Taken by the United States and the
European Union, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 92 (1995).
242. No car provides complete protection for its occupants in the event of a crash.
Thus, the issue of whether a car is defective because of its inability to withstand a crash is a
complex inquiry involving a risk-utility analysis, the latency or obviousness of the defect,
and the consumer's reasonable expectation. Id. at 92-99; see also THIRD RESTATEMENT,
supra note 10, § 2 cmts. f-g (discussing numerous factors to be considered in determining
the existence of a design defect).
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it ought not do so in cases involving the discharge of firearms. In both
cases, the proper inquiry is on the foreseeability of the ultimate result
from the perspective of the manufacturer. 43
In addition, both cars and guns present challenges to the
traditional notion of product defect as a "malfunction" of the product.
As with gun violence cases, uncrashworthy cars usually function as
intended. Only under certain circumstances is the defect manifested.
Were it not for the intervening accident, the defect would never affect
the owner and driver.
These similarities make a compelling argument that victims of
gun violence should be permitted to recover damages from gun
manufacturers. Guns present an even stronger case for manufacturer
liability than uncrashworthy cars, however. Even those who make the
most audacious claims concerning the usefulness of handguns could
not seriously argue that they are as useful as automobiles. Whether
the claims sound in negligence or strict liability, the magnitude of the
risk created by a handgun manufacturer will overshadow the utility of
the gun. While this fact alone may not be sufficient to impose liability
on the gun manufacturer, it emphasizes that the analogy to
automobiles, though imperfect, may lend strength to arguments for
imposing liability on gun manufacturers.
IV. JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO ALLOW PRIVATE CLAIMS AGAINST GUN
MANUFACTURERS
In a small number of cases, strong judicial voices-writing
sometimes for the court and sometimes in dissent-have espoused
and articulated arguments favoring claims against gun manufacturers.
While these cases cannot be characterized as a trend, they provide
valuable insight into the alignment of judicial sensibility and legal
argument that may result in accountability of gun manufacturers in
the tort system. These judicial voices also address both strict liability
243. In Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983), the fact that the
plaintiff had been injured by a drunk driver-whose conduct was worse than negligent-
did not insulate the defendant from liability in placing a telephone booth too close to a
highway and in improperly maintaining the booth's door so as to prevent the plaintiff's
escape. Id. at 952. The court relied in part on section 449 of the Second Restatement,
which provides in part: "If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular
manner is ... one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for harm caused thereby." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 449
(emphasis added). This provision is highly relevant in cases involving the design,
manufacture, and sale of guns, where the defendant's culpability often arises from the
"likely" conduct of third parties. For further discussion of crashworthiness, see Culhane,
supra note 241, at 92-99.
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and negligence and cover the activities of product design and
marketing. The discussion that follows reveals the acuity and
persuasiveness of their arguments.
A. Strict Liability
In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,2" the Maryland Court of
Appeals, on questions certified by the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, allowed a strict liability claim for the
manufacture and sale of "Saturday Night Specials." '245 Although
Maryland law did not generally recognize the applicability of strict
product liability doctrine to guns, the court created an exception for
Saturday Night Specials. The court examined the characteristics of
the weapons-including their attractiveness to criminals-in light of
federal246 and state247 policy and ruled that they "comprise a distinct
category of handguns that, because of their characteristics, should be
treated differently from other handguns. '248 This finding led the court
to rule that manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials could be held
strictly liable under a design defect theory.
244. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (on certification from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland), overruled by MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-1(h) (Supp.
2002).
245. Id. at 1159. The court described Saturday night specials as having "short barrels,
light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use of cheap quality materials, poor
manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliability." Id. at 1153-54. The court cited Senate
testimony maintaining that the poor quality of these weapons poses a danger not only to
persons intended as targets, but also to bystanders and to users themselves, due to a high
rate of misfires, backfires, and accidental fires. Id. at 1153 n.9 (citing Hearings on S. 2507
Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st sess., at 109-10 (1971)). Their cheap construction has resulted
in extraordinarily low prices. The inexpensive metal used to manufacture them is soft
enough to allow for removal of serial numbers. Id. The design features, poor quality, easy
availability, and low cost of Saturday night specials make them "attractive for criminal use
and virtually useless for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport, and protection
of persons, property and businesses." Id. at 1154. Recent data demonstrate that the
successors of the Saturday night special are guns with more firepower-and thus greater
wounding potential-than the Saturday night special, but which retain the low cost and
poor quality of their predecessors. Wintemute, supra note 49, at 1752.
246. The court examined federal law, particularly the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-618, sec. 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000))
(ruling prior to Brady amendments), and determined that Congress imposed certain access
restrictions and other regulations on Saturday night specials because of their negligible
legitimate utility. See Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1154-57.
247. The court examined Maryland gun control laws, which the court determined
embodied the same restrictive policy evinced by federal law. 497 A.2d at 1157-58 (stating
that because the chief "value" of Saturday night specials is for the commission of crimes,
these guns do not conform to any legitimate uses permitted by Maryland gun control
laws).
248. Id. at 1154.
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The Kelley court's theory of strict liability centered on gun
manufacturers' knowledge of the extraordinary hazards of their guns
and their propensity for use in criminal activity. Declaring that "the
manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special knows or
ought to know that he is making or selling a product principally to be
used in criminal activity, 1249 the court proceeded to fashion the
elements of the strict liability claim. Acknowledging that this claim
was distinct from both Second Restatement doctrines-the doctrine
of abnormally dangerous activities in section 519 and strict product
liability in section 402A-the court characterized it as "a separate,
limited area of strict liability," justifiable by the need for the common
law to adapt to social exigencies .25  The court established the
following elements of this strict liability claim: (1) the gun involved in
the case must fall within the definitional parameters of a Saturday
Night Special; (2) the plaintiff or the plaintiff's decedent must have
suffered injury or death in a shooting by a Saturday Night Special;251
(3) the shooting must be a criminal act; and (4) the plaintiff must not
have been a participant in the crime. If all of these requirements are
met, the defendant or defendants will be liable for "all resulting
damages ... consistent with the established law. '252  Liable parties
would be the manufacturer and anyone else in the chain of
distribution of the gun.253
In justification of its special strict liability claim for Saturday
Night Specials, the Kelley court observed generally that under the
249. Id. at 1158.
250. Id. at 1159.
251. In determining whether the gun involved in the shooting was a Saturday night
special, the court first noted that there is no single definition of a Saturday night special;
rather, these guns feature the characteristics of small barrel length, low cost,
concealability, low quality materials and workmanship, and unreliability of performance.
Id. at 1159-60. The determination of whether the gun can be characterized as a Saturday
night special would be a question of fact, although the court would first determine whether
the gun "possesses sufficient characteristics of a Saturday Night Special." Id. at 1160.
Also affecting this determination would be the perceptions of the public and the law
enforcement community as to whether the particular handgun involved in the case was
considered a Saturday night special. Id.
252. Id. at 1160.
253. Id. In 1988, the Maryland legislature overruled Kelley when it enacted a statutory
provision disallowing claims for strict liability involving any gun. The statute provides:
A person or entity may not be held strictly liable for damages of any kind
resulting from injuries to another person sustained as a result of the criminal use
of any firearm by a third person, unless the person or entity conspired with the
third person to commit, or willfully aided, abetted, or caused the
commission of the criminal act in which the firearm was used.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-1(h) (Supp. 2002). This provision also incorporates what
appears to be a superfluous proximate cause provision in the second clause.
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consumer expectation test adopted by the courts in Maryland,
handgun manufacturers could not be strictly liable for defective
design. The court stated that under existing law, "[f]or the handgun
to be defective, there would have to be a problem in its manufacture
or design, such as a weak or improperly placed part, that would cause
it to fire unexpectedly or otherwise malfunction." '254 It was precisely
this malfunction rule that the court rejected in cases involving
Saturday Night Specials.
The need for a malfunction of the product was questioned in a
somewhat oblique fashion by Judge Guido Calabresi of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in his dissent in
McCarthy v. Olin Corp. 5  The primary thrust of Judge Calabresi's
dissent in the case was to state his objection to the majority's refusal
to certify the tort law questions raised in the case to the New York
Court of Appeals." 6 In that light only, he examined the law of
product liability to determine whether New York law was sufficiently
clear to support the majority's refusal to certify questions to the court
of appeals. He determined that it was not.257 During the course of his
analysis, Judge Calabresi raised some thoughtful questions about the
evolving flexibility of product liability law.
Judge Calabresi's discussion of New York law necessarily
revolved around a comparison of the consumer expectation test and
the risk-utility test for product defectiveness.2 8  Noting that an
increasing number of jurisdictions have espoused the risk-utility test,
he characterized this test as one that may impose liability where
254. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1148. Under the consumer expectation test, a person would
normally expect a handgun to be "dangerous, by its very nature, and to have the capacity
to fire a bullet with deadly force." Id. Moreover, the court opined, a handgun is not a
defective product simply by virtue of the fact that it is used in the commission of a crime.
Id.
255. 119 F.3d 148, 157-75 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 157-61 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge Calabresi emphasized this point
from the first words of his dissent:
This case is less about bullets than about federal/state relations. It raises
important questions of when it is appropriate for this court to certify issues of
New York law to the New York Court of Appeals. I believe that federal courts
in general, and this circuit in particular, have tended to be far too reluctant to
certify questions to the state courts.
Id. at 157 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge Calabresi emphasized his caution in this regard
in the last footnote of the opinion: "In this respect, I have, in my dissent, emphasized the
arguments in favor of liability, not because I am necessarily convinced by them, but
because that is what I must do to determine whether there is sufficient uncertainty to
warrant certification." Id. at 175 n.34 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 174 (stating that issues of liability in the case present a "complex question of
New York common law" that lacks sufficient precedent).
258. See id. at 170-73 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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"there is something wrong with any product that is unreasonably
dangerous, 'even though it comports in all respects to its intended
[and obvious] design.' "259 He further noted that New York, the Third
Restatement, and other jurisdictions have required that the plaintiff
show the availability of a safer alternative design before liability may
be imposed. 6 In the instance of the Black Talon bullets that were
the subject of the product liability claims in McCarthy, Judge
Calabresi observed that a safer alternative design did exist by
eliminating the "talons" that gave the bullets their extreme wounding
power.26 1 His ultimate position was that New York law was not
sufficiently clear to permit the Second Circuit to rule without input
from the court of appeals. He advised that the determination of the
test for product defect "will turn in substantial part on considerations
of public policy" 262-considerations best left to the New York courts.
In both Kelley and the Calabresi dissent in McCarthy, the judicial
voices expressed deep concern and alarm about the availability of
products that were uniquely lethal with no sport or recreational value.
While Judge Calabresi considered the possibility that highly lethal
bullets that could have been designed to eliminate the excess lethality
may fit into a definition of defect within strict liability doctrine, the
Kelley court chose instead to craft a strict liability exception for the
type of gun involved in the case. What the two products have in
common is their excess hazard. They were designed-intentionally-
by the manufacturers with features that present extreme dangers.
These judges recognized a need to curb certain gun manufacturer
practices that were likely to cause ultimate harm to innocent victims.
B. Negligence
In one of two relatively recent high-profile gun cases,2163 a
California appellate court, in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. ,26 recognized a
claim for negligent marketing against a gun manufacturer. Although
the California Supreme Court ultimately reversed the appellate
259. Id. at 171 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391
A.2d 1020, 1025 (Pa. 1978)).
260. Id. at 173-74 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 173 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 174 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
263. In addition to Merrill, the other case was Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307
(E.D.N.Y. 1996). Hamilton was brought in federal court, and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals certified questions of state tort law to the New York Court of Appeals. The
result was Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001), in which the
court of appeals concluded, among other things, that New York law did not recognize a
cause of action against gun manufacturers for negligent marketing of firearms. Id. at 1066.
264. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
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court,265 both the Court of Appeal's opinion and the lone dissenting
opinion of Justice Werdegar of the California Supreme Court offer
strong and persuasive arguments favoring the liability of gun
manufacturers for negligence.
Merrill arose from highly publicized shootings in an office
building at 101 California Street in San Francisco in which the shooter
used two semiautomatic assault weapons and an additional
semiautomatic pistol. 66 The plaintiffs did not assert claims for
product defect, but rather focused on the circumstances of the
marketing of the assault weapons. The two opinions presented
detailed descriptions of the testimony and other evidence on the
features of the assault weapons-the TEC-9 and the TEC-DC9
previously discussed267-and on the marketing efforts of the
manufacturer,2 68 as well as the course of events leading up to the
shooter's purchase of the weapons. 269  The evidence presented a
picture of a highly lethal gun that could be made fully automatic and
that was marketed in a manner that would attract criminals.270 The
plaintiffs' claims for negligent marketing addressed manufacturing,
marketing, and availability of the guns to the general public, including
criminals, as interdependent concepts.27 1
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the general rule that the
manufacture or distribution of a gun that is not defective-according
to the traditional definition of defect-does not create liability in
negligence. 272 The court noted the widespread availability and use of
firearms in contemporary American society and expressed a desire to
allow law-abiding citizens to continue to purchase and use firearms. 3
265. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 133 (Cal. 2001).
266. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
267. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
268. 28 P.3d at 136-39 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-57.
269. 28 P.3d at 136 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-54. Gian Luigi
Ferri made several trips to pawn shops inquiring about guns and eventually purchased one
of the TEC-9 guns used in the shootings. During these visits, he told one salesperson he
was interested in a gun for "home protection," and another that he was looking for a gun
to use for target practice, or "plinking." Id. at 152-53. Subsequently, Ferri purchased the
second TEC-DC9 used in the shootings at a gun show. Id. at 153. Both guns were
purchased in Nevada, and were purchased legally under federal and state law, except that
Ferri used a counterfeit Nevada driver's license in violation of federal law. Id. at 153-54.
He later purchased the semiautomatic pistol used in the shootings at one of the pawn
shops he had previously visited in Nevada, as well as Black Talon bullets for the pistol. Id.
at 154.
270. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
271. See id. at 162.
272. Id. at 163.
273. Id.
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The court emphasized, however, that this fact does not abrogate the
manufacturers' duty to reduce the risks associated with their guns. 4
That said, the court proceeded to outline the elements of negligence
that could, under appropriate circumstances, lead to a gun
manufacturer's liability. The court stated: "Appellants' complaint
can best be understood as presenting a theory. of negligence based on
Navegar's breach of a duty to use due care not to increase the risk
beyond that inherent in the presence of firearms in our society.
2 75
The plaintiffs' proof would then focus on the manner in which the
defendant manufactured, marketed, and made available to the public
the guns in question in the case. 276  The duty, thus defined, would
require gun manufacturers "to refrain from affirmatively increasing
the inherent risk of danger posed by the furnishing of their
product.
'2 77
The Court of Appeal examined existing California tort law and
determined that while a defendant generally does not have a duty to
control the actions of a third person absent a special relationship
between the defendant and the third person or the ultimate victim,
such a duty may exist in certain recognized special circumstances.
One such circumstance exists " 'where the defendant, through his or
her own action (misfeasance) has made the plaintiff's position worse
and has created a foreseeable risk of harm from the third person.' "278
The court had no trouble determining that the defendant gun
274. "This does not mean, however, that those who manufacture, market and sell
firearms have no duty to use due care to minimize risks which exceed those necessarily
presented by such commercial activities." Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 164. In explaining this concept of duty, the court cited to sports cases in
which the inherent danger in the activity was part of the social value of the activity. The
cases cited supported a duty not to increase the danger beyond what makes the activity
socially useful. Id. at 163-64. In contrast to sports, however, assault weapons serve no
recreational purpose and have no apparent social utility to the general public. Indeed, any
utility to the military or law enforcement organizations is questionable as well. The court
stated:
The closest Navegar came to establishing that the TEC-DC9 has any utility
whatsoever was the deposition testimony of the chairman of its board of directors
that the weapon provided effective protection against a government "takeover"
and "corrupt law enforcement agencies" and could also be used for "plinking,"
casual shooting for fun at random targets, such as bottles and cans. The first two
of these putative uses are exceedingly implausible if not preposterous .... Chief
Supinski ... pointed out that "the size, weight, and configuration of the TEC-9
presents a challenge to any shooter to shoot accurately. Since the purpose of
'plinking' targets is to hit them, the TEC-9 is not even useful for that purpose."
Id. at 166.
278. Id. at 164-65 (quoting Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282, 284 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980)).
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manufacturer had created a foreseeable risk of harm in the design,
marketing, and availability of the TEC-9 and TEC-DC9.279 The court
concluded: "Navegar had substantial reason to foresee that many of
those to whom it made the TEC-DC9 available would criminally
misuse it to kill and injure others, [and] that its targeted marketing of
the weapon 'invited or enticed' persons likely to so misuse the
weapon to acquire it. '280
Justice Werdegar of the California Supreme Court took this
point a step further in her dissent, stating that "the record in this case
shows not only foreseeability but foresight itself. '281  She noted that
the owner of Navegar admitted that the low price of its weapons was
appealing to criminals and acknowledged the company's awareness
that some of its guns would harm people. But the company took the
position that it was unable to exert control over the criminal acts of
others.282 Thus, lack of foreseeability was not a viable argument for
Navegar, nor did the company even bother to advance it in the
California Supreme Court.283
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found support for its ruling in
public policy. Here the court cited the morally reprehensible nature
of the defendant's conduct and the deterrent value of allowing such
claims.2 84 Separately, the court examined the projected impact of
imposing such a duty on the manufacturer, concluding that the
negligible social utility of the TEC-9 and TEC-DC9285 was certainly
outweighed by the goal of protecting the life and health of members
of the public.286  These policies had been articulated by both the
California legislature287 and the United States Congress.288
279. See id. at 165-69.
280. Id. at 168-69.
281. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 141 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
284. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169-70 (citing statistics on the societal costs of gun
violence, including medical costs, police resources, and public fear and stress of living in a
violent society).
285. Justice Werdegar also emphasized the guns' lack of social utility:
[A]t stake is nothing more than a gunmaker's ability to make and sell on the
civilian market, unfettered by potential negligence liability, a type of firearm that
Congress and our own Legislature have found highly dangerous to public safety
and of relatively little value for recreation, hunting, and other legitimate uses.
Merrill, 28 P.3d at 141 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
286. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
287. The Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 ("AWCA") expressly stated that an
assault weapon's "function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially
outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (West 2000). The Court of Appeal in Merrill conducted a lengthy
analysis of the AWCA. The court concluded that imposition of a duty in negligence on
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The Court of Appeal also took issue with the manufacturer's
complaint that such a duty would effectively impose an impermissible
judicial ban on the legal manufacture and sale of firearms. The court
emphasized that civil liability is aimed at cost internalization, not
elimination of the product or activity.289 Even if liability forces
manufacturers out of business or into the protection of the
bankruptcy laws, such results have been tolerated repeatedly in other
industries, such as the asbestos industry.290 Furthermore, a ruling that
the manufacturer of assault weapons would not create an impermissible conflict with the
AWCA, either directly by preemption, or by deference to the legislature. Merrill, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 173-75. In fact, a common law duty-which, not insignificantly, has been
codified in general terms by the California legislature-would supplement the penal
provisions of the AWCA. See id. at 174. The most significant obstacle to the common law
duty announced by the Court of Appeal was a provision in the California Civil Code
banning firearm or ammunition product-liability actions based on defective product
claims. The provision states that "no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defective in
design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury
posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when discharged." CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 1714.4(a) (West 1998). Additional language in the section underscores the
point: "The potential of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, damage, or
death when discharged does not make the product defective in design." Id. § 1714.4(b)(1).
The section addresses causation as well: "Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge
of a firearm or ammunition are not proximately caused by its potential to cause serious
injury, damage, or death, but are proximately caused by the actual discharge of the
product." Id. § 1714.4(b)(2). The Court of Appeal concluded that this section was
inapplicable, in its entirety, to the present negligent marketing case because the section
was intended to preclude strict liability design defect claims and no others. Merrill, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 175-76. In so ruling, the court examined the legislative history of the
provision, which clearly demonstrated that language relating to negligence claims was
deleted by the Senate, and explanatory language clearly specifying "defective in design"
was inserted. Id. at 176. The legislature accepted the Senate modifications. Id. Thus, the
court concluded that a reasonable interpretation of the provision was that it did not
purport to proscribe negligence actions and therefore had no relevance to the common
law duty prescribed in the opinion. See id. The court stated:
The policy expressed in section 1714.4 of insulating firearms from product
liability actions based on design defects under the risk/benefit theory... does not
relate to the manner in which nondefective firearms or ammunition are
manufactured, marketed, and sold to the public. Nor does it relate specifically to
assault weapons, as does the AWCA.
Id. (citation omitted).
In contrast, the California Supreme Court held that section 1714.4 applied to bar
the plaintiffs' negligence claims. Merrill, 28 P.3d at 125. The court concluded that alleging
that a product was negligently placed on the market was virtually identical to alleging a
strict liability theory for defective design, particularly in the application of the risk-utility
test. Id. To rule otherwise, the court explained, would be to allow plaintiffs to keep alive
prohibited claims merely by manipulating the wording of the claim to avoid the language
of product defect. Id. at 126-27.
288. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-72 (referring to the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
289. Id. at 178.
290. Id. at 172 & n.15, 179.
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defines a duty in negligence to encompass the manufacturers of
certain guns insofar as those guns may injure innocent third parties is
not the end of the case; plaintiffs have a burden of proof that they
must carry, and the jury ultimately will decide the matter. 91 In light
of the fact that neither Congress nor the California legislature has
preempted common law actions, the courts are free to recognize
doctrines that do not conflict with legislative enactments.29
With regard to causation, the Court of Appeal determined that
sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the actions of the
defendant manufacturer constituted a substantial factor in the injuries
claimed by the plaintiffs.293 The court once again relied upon
traditional negligence doctrine294 relating to the intervention of the
criminal or negligent act of a third person. The court stated that
under these circumstances, "the defendant's conduct may constitute a
[legally cognizable] contributing cause if it created or increased the
risk of such criminal or negligent acts even though the defendant did
not control the party whose criminal or negligent act most directly
caused harm. '295 Where the criminal act of a third party is reasonably
foreseeable to the manufacturer, the manufacturer's actions may be
deemed a proximate cause of the injury that occurs.296
291. The court observed: "Such a jury determination will, to be sure, also necessitate a
value judgment-indeed the ultimate one-as to the risks and social utility of Navegar's
conduct." Id. at 180. The court expressed its opinion that insufficient evidence of
foreseeability has thwarted plaintiffs in gun personal injury cases against manufacturers
more often than other failures in their cases. Id. at 180-81 n.23. In contrast, the court
stated, the evidence of foreseeability of harm in the Merrill case was "compelling." Id. at
181 n.23.
292. See id. at 180; see also Merrill, 28 P.3d at 147-48 (Werdegar, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a finding of negligence on the part of a gun manufacturer does not equate
with a legislative ban on the manufacture of a particular gun).
293. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-89.
294. Id. at 186.
295. Id.
296. See Kush v. City of Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. 1983). The court in Kush
held the defendant board of education liable for foreseeable acts of students hired as
summer employees who took chemicals from a school chemistry lab and left them on
school premises, where they were found by the infant plaintiff. Id. at 728. Similarly, the
acts of third parties using guns in ways hazardous to others are foreseeable, although the
specific incidents may not be. In her dissent in Merrill, Justice Werdegar observed:
[P]laintiffs seek not imposition of a duty of rescue or prevention, but rather,
application of the ordinary duty . . . to conduct one's activities with reasonable
care for the safety of others .... Where, as here, the defendant's positive
conduct of its business is claimed to have created or increased the risk of danger
to the plaintiffs from attack by a third person, liability is not barred simply
because the defendant had no special relationship with the third party actor or
the victims.
Merrill, 28 P.3d at 143-44 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
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The negligence analysis conducted by 'Judge Calabresi in his
dissent in McCarthy297 paralleled the view of the Merrill Court of
Appeal. The determination of whether a duty existed was key to the
McCarthy case as well. While it was beyond the scope of his opinion
to decide these issues, Judge Calabresi found it reasonable for the
New York courts to recognize a duty by the Black Talon
manufacturer if it so chose.298  Nor did 'Judge Calabresi see any
impediment to liability in a causation analysis. 299
Judge Calabresi's reading of New York law emphasized the
public policy context of the law. It is up to the state, he urged, to
conduct its own public policy analysis-an analysis he did not believe
the New York courts had yet fully undertaken. 00 As would be
expected from Judge Calabresi, °1 the role of cost internalization
figured prominently in this overall analysis.3 2
297. Again, because Judge Calabresi directly dissented from the majority's refusal to
certify questions of New York tort law to the New York Court of Appeals, he did not
reach an ultimate conclusion as to how New York law would apply to the Black Talon
case. His goal was to demonstrate that it was not unreasonable to interpret New York law
to encompass the ammunition manufacturer in the case. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119
F.3d 148,161 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 168 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). "Whether the imposition of liability in these
circumstances would go beyond the dictates of sound public policy is, of course, a difficult
policy issue, but it is certainly not out of the question that the [New York] Court of
Appeals might make just that determination." Id. at n.20 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
299. See id. at 164-65 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
300. See id. at 165-66 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge Calabresi quoted the New York
Court of Appeals regarding the judicial determination of duty:
[Duty] coalesces from vectored forces including logic, science, weighty competing
socioeconomic policies and sometimes contractual assumptions of responsibility.
These sources contribute to pinpointing and apportioning of societal risks and to
an allocation of burdens of loss and reparation on a fair, prudent basis ....
Courts traditionally and as part of the common law process fix the duty point by
balancing factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties and society
generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like
liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies
affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of liability.
Id. at 166 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp.,
634 N.E.2d 189, 192-93 (N.Y. 1994)).
301. As the widely respected author of GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970), and numerous other
publications on the subject, Judge Calabresi's expertise as a tort-law theoretician places
him in a unique position to evaluate the policy aspect of duty.
302. See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 169-70 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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V. SERVING THE POLICIES OF TORT LAW THROUGH GUN
MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
Before setting forth our proposal, a brief examination of the
policy goals of the tort system as they apply to gun manufacturer
liability is warranted. Our analysis demonstrates that liability of
manufacturers for inherently dangerous products, under appropriate
circumstances, would effectively serve those goals. As a preliminary
matter, victims of gun violence frequently cannot identify the person
directly responsible for the shooting that caused the injury-the
person who actually pulled the trigger. And in instances where the
person is known and within the jurisdictional reach of the court, that
person more likely than not will be judgment-proof. While the
unavailability of the most culpable tortfeasor will not, standing alone,
justify imposing liability on a different party, the unavailability does
make it all the more reasonable to impose liability on the original
responsible party who initiated the risk to which the victim was
exposed, knowing the dangers of the product. This party is the gun
manufacturer.
It is easy to become mired in the details of the various theories
that might be employed to hold sellers of guns accountable for gun
victims' injuries. Those details, however important, should not
occlude the fundamental policy question: What justifies holding gun
sellers liable for the injuries caused by their products? As previously
discussed, some would argue that liability is not proper unless a
statute explicitly bans the sale.30 3  Under this view, even the
manufacture and marketing of guns and ammunition known to
present enormous threats to the public safety are beyond judicial
power to influence. As shown throughout this Article, courts have,
by and large, acquiesced in this conclusion.3 4 But this result is
consistent neither with the major policies underlying tort law nor with
product liability law in particular.
Judicial reticence in these cases reflects certain concerns. Most
obviously, the whole issue of gun sales and regulation has become so
politically freighted that judges doubtless feel more comfortable
remaining to one side of the fray.30 5 Courts have been known to
express the view that the legislature is better positioned to assess the
303. See supra Part I.
304. See, e.g., supra notes 95-1.25 and accompanying text (discussing cases refusing to
hold gun manufacturers liable for defective products).
305. For a discussion of the political fray, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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risks and benefits presented by guns." 6 Indeed, legislatures are
equipped with certain fact-finding capabilities unavailable to courts,
which are tethered to the facts of individual cases. Thus, courts
should be careful when acting in areas that may conflict with
legislative determination. °1 But where, as in the matter of guns,
neither Congress nor the state legislatures have comprehensively and
responsibly addressed the issue of gun regulation, the courts play an
essential role. A further reason for judicial reticence is the difficult
task of deciding which acts should result in liability, once liability is
recognized in principle. For the reasons developed below, neither of
these justifications for inaction can bear scrutiny. Indeed, imposition
of liability in some cases is not only consistent with fundamental
principles of tort law, it is required by them.
A. Support for Gun Manufacturer Liability in the Policies of Tort
Law
Tort law is grounded in well-understood principles of corrective
justice.3"8 Unless a powerful countervailing reason is present, liability
306. As discussed supra note 287, legislation had a dispositive effect on the outcome of
the California Supreme Court's holding in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal.
2001), as the court read the statute banning firearm product liability actions so broadly as
to bar suits based on negligence as well. Cf. Culhane & Eggen, supra note 198, at 257-89
(discussing the dismissal of a municipality's public nuisance claim against a gun
manufacturer based on an overly deferential reading of a Florida state statute regulating
firearms).
307. See Culhane & Eggen, supra note 198, at 302; cf. Lytton, Tort Claims, supra note
27, at 52-54 (arguing that legislatures are better-equipped to sift through complex data).
308. The principles of corrective justice were originally articulated by Aristotle in his
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Chapter VII (Prometheus Books ed. 1987). Once one
moves beyond the proposition that corrective justice requires righting the balance that has
been upset when the defendant does something to affect the plaintiff's interests without
consent or justification, however, scholars are in famous disagreement as to what
circumstances warrant compensation. Under one view of corrective justice, compensation
is required only when one of the set of possibilities that made the defendant's conduct
unreasonable in the first place comes to fruition by injuring a particular plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 407 (1987) [hereinafter Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing] (discussing the notion
of wrongdoing without causation); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
403 (1992) (discussing corrective justice as the neutralizing of one party's gain and
another's loss). The former piece is part of a comprehensive symposium on the various
articulations of the corrective justice theory. See Symposium: Corrective Justice and
Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403-863 (1992).
Criticisms of Weinrib's formulation of the corrective justice principle range from
complaints about the overly formal nature of his theoretical architecture, see JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 433 (1992) ("Weinrib ... claims to have derived the
content of corrective justice from [an] abstract Kantian or Hegelian conception of free
agency. My approach could not be more different."), to more basic disagreements over
whether corrective justice requires compensation even when the defendant's actions are
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is generally imposed upon those whose conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of harm to a foreseeable class of persons,3"9 when
personal injury results to a person in that class.310  This kernel
principle of tort law has proved immensely difficult in practical
application.
The simplest and most direct example of the operation of tort
principles is when one deliberately swings a fist at another person,
thus creating a high degree of foreseeable risk of contact;311 liability
naturally follows the successful blow. But not since the beginning of
English tort law have courts restricted liability to such simple cases.
The ancient writ of trespass on the case, for example, developed for
situations in which the connection between the wrongful conduct and
the result was less direct, such as where the defendant negligently left
a pole on the highway that later caused a horse to stumble.31 Thus,
very early, tort law addressed culpability for indirect harms and
recognized that liability can flow from such actions.
For centuries, however, the causal intervention of a culpable
third party displaced the original tortfeasor from the cause of action.
Under the so-called "last wrongdoer rule," the intervening actions of
the third party became a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injury.313
Courts preferred simple causal chains, and disfavored the idea of
not unreasonable in any way, see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 159-60 (1973). Our view is in accord with the more common position
that corrective justice is only brought into play when the defendant's actions were
unreasonable.
309. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that "[t]he risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is
risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension").
310. See John G. Culhane, A "Clanging Silence": Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89
Ky. L.J. 911, 981-94 (2000-2001) (discussing recent retreat from foreseeability in
California and Texas, and citing New Jersey as an example of a jurisdiction that continues
to take the concept seriously). Foreseeability is not the only factor relevant to duty. See
id.; see also McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the place of foreseeability in various jurisdictions, including New
York). Where personal injury is involved, a duty should generally be owed to the injured
party by those whose conduct created the foreseeable risk. According a central role to
foreseeability respects the intrinsic, adjudicative nature of tort law.
311. According to the Second Restatement, one "intends" the resulting contact if he
"desires to cause consequences of his act, or ... believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 8A.
Although "intent" is generally used in battery, and "foreseeability" in negligence, the two
concepts are part of a continuum. In a sense, "intent" and (especially) "substantial
certainty" are extreme forms of foreseeability.
312. W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORTS 46 (14th ed. 1994).
313. Under this rule, the intervening culpable conduct (negligent or worse) of a third
party relieved the original defendant of liability. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 491-92 (7th ed. 2000).
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allowing one plaintiff to have more than one defendant against whom
to proceed. But today, common law-courts consistently recognize
that the very principle that justifies liability in the first place-the
creation of an unreasonable, foreseeable risk-also militates against
such bright-line rules choking off liability against the defendant whose
initial negligence set the dangerous course of events in motion.314
Thus, as mentioned earlier, one who negligently entrusts an
automobile to someone likely to pose a danger to others will be liable
when that danger is realized through the car borrower's negligence. 15
Tobacco companies that concealed information concerning the
addictive nature of nicotine may be held accountable for smoking-
related diseases despite the intervention, possibly negligent, of the
smoker.3"6 And the manufacturer of a product that presents a
foreseeable, but correctable, risk if misused is routinely made to
compensate the plaintiff who in fact misuses that product.3"7 Even the
intentional intervening act of a third party will not operate to defeat
recovery, where such act is foreseeable from the perspective of the
initial defendant.3 8  Thus, extending tort liability to gun
manufacturers for the foreseeably illegal use of their products fits
squarely into the progression of modern tort doctrine.
This evolution brings tort law closer to fulfilling one of its central
aims-deterrence of conduct that imposes an unreasonable risk on
others.319 While it may not be possible to eliminate entirely the harm
314. See id. at 491-94.
315. See supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 200-20 and accompanying text.
317. See infra notes 410-14 and accompanying text.
318. For example, a security company would be liable to the owners of burglarized
offices for its employee falling asleep on the job because "the likelihood that a third
person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the
actor negligent." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 449. A security guard falling
asleep is negligent precisely because of the likelihood of the very criminal behavior the
company was hired to prevent. Similarly, a railroad company that drops the plaintiff off in
a high-risk area will be liable for her subsequent sexual assault. Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E.
690 (Va. 1921) (holding the defendant liable for negligently taking the passenger past her
stop and leaving her in a dangerous area where she was twice raped). In Hines, the court
noted that "the very negligence alleged consists of exposing the injured party to the act
causing the injury." Id. at 695; see also Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1976)
(physician liable for negligently failing to diagnose a battered child, thereby allowing child
to return to the offending parent where the harm continued).
319. Whether deterrence is relevant to corrective justice has been a contested issue.
Under a formal theory of corrective justice, it is not, because the only concern is to restore
the allocation of assets that existed before the defendant's actions upset that allocation.
See Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, supra note 308, at 444-50. The more prevalent
view, which we share, is that the requirement of achieving corrective justice should not
(and, in fact, docs not) disable courts from considering the consequences of their rulings
beyond restoring the balance upset by this wrongful act involving these parties. This
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presented by guns-or by any product, for that matter-without
eliminating that entire class of products from the market, it is
nevertheless possible to reduce the overall harm guns cause. Liability
produces an incentive for manufacturers to adopt safer product
designs and marketing practices, absorbing the costs of these safer
designs into the price of the products.32 ° In addition to these specific
deterrence issues, tort liability serves an important general deterrence
purpose. Manufacturers that see other manufacturers profit with
impunity from products or distribution patterns that endanger the
public health may find it irresistible to mimic the profitable conduct,
thus amplifying the problem.
Focusing on deterrence leads from corrective justice to its
principal theoretical rival, the economic efficiency model of tort. In
one well-known articulation of efficiency theory, Judge Calabresi
stated that the goal of tort liability is to determine the "cheapest cost
avoider" and place liability on that party.3 21 In other words, who "is
in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision
once it is made"?3 22 The economic model also counsels in favor of
liability against gun manufacturers under certain circumstances. Gun
manufacturers are often the cheapest cost avoiders-not the innocent
victims, who typically have not even voluntarily encountered the
manufacturer's product.3 23  Imposing liability on gun manufacturers
for injuries associated with their products would hold them
accountable for their decisions to design and market lethal products
with knowledge of the injuries that are likely to occur.
The goal of cost internalization is particularly relevant to the sale
of guns. By placing liability on the product seller, the product's price
position is not inconsistent with our earlier emphasis on tort law's intrinsic function. See
supra note 310, in which we expressed a view disfavoring judicially imposed limitations on
duty. Such limitations are vulnerable to criticism because they serve only to disqualify an
innocent plaintiff, whose injuries allegedly are caused by the defendant's wrongful
conduct. No similar solicitude is due the party whose conduct was wrongful in the first
place; the deterrent effect of tort law may, at least as a formal matter, be seen as incidental
to the central mission of corrective justice between the parties.
320. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 145 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J.,
dissenting).
321. CALABRESI, supra note 301, at 135 &passim.
322. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
323. In cases involving conduct by both a manufacturer and a product user that
ultimately injures an innocent third-party plaintiff, Calabresi and Hirschoff have this to
say: "If both the manufacturer and the user are in a better position than the ... victim to
make the cost-benefit analysis, the strict liability test would require, as a general rule, that
the victim should recover, whether he sues the manufacturer or the user." Id. at 1072.
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can accurately reflect all of its costs, including the costs of injuries
caused by the product and the costs of insuring against those risks. In
this manner, the costs of doing business include the resulting costs of
marketing a dangerous product.3 24 One of the successful arguments
typically made by product manufacturers against the imposition of
strict product liability has been that they should not be held liable for
hazards associated with a product that were unknowable at the time
of the product's marketing.3 25 Guns, however, contain risks that are
not merely knowable at the time of marketing, but actually are
known. As one court has stated, shifting the costs of injuries
associated with the product onto "all those who produce, distribute
and purchase manufactured products is far preferable to imposing it
on the innocent victims who suffer illnesses and disability from
defective products. 3 26 In addition to the normative statement this
policy makes, there is a highly practical element of both compensating
the innocent victim and spreading the costs among the users of the
products in price increases, rather than onto society as a whole, which
must bear the cost of injuries through public expenditures related to
health and safety.
B. The Role of the Judiciary
Semi-automatic handguns and Black Talon bullets are examples
of highly technological product designs that have emerged in the
twentieth century and that were not contemplated during the
evolution of the strict product liability doctrine embodied in the
Second Restatement. They offer graphic examples of why the laissez-
faire approaches of government and traditional tort law toward these
inherently dangerous and uniquely lethal products no longer work.
But they also pose the question of the proper role of the judiciary in
addressing the dangers of modern products. With regard to guns, the
324. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information," 48 TEx. L.
REV. 398, 408 (1970) ("It should be a cost of doing business that in the course of doing
business an unreasonable risk was created.").
325. Cf. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (noting
and rejecting defendants' argument that they should be allowed to raise the state-of-the-
art defense in an asbestos personal injury case based upon inadequate warnings). Most
courts have disagreed with the Beshada court; the current consensus is that liability should
not be imposed for failing to warn of the unknowable. See Mark McLaughlin Hager,
Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus
on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1994). Of course, what was
knowable is a world apart from what was actually known by the defendant when the
product was designed.
326. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547.
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judiciary serves an important supplemental role to existing legislation,
and courts should affirmatively embrace that role.327
In their effort to avoid tort liability, gun manufacturers and their
supporters often cite the fact that guns are legal. In his dissent in
McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,328 Judge Calabresi stated, "Legality of an act
does not insulate it from possible tort liability." '329 This statement
reflects a fundamental principle of our legal system-that legislative
and judicial activities serve different functions. The majority of
jurisdictions follow a rule that compliance with safety statutes or
regulations relating to products is relevant evidence on the issue of
product defect, but not dispositive on liability. 330  Absent
preemption33' of state common law, existing safety regulations are
viewed as "minimum standards" beyond which the judicial system is
free to go in crafting rules of liability.332
Notwithstanding this basic tenet, courts often defer to
legislatures in areas of substantial public interest, particularly on
issues traditionally within the scope of legislative action.333 Courts
327. This statement has not gone unchallenged. One article argues, specifically with
reference to guns, that "courts intrude on the regulatory and revenue responsibilities of
legislatures" when they permit suits challenging the design and sale of otherwise lawful
guns. See Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, So Sue Them, Sue Them..., THE WKLY.
STANDARD 19-20 (May 24, 1999). See generally Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and
Judicial Rulemaking: Commitment to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 KAN.
L. REV. 65, 67-68 (2000) (stating that "the judicial role should be contracted so as to
encompass only limited forms of decisionmaking-those which are either legislatively
mandated ... or essential to ensuring that the adjudication process remains broadly
consistent with the majoritarian political commitment of our society as a whole.").
328. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
329. Id. at 163 n.14 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
330. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1987)
(finding compliance with FDA regulations in toxic shock syndrome case insufficient to
preclude liability); Sours v. Gen. Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1517 (6th Cir. 1983)
(finding compliance with federal motor vehicle safety regulation in automobile case
insufficient to preclude liability). See generally DOBBS, supra note 91, at 1033-35
(commenting that evidence of compliance with a statute or regulation is not a dispositive
defense).
331. The existing federal statutory, and regulatory structure for firearms and
ammunition does not preempt state common law. See supra notes 59-75 and
accompanying text.
332. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 625 A.2d 1066, 1070 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1219 (1992); DOBBS, supra note 91, at 1034 (stating that "[f]requently regulations are
intended to provide a floor..., not an optimal level or a ceiling on safety precautions").
333. Thus, for example, the New York Court of Appeals refused to impose a discovery
statute of limitations on latent disease claims, even though plaintiffs found that their
claims had become time-barred under the existing time-of-exposure rule prior to their
development of symptoms. See Wetherill v. Eli Lilly & Co., 678 N.E.2d 474, 478 (N.Y.
1997). The New York courts thus deferred to the state legislature on a traditional
legislative function-determining statutes of limitations and related tolling provisions. In
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may also defer to legislatures or regulatory agencies on matters for
which statutory action or regulation is imminent.334 In many gun suits,
courts have invoked this deferential attitude, stating that the social
policies involved make liability appropriate for legislative decision-
making, rather than judicial determination. ,The court in Martin v.
Harrington & Richardson, Inc.335 typified this judicial attitude, stating:
"Imposing liability for the sale of handguns, which would in practice
drive manufacturers out of business, would produce a handgun ban by
judicial fiat in the face of the decision by [the state] to allow its
citizens to possess handguns." '336 Such deference to the legislature
under these circumstances is both unwarranted and ineffectual.
As Judge Calabresi stated: "There is all the difference in the
world between making something illegal and making it tortious....
[V]ery different policy considerations go into the decision of whether
to forbid something and the decision of whether to find a duty that
permits liability for the harm it causes." '337 Tort liability is not a
product ban. Rather, tort liability forces cost optimization by
requiring manufacturers to take steps to conduct their own risk-utility
analysis in deciding whether to continue marketing the product as-is,
modify the product design, or remove the product entirely from the
market. Critics of gun manufacturer liability charge that any such
liability will effectively constitute a ban of firearms because guns can
be made no safer.338 This is simply not true. Some guns have no
1986, the New York State Legislature enacted a broad discovery statute of limitations for
toxic exposures, including prescription drugs. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney Supp.
2002). At the same time, the legislature authorized the revival of previously time-barred
claims involving exposure to certain enumerated substances. 1986 N.Y. Laws 682 (§§ 4-5).
334. See Hammond v. Int'l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 651 (3d Cir. 1982) (OSHA
regulations requiring a roll-over protective structure promulgated after manufacture of an
allegedly defective vehicle could be introduced into evidence, as regulation "provides
strong support for the proposition that a loader tractor ... does not possess every element
necessary to make it safe for use.").
335. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984).
336. Id. at 1204. The Martin court also favorably quoted an earlier decision in which
the court stated: " 'Although ... a social policy [of gun manufacturer liability] may be
adopted by the legislature, it ought not to be imposed by judicial decree.' " Id. (quoting
Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 81 L. 27923, slip op. at 3 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Law
Div. July 21, 1983)).
337. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 169-70 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting).
338. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1269 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the marketing of a handgun is not an ultrahazardous activity and expressing concern that
liability would send manufacturers out of business); Timothy A. Bumann, A Products
Liability Response to Gun Control Legislation, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 715, 733 (1995)
(referring to a defense attorney's argument against gun manufacturer liability and stating
that "[t]he gun control proponents have made it clear that their goal is to put the firearms
industry out of business"). This point of argument is so fraught with emotion that
2002]
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sporting value; indeed, some even have no value for the limited
purposes of legitimate law enforcement or the military. Certain guns
appeal to criminals more than others, due to features that have no
social value, such as fingerprint resistance, modifiability, and
excessive firepower. And some guns and ammunition are designed to
achieve maximum wounding power and carnage. Some of these guns
probably should not be on the market, but others may serve some
legitimate function. The prospect of tort liability places these
decisions in the hands of the manufacturers.
While legislatures have a legitimate interest in regulating firearm
sale and usage, existing regulation has done little or nothing to
prevent the surge in the manufacture and sale of firearms with
increased hazards.339  More effective regulation is not on the
legislative horizon. Plaintiffs have argued that judicial intervention is
particularly crucial when, as with guns, legislatures have done little to
regulate the hazards. Some courts have disputed plaintiffs' arguments
that legislative inaction mandates judicial imposition of liability on
gun manufacturers. These courts have implied that minimal
regulation is not the result of legislative indifference or political
disagreement. Rather, these courts aver that further legislation is not
forthcoming because legislators have determined that it is not
warranted or desirable. Thus, in Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft,34 0
where the plaintiff argued that tort liability was appropriate in light of
legislative inaction,341 the court stated:
It would be improper for courts to ignore the fact that
legislatures have repeatedly rejected arguments like those
made by the plaintiff's attorneys in this case. Indeed, ... the
clear inference is that the majority of legislators-certainly
those in Texas-do not consider that the manufacture and
sale of handguns to the public is unreasonably dangerous or
is socially unacceptable.342
reasoned analysis and response are often difficult. At least from an economic standpoint,
allowing liability to send some manufacturers out of the marketplace may be a desirable
result: "[I]f people purchase fewer handguns and some companies go out of business,
efficiency has been improved and, because handgun victims are assured compensation,
everyone is better off. There is no need to preserve companies for their own sakes by
employing a rule that produces inefficient results .... ." Paul R. Bonney, Note,
Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 GEO. L.J.
1437, 1459-60 (1985).
339. See supra Part I.B.
340. 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Texas 1985).
341. Id. at 1213. "[Plaintiff] claim[s] that the fact that not a single legislature has
banned handguns-and that most have rejected efforts for any meaningful gun control-
'weighs very heavily in the plaintiff's favor.' " Id. (quoting Transcript, p. 26).
342. Id. at 1214 (footnotes omitted).
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Similarly, in Mavilia v. Stoeger Industries,343 a federal district court in
Massachusetts noted that the state legislature had considered and
rejected "numerous" resolutions to ban handguns. The court
concluded that the lack of legislative activity signified affirmative
legislative support for the marketing of handguns to the public.3"
This interpretation of legislative inactivity ignores the realities of
the political process. Banning a product outright is a difficult
legislative endeavor, fraught with political implications for legislators
who are beholden to their constituencies. A legislator's decision to
vote against a product ban does not imply that he or she is not in
favor of increasing regulation of the product.
Indeed, the lack of a legislative ban provides perhaps the best
situation for judicial intervention. The role of the judiciary is not to
impose absolute product bans. Rather, the common law supplements
positive statutory enactments and regulation in ways that may modify
product seller behavior so as to enhance public safety.345 Admittedly,
a manufacturer might determine that removal of a product from the
market is the most prudent response to the threat of liability. But
that would be a decision for the particular manufacturer. Under a
common law rule applying product liability law to gun manufacturers,
it is conceivable that a manufacturer of a Saturday Night Special may
decide to remove the product from the market because the risk of
harm is high and, therefore, the risk of liability is great. It is far less
likely that a hunting rifle would be forced from the market because
the sporting utility of the rifle is substantial and the likelihood that it
would inflict criminal harm is diminished. The cost of harm inflicted
by the rifle would likely be outweighed, in the manufacturer's
analysis, by the profitability of the safe use of the rifle in its ordinary
use.
It is a reality of the regulatory process that regulatory responses
to problems do not necessarily reach the broad range of all hazards
posed by products. Government regulators tend to focus narrowly on
343. 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983).
344. Id. at 111; accord Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 198 (E.D. La.
1983) ("Given the prominence of the handgun issue in public debates, the only plausible
explanation for the refusal to ban handgun sales to the general public.., is that a majority
of the legislators think such a ban would be undesirable as a matter of public policy."),
affd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
345. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066 (N.Y. 2001). After
acknowledging this point, the court of appeals went on to say that "we should be cautious
in imposing novel theories of tort liability while the difficult problem of illegal gun sales in
the United States remains the focus of a national policy debate." Id. While that policy
debate is continuing, all evidence points to the virtual end-at least for the time being-of
meaningful legislative action on this matter.
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acute problems.346 While this approach may result in effective
resolution of a specific immediate problem, it often ignores other
existing problems or creates additional problems.347 Moreover,
administrative agencies have inconsistent track records in both
prioritizing risks and drafting effective regulations.348 In light of these
problems, the common law has an important role to play in
supplementing the regulatory process.
Furthermore, as Professor Carl T. Bogus has observed, flaws in
the regulatory process may allow manipulation of product
information by manufacturers in their favor.349 Federal agencies are
littered with products about which the manufacturers have presented
partial or incorrect information.35 Because federal agencies rely
upon the manufacturers to conduct full-fledged testing of their
products and present that data to the agencies, the agencies are not
equipped to verify or conduct that testing themselves. As a result,
"the manufacturer holds the cards" in the regulatory process.35' This
fact highlights the important role of the judicial system352 in assuring
the safety of products on the market.
Bogus has astutely noted that political disagreement over
regulation of other products has not caused the same degree of
judicial deference to legislatures as that evidenced in the gun suits.353
He suggests that courts have treated guns differently not only because
they have generated political debate, but because of the nature of that
346. See BREYER, supra note 26, at 19-20.
347. See id. at 12 (analyzing example of asbestos removal).
348. See id. at 10-29.
349. Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 72-76 (1995) [hereinafter Bogus, War on the Common Law].
350. The products cited by Professor Bogus are asbestos, PCBs, the Dalkon Shield
birth control device, MER/29 (an anticholesterol drug), and heart catheters. Id. at 73.
351. Id. at 76.
352. Professor Bogus would take this point one step further. He has stated:
The courts have final authority in matters involving constitutional law, and
therefore the concept of judicial restraint is critical in constitutional cases. The
situation is reversed in common law areas, however; just as there is no check on
bad constitutional law made by the courts, there is no check on bad common law
made by legislatures. It is time to recognize a parallel doctrine of legislative
restraint.
Id. at 71. This Article is not the place to engage in a jurisprudential debate on the
appropriate balance between legislative activity and the common law in all areas of the
law. But this debate is significant here inasmuch as it demonstrates that the injuries
inflicted by guns cannot be dismissed so facilely by a brief statement in a judicial opinion
that they are matters for the legislature. The issue is far more complex and requires
participation by both the legislative and judicial branches.
353. Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103,
1149-53 (1991).
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debate. The politics of the gun debate have reached a broader base
of participants than the debate over other products, such as
pesticides. Gun issues have generated strong passions in an especially
large consumer base-not merely in specific interest groups-whose
members are both in favor of and against regulation. This broad
public interest, coupled with the remarkably vigorous and well-
financed lobbying activities of the National Rifle Association
("NRA") at all levels of government, represent intimidating silent
forces in the courtroom.354
Finally, the issue of tort compensation for gun victims cannot be
divorced from the raging debate over tort reform generally, the
flames of which have burned in Congress and state legislatures since
the 1980s. While recent efforts at general federal tort liability
reform-particularly in the area of products liability-have fizzled,355
the disappearance of extreme tort reform proposals from the legal
landscape is unlikely. The tort reform movement is driven by the zeal
and resources of the business community and their lobbying
organizations. These groups view the tort system as resulting in
"excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards and
unfair allocation of liability." '356 The gun lobby has been a perennial
and vigorous supporter of tort reform. Thus, the tort reform debate
has been closely tied to the gun debate, invoking the same interests
and policies.
On the state level, tort reform has made greater inroads, but it
has been no less controversial. A typical example of a state tort
reform act was the legislation enacted in Ohio, which included
provisions on comparative fault, joint and several liability, statutory
limitations of actions, damage caps, and separate provisions for a
variety of types of actions, such as product liability, premises liability,
and medical malpractice.357 Similarly, legislation enacted in Florida in
1999351 included many provisions favorable to business. The Florida
354. See id. at 1156-57. Professor Bogus suggests that the intimidation factor may arise
from inevitable accusations by the NRA of "judicial activism," should a judge determine
that tort law appropriately applies to guns. Id. at 1157. A further concern may be that
angry pro-gun forces will redouble their efforts at tort reform in the wake of judicial
decisions that are favorable to personal injury plaintiffs. Id. at 1158-59.
355. See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. (1997)
(proposing a uniform set of legal principles governing product liability).
356. Id. § 2(a)(4)-(5). This language appeared in the "Findings" section of the Senate
bill.
357. See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1073
n.6 (Ohio 1999).
358. 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 99-225 (West) (H.B. 775).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
act, among numerous other provisions, capped punitive damages359
and created a rebuttable presumption that a product was not
defective if its design complied with existing government standards
and regulations.36° Both the Ohio and Florida examples demonstrate
the risks of such broad legislation. In 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court
held the Ohio tort reform statute unconstitutional3 6' because it
usurped the authority of the court to establish rules governing
litigation and to act as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of Ohio
law.362 The constitutionality of the Florida act has been the subject of
a long battle in the courts of the state, and its ultimate fate is far from
certain.363
The examples of Ohio and Florida illustrate both how hard-
fought the battles of tort reform have been and how fragile the
boundary is between permissible legislative intrusion in an area
traditionally left to the courts and impermissible legislative
usurpation of judicial authority. The tort reform debate will continue,
in different forms and with different features, indefinitely. Gun
interests and gun control advocates have a continuing stake in the
outcome of the debate, on both the federal and state levels. Their
concerns and passions on this subject-and not the matters raised in
individual cases-will continue to boil the kettle of legal issues of gun
tort liability. Leaving issues of gun manufacturer liability solely to
legislatures virtually guarantees delay, uncertainty, and political bias.
VI. GUN TORTS: FASHIONING A REMEDY FOR GUN VICTIMS FROM
EXISTING TORT LAW
The appropriate remedy for victims of gun violence is obvious
when one strips away the diversions and distractions of the political
debates over guns and tort reform. It is in plain sight in existing tort
doctrine. It is the next logical step in the evolution of the common
law of product liability. Courts should not fear the political
ramifications of taking this logical step. Rather, they should embrace
and develop a reasoned, nuanced approach to its implementation.
359. Id. § 23.
360. Id. § 15.
361. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at li1l.
362. Id. at 1073.
363. Appeals Court Reverses Finding that Florida Repose Law Unconstitutional, 17
Toxic L. RPTR. 1002 (2002) (discussing recent ruling impacting fate of Florida tort reform
act).
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A. Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Products
Courts have recognized the inherent lethality of handguns, as
well as the fact that criminal use of guns is easily foreseen by
manufacturers. In Richman v. Charter Arms Corp.,364 for example,
the court, analogizing to automobiles,365 held that violence is a
foreseeable use of guns. The court stated:
The analogy here is manifest: if car manufacturers must
reasonably expect purchasers of their products to speed
periodically, then surely handgun manufacturers must
reasonably expect purchasers of their products to kill
periodically .... For this reason, the Court finds that in the
context of this case the criminal use of a handgun is, as a
matter of law, a normal use of that product. 66
Unfortunately, courts have perverted the foreseeability concept in
holding gun manufacturers immune from liability for gun violence,
given that the criminal use of their guns is eminently foreseeable.367
This result is absurdly counterintuitive. It permits manufacturers with
full knowledge that their guns will be used to commit violent crimes
to continue producing and marketing those guns because the tort
system has not done its job of requiring the manufacturers to modify
their unreasonably hazardous behavior and products.
This attitude reaches its zenith in the Third Restatement. With
characteristic linguistic circuitousness, the Third Restatement states
the dilemma using the example of a toy gun that shoots hard rubber
pellets with excessive force. Under the risk-utility test endorsed in
364. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), affd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. Perkins v.
F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
365. Specifically, the court discussed a case in which two persons were injured in a
sports car when the car lost a tire tread. LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623
F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980). The LeBouefcourt upheld a judgment against the manufacturer
because the accident occurred while the car was being used for its normal use-and not
being misused by the driver-notwithstanding the facts that the driver was intoxicated and
speeding. Id. at 989. The court explained that the manufacturer could reasonably have
foreseen that its cars-particularly sports cars-would be driven in excess of the speed
limit. Id. at 989 n.4.
366. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 197. This case involved the kidnapping, robbery, rape,
and murder of a woman by a man who obtained from an acquaintance a "snub nose .38"
handgun manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 193.
367. See, e.g., Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
no design defect because the handgun performed as intended); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935
F. Supp. 1307, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the act of manufacturing a handgun
"does not give rise to liability absent a defect in the manufacture or design of the product
itself"), vacated by 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771,
773 (D.N.M. 1987) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the potential criminal use of a
firearm renders the product defective), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); see also supra
Part II (discussing judicial decisions hostile to gun manufacturer liability).
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the Third Restatement, such a gun that causes injury could be
deemed defective because alternatives exist, such as softer projectiles
or water.368 The Restatement continues: "However, if the realism of
the hard-pellet gun, and thus its capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently
important to those who purchase and use such products . . ., then no
reasonable alternative will ... be available." '369  The Third
Restatement places guns and ammunition into the latter category of
products for which no reasonable alternative is available. Indeed, in
the Third Restatement's view, Black Talon bullets may be analytically
indistinguishable from rubber pellets. According to the Third
Restatement, the only question is whether the "capacity to cause
injury" is "sufficiently important" to the user; if so, the product is not
defective. While this approach examines the availability of
alternative design, it omits any analysis of the social utility of the
product.37 °
The theory that gun manufacturers must not be made to reduce
the hazards of their products through tort liability because guns are
intended to shoot and kill is patently absurd. It is time that courts
recognize this incongruence and fashion a tort remedy against gun
manufacturers for victims of gun violence. Contrary to popular
rhetoric, courts (and especially juries) often stand the best chance of
achieving truly democratic results, because there is less opportunity
for special interests to gain control of the proceedings.37' Courts
368. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. e.
369. Id.
370. The Third Restatement raised the possibility of liability for manifestly dangerous
products in a narrowly defined set of circumstances. See id. The sole illustration involved
an exploding cigar, intended as a joke item. If the cigar's explosion caused the smoker's
beard to catch fire, thus causing injury, the manufacturer could be found liable even
though no reasonable alternative design could have eliminated the hazard while retaining
the joke element of the cigar. Id. illus. 5. Liability may be found under these
circumstances because "[t]he utility of the exploding cigar is so low and risk of injury is so
high as to warrant a conclusion that the cigar is defective and should not have been
marketed at all." Id. The language of comment e and illustration 5 is generally
disapproving of any exception at all, so it is safe to assume that the exploding cigar was
intended to be an isolated one. We view the exploding cigar as having much in common
with many of the excessively hazardous firearms and bullets that have been the subject of
lawsuits by shooting victims and their families. These guns and ammunition often have
little or no utility other than the commission of crimes and the killing and maiming of
persons. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 125 (Cal. 2001) (gunman using
semiautomatic assault weapon to kill eight people). Thus, these products seem to be
indistinguishable from the exploding cigar example, except that the harms they cause are
far more serious.
371. See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis. The Case of
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 533 (2000) ("[C]ourts tend to be populist and deliberative,
whereas legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, hasty, and
unwilling or unable to offer reasons for their actions."); see also Mark Curriden, Putting
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should not permit the same paralysis that has afflicted the legislative
branch to afflict their own offices.
1. Strict Product Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Product
Design
Strict product liability doctrine contains the essential theory and
framework to impose liability on gun manufacturers for injuries and
death caused by gun violence. While strict liability typically has been
applied to guns only when they malfunction, contemporary product
liability doctrine supports a broader scope for design defect to
encompass manifestly unsafe products. The risk-utility doctrine
advocated in some form by most states and the Third Restatement is
clearly applicable to such products, while the consumer
contemplation test is more difficult to apply.372
As mentioned above, the Third Restatement recognizes that
under certain circumstances a product design may be so manifestly
unreasonable as to constitute a defect, notwithstanding that the
product was in normal use and did not malfunction when the injury
occurred.373 If a product falls into this category, it may contain a
design defect absent proof of a reasonable alternative design.374 The
rationale behind this approach is that "the extremely high degree of
danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its
negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully
aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or to allow children
to use, the product." '375 The Reporters make clear, however, that they
the Squeeze on Juries, 86 A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 52, 58 (discussing various state statutes
enacted to shield certain special interest defendants from tort liability). A thoughtful
recent article that addresses the democratic nature of both the legislative and adjudicative
processes is Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as
Adjudication, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2001). In Peters's view, participation is "central to
democratic legitimacy . I..." d. at 20-22. Thus, when special interests capture legislators,
in the sense of rendering them incapable of seriously considering opposing viewpoints,
participation-and therefore democracy-suffers. The analogy in the adjudicative process
would be to a judge who is bribed, or unduly influenced, by one of the parties.
372. The position advanced in this Article is consistent with that developed in Culhane,
supra note 241. The consumer expectation test is difficult to apply in the case of products,
such as handguns, that typically injure a bystander, rather than the consumer. For an
analysis of the ways in which the developing doctrine of bystander liability supports gun
manufacturer liability for the injuries and death of victims of gun violence, see infra notes
400-06 and accompanying text.
373. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. e.
374. Id.
375. Id. It is curious but telling that the Restatement employs toy guns and exploding
cigars as examples of products that raise the issue of manifestly unreasonable design. Id.
illus. 5. The choice to illustrate this significant concept with the examples of a toy and a
novelty item is a clear effort to avoid the troubling issues of guns and tobacco products.
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espouse a conservative application of this theory, declining to apply it
to truly dangerous products such as guns.376 Viewed objectively, there
seems to be no real reason-other than political inclination or a
penchant for legal inertia-not to apply this theory in appropriate
cases involving guns.377
2. The Test for "Manifestly Unreasonable Design"
The obvious starting point for a determination of manifestly
unreasonable design is the risk-utility analysis. Yet, simple
application of this test is insufficient to deal with the issues involved.
An unmodified risk-utility analysis could lead to liability in virtually
all cases of injury of third persons from guns, including persons
injured in hunting accidents. Accordingly, evaluation of a manifestly
unreasonable design must consider a series of factors to enable
nuanced examination of the product under scrutiny.378 Thus, the
proposal set forth below employs various familiar legal tests not
usually found in tandem and applies them in a new context. The test
is a synthesis that recognizes that some torts that have proliferated in
contemporary society require a fresh approach,379 and encourages
courts to relinquish their grip on old-fashioned modes of applying the
tests and develop a balanced, sensible approach to gun torts.
To determine whether a manufacturer should be held liable for a
manifestly unreasonable product design, it is useful to adapt and
apply the multifactored analysis usually reserved for abnormally
376. See id. § 2, rptrs' note IV.D (endorsing the view of a majority of courts).
377. For a discussion of the treatment under this theory of guns that have substantial
legitimate uses, see infra notes 396-98 and accompanying text.
378. Some commentators have discussed the concept of "generic product liability,"
which would obviate much of the analysis we propose. See Bogus, War on the Common
Law, supra note 349, at 9 (discussing the inevitable evolution of product liability law
toward generic liability); Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict
Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 131 (1996) (stating that the Third Restatement
approach is too restrictive). The primary criticism of generic product liability has been its
sweeping and somewhat indiscriminate breadth, which would wipe out liability for whole
categories of products. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A
Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 423 (1997) (discussing problems associated with
generic product liability in the context of tobacco litigation). Whether or not generic
product liability would have this effect, our proposal is preferable because it allows the
application of strict product liability to inherently dangerous products and forces an
examination of the merits of each product that comes before the courts.
379. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the
Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers' Compensation Systems, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1992) (discussing ways in which toxic torts in the workplace
challenge traditional legal tests and recommending new approaches to liability questions).
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dangerous activities. 8° Use of these factors is appropriate for several
reasons. First, simply put, they have been used for many years in a
related strict liability context and have proved workable.381 Second,
the factors construct a risk-utility analysis which parallels the
developments in strict product liability. Finally, these factors are
consistent with strict product liability law in the sense that they infuse
elements of reasonableness and foreseeability 32 into strict liability,
thus moving away from absolute liability. The abnormally dangerous
activities factors must be modified, however, to suit the unique
characteristics of these consumer products.
The factors set forth in section 520 of the Second Restatement
reflect their focus on activities. With minimal modification, and the
addition of other factors, they are quite relevant to products involving
manifestly unreasonable design. Accordingly, we offer the following
factors as determinative of a manifestly unreasonable design:
(1) the existence of a high degree of risk of harm to the
person of others;
(2) the likelihood that the harm that results will be great;
(3) the extent to which the product is not in legitimate
common usage;
(4) the extent to which the product's value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes;
(5) the availability of a safer alternative design;
(6) the seller's actual or constructive knowledge that the
product is likely to be used in the manner that caused the
injury to the plaintiff.
The first four factors track closely the section 520 factors.3 83 As with
the section 520 factors, all factors are to be considered, but no single
380. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 520. These factors are listed supra
note 177.
381. A fairly recent use of, and justification for, the strict liability factors were offered
by Judge Posner in Indiana Belt Railroad v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th
Cir. 1990) (concerning the transportation of dangerous chemicals by rail).
382. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), § 20 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 2001) (regarding
claims for abnormally dangerous activities, stating that "the case on behalf of strict liability
is strengthened when the defendant has actual knowledge of the risky quality of the
activity in which the defendant is engaging ... [and thus] is deliberately engaging in risk-
creating activity for the sake of the defendant's own advantage").
383. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 520.
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factor will be dispositive. 8" All six factors need not be present to
determine that the product design was manifestly unreasonable."'
The first three factors focus on the weight of the harm caused by
the use of the gun. The first and second factors state the role of
degree of risk and severity of harm. The third factor adds to the
language of section 520(d) the word "legitimate," recognizing that a
product may have several different uses, some legitimate and some
socially unacceptable. This is particularly true with some guns, which
may be used for legitimate purposes, such as law enforcement or
sporting, or for illegitimate criminal purposes. Because criminal use
of a gun is illegitimate, such use is not "common usage" for the
purpose of this factor. Thus, where a gun has virtually no legitimate
purpose, but is commonly used for criminal activity, this factor would
weigh strongly in favor of liability.
The fourth factor is the essence of the risk-utility balancing test.
It also addresses the characteristics of the gun under scrutiny and
complements the third factor. Injuries inflicted as a result of criminal
use of a gun that has no legitimate uses will weigh more heavily than
injuries inflicted through the use of a gun in its legitimate use. Thus,
barring extraordinary circumstances, injuries inflicted in the course of
legitimate law enforcement activities through the use of a particular
manufacturer's firearm likely would not result in manufacturer
liability because of the legitimate use of the firearm and the value of
law enforcement activities to the community.
The fifth factor is a modification of section 520(c), which focuses
on "the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care." '386 In the case of a product, the issue translates to considering
whether a safer alternative design was available to the defendant.
While existence of a safer alternative design may provide evidence of
the manufacturer's choice to make the product more dangerous when
faced with a viable safer option, the alternative design is not a
requirement for the manufacturer to be held liable. Thus, this
approach rejects the Third Restatement's position in favor of that
followed by most courts that have considered the issue.387 While not
an absolute requirement, the existence of a safer alternative design
weighs heavily in favor of liability.
384. See id. § 520 cmt. f.
385. See id.
386. Id. § 520(c).
387. See supra note 106.
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The sixth factor addresses legal causation.388 Because gun
violence typically results from an intervening cause-that is, the
violent act of the shooter-the sixth factor permits liability where the
manufacturer knew or had reason to know that its gun design likely
would be used by criminals to cause injury to other persons.389 This
cause of action contemplates a causation rule based upon the
manufacturer's knowing creation of an extreme hazard to the public.
In this sense, the rule mirrors that contemplated by the doctrine of
abnormally dangerous activities set forth in Second Restatement
section 519. Section 519 does not require that the defendant have
knowledge that the specific plaintiff could foreseeably be harmed by
the defendant's activities. Rather, the focus of the inquiry is on the
high degree of risk of harm inherent in the activity.3 90 Subsection (2)
of section 519 emphasizes this point, declaring that strict liability "is
limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous." '391 Similarly, for a manufacturer to be liable
388. The only section 520 factor that does not appear on the above list, even in
different form, is 520(e), which focuses on the "inappropriateness of the activity to the
place where it is carried on." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 520(e). This
factor is more appropriate for land-based activities.
389. Courts could require manufacturers to assume a significant role in gathering
information regarding the uses to which their products are put and the persons to whom
the products appeal. Requiring manufacturers to conduct their own studies, however,
raises some concerns. Gun manufacturers-as all manufacturers of products to some
degree-have a vested interest in viewing their products in the light least likely to result in
liability, and such studies would be subject to criticism for bias. This is particularly true in
the absence of regulatory oversight of gun design and manufacture. Nevertheless, the
manufacturers should not be allowed to simply place their products into the stream of
commerce and blindly turn their backs to the foreseeable consequences of the products'
use. Thus, while we do not suggest imposing any absolute affirmative duty on the
manufacturer to conduct studies in all circumstances, our proposal does mandate that the
gun manufacturer be required to conduct a reasonable investigation of the actual use of its
products. This standard may require the manufacturer to conduct its own studies, collect
information from Justice Department studies or other sources, or both, depending on the
kind of data and its availability.
390. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 306-07 (W.D. Tenn.
1986) (stating that modern courts attach strict liability to activities that are considered
ultra-hazardous), affd in part & rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Klein v.
Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 922 (Wash. 1991) (stating that strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities applies to fireworks displays). In Sterling, the district court
determined that the defendant's chemical waste burial site created a high risk of harm to
the community. The residents who brought suit in a class action against Velsicol were
members of the community. In Klein, the court ruled that setting off a public fireworks
display, even during a Fourth of July celebration, was considered an abnormally
dangerous activity. The court found that the first two Restatement factors were met, but
not the others. Regarding the high degree of harm inherent in the activity, the court
emphasized the "high risk of serious personal injury or property damage ... because of
the possibility th. t a rocket will malfunction or be misdirected." 810 P.2d at 920.
391. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 519(2).
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for a claim based upon manifestly unreasonable design, the
manufacturer need only have actual or constructive knowledge that
the product is likely to be used in a manner that would harm other
persons.392
The determination of whether a product has a manifestly
unreasonable design could be made by the court as a matter of law
where the evidence presented on a summary judgment motion
supports doing so. This proposal envisions a significant role for the
jury in resolving questions of fact related to the manifestly
unreasonable design factors.393 In addition, the jury would consider
fact questions related to apportionment among multiple parties,
including the plaintiff, and fact questions relating to any affirmative
defenses, as well as damages. The procedural law of the forum state
would structure the means of jury participation, whether by special
interrogatories or other devices.
3. Illustrations of the Manifestly Unreasonable Design Doctrine
A few examples illustrate appropriate applications of the
manifestly unreasonable design doctrine to guns. The first example
("Illustration One") is an assault weapon capable of being modified
to increase firepower and lethality. This gun is unsuitable for sporting
uses, law enforcement, or even self-defense because it sprays fire
inaccurately and presents danger to the shooter.394 It contains
features that make it appealing to criminals, including a surface that
makes the gun somewhat resistant to fingerprints. The manufacturer
392. The proposed new third restatement of torts takes up the issue of intervening
causes in strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), § 24 cmt
b (Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 2001). Comment b essentially rejects strict liability
where the action of a third person has intervened, thus causing damage. Id. The example
presented is that of explosives stored on the defendant's land, but stolen by a third person
who thereby causes injury to another. Id. This reasoning does not have direct relevance
to our proposal because of its land-based nature. In contrast, a manufacturer who,
knowing the special dangers of its product, places the product on the market, and the
foreseeable danger occurs, is in a different position from the landowner whose explosives
may be stolen by a third person. The manufacturer has affirmatively placed the product in
a position to be used by the third person and has profited from its product distribution.
393. This approach differs from the approach under the abnormally dangerous
activities doctrine. The Second Restatement states that the determination whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous is to be made by the court-not the jury. SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 520 cmt. 1. The approach of the Second Restatement
suits the nature of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine, which was intended to
approximate absolute liability. The proposal in this Article is not one of absolute liability.
Nor is it one of generic product liability.
394. An example of a gun in this category is the TEC-9/TEC-DC9. See Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 154-56 (1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
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has marketed the gun through advertisements in magazines that are
known to appeal to criminals.
Illustration One clearly fits within the scope of the manifestly
unreasonable design doctrine. This highly lethal gun was designed as
an assault weapon, with expanded firepower and the capability of
being modified to cause even greater damage (factors one and two).
The gun has virtually no benefit to the community, as it is unusable
for effective law enforcement, sports, or self-defense (factor three).
Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that the high risk of harm to others,
through the criminal use of the gun, outweighs any value of the gun to
the community (factor four). Clearly, safer alternative designs were
available if the manufacturer wanted to provide the market with a
handgun to be used for law enforcement, sports, or self-defense
(factor five). If the goal of the manufacturer were to provide
criminals with a highly lethal handgun that increases kill power, then
a safer alternative design is irrelevant. Under such circumstances,
unavailability of a safer alternative design does not preclude liability.
Finally, actual or constructive knowledge of the use of the gun to
harm others would be established by the marketing pattern of the gun
through advertisements in magazines that appeal to persons who are
likely to use it to harm others illegally (factor six). Such knowledge
could also be established by the broad availability of information-
through the news media or studies by governmental or private
entities-regarding the usage of the gun. Further, the manufacturer
would be well aware that its product had no redeeming social value,
as it was packed with features that appeal to sociopaths.395
Illustration Two is a traditional hunting rifle. This rifle is
marketed to hunters by advertisements in outdoor sports and hunting
magazines and on web sites. It has been shown on television sports
programs as an example of a rifle appropriate for deer hunting. As a
395. Another example of a gun that fits into Illustration One is the Saturday night
special. This handgun has a short barrel, is lightweight, and easily concealed. Poor
manufacture with inexpensive materials makes this gun cheap and readily available in
quantity. Because of its poor quality, it essentially has no use for law enforcement, sports,
or self-defense. But it is attractive to criminals. The same rationale for liability discussed
in the text would apply to the Saturday night special as having a manifestly unreasonable
design. One Department of Justice study indicated that of the handguns used in robberies,
homicides, and assaults, guns fitting the description of the Saturday night special were
used in 69%, 69%, and 75%, respectively. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153
n.9 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONCENTRATED URBAN ENFORCEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
INITIAL YEAR OF OPERATION CUE IN THE CITIES OF WASHINGTON, D.C., BOSTON,
MA., AND CHICAGO, ILL. 96-98 (1977)). This kind of information would serve to
establish the knowledge in factor six.
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result, most users of this rifle are hunters. This rifle is unattractive to
most criminals because it is costly, heavy, and slow in comparison to
handguns; it also requires a higher level of skill than many other
firearms. If a criminal uses the rifle to intentionally shoot another
person, the rifle's manufacturer probably would not be liable under
the test for manifestly unreasonable design. First, the risk of harm to
others is less in the case of this gun produced for sporting purposes
because most purchasers will be using the gun for that legitimate
purpose. The likelihood that any harm will be great also does not rise
to the level of the gun in Illustration One. While the harm to an
individual-death or serious injury-could be great, the likelihood
that a criminal will go on a shooting spree with the rifle is much
smaller.396 So, too, does the rifle provide a value to the community in
its sporting use that was not present in Illustration One. Moreover,
the rifle, when used for its intended purpose according to generally
recognized safety guidelines, is reasonably safe, thus indicating that
the rifle's value to the community of hunters outweighs its inherent
danger. The gun in Illustration One, on the other hand, is eminently
unsafe and is incapable of being made safe for any socially acceptable
purpose. Finally, while the manufacturer would have knowledge that
the rifle might be used for criminal purposes to harm other persons, it
is not reasonable to assume that it is likely to be used for such a
purpose, absent statistical information to support that contention.
When these factors are put into the balance-and assuming no safer
alternative design is available-the gun would not be considered a
manifestly unreasonable design.397 If, however, the marketing and
distribution of the gun were to invite criminals to use the gun illegally,
then an injured plaintiff could pursue a cause of action for negligent
marketing.398
396. Such incidents nevertheless do occur. See Sarah Kershaw, The Hunt for a Sniper:
The Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at Al (detailing investigation into sniper
attacks in Washington, D.C., area by shooter using rifle and bullets commonly used for
hunting). In a highly publicized event in 1966, 16 people were killed and 31 wounded by a
sniper at the University of Texas, using a 6mm hunting rifle and "a footlocker full of semi-
automatic weapons." Sylvia Moreno, Towering Tragedy, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Aug.
1, 1996, at Al.
397. If statistics and studies demonstrate that the rifle is used by criminals during the
commission of a crime at a significantly higher rate than other rifles, one could reasonably
question whether the rifle was truly intended to be used in sporting. Thus, weighing of the
facts could lead to the conclusion that the rifle was designed in a manifestly unreasonable
manner. Such a scenario would effectively place the rifle into the category of Illustration
Three. See text discussion infra. Without such additional information, however, the court
could rule that the hunting rifle was not a manifestly unreasonable design.
398. See infra notes 415-16 and accompanying text.
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Illustration Three is the most difficult example. This gun is a
semi-automatic handgun that is frequently used by law enforcement
officials. It also may be used for target practice by sports enthusiasts
and has been purchased by citizens for home security. Its versatility
makes it appealing to criminals as well, but not to the extent of a
Saturday Night Special, which is far cheaper and more easily
available. This gun is widely marketed to law enforcement and to the
public. It is advertised in magazines and on web sites targeting sports
enthusiasts, law enforcement personnel, survivalists, and persons
likely to be planning criminal activity.
The difficulty with applying the test for manifestly unreasonable
design to the gun in Illustration Three lies in the gun's versatility. Its
various uses have an escalating degree of risk associated with them.
The extent to which the gun is in legitimate common usage and the
extent to which its value to the community outweighs its dangerous
attributes are difficult to resolve and will require resolution of
questions of fact by the jury. Presumably, legitimate law enforcement
and sporting uses would be the safest function of the gun. Home
defense would be less safe, to the extent that the gun is purchased by
persons with insufficient or minimal training and recognizing the
reactive circumstances under which the gun might be used. But the
concept of home defense is such that the gun should rarely, if ever, be
used.399 Criminal activity would present the highest risk of harm.
Thus, the context in which the gun is used in a given case colors the
determination of whether it is a manifestly unreasonable design.
What has high utility in law enforcement has no social value in
criminal activity. A careful balancing of the factors in the test would
determine the result with regard to the gun in Illustration Three.
Assuming the plaintiff was injured by the criminal activity of the
shooter, the factfinder would likely be required to examine the
399. One issue that arises in this context is whether guns that lack safety locks or other
devices that restrict their use should be considered defectively designed. Under our
proposed test for manifestly unreasonable design, such a finding is possible, but not
inevitable. Resolving the issue would require careful consideration of the type of safety
devices available, their benefits (impeding wrongful or accidental discharge) and their
risks (that the safety device, or user-specific technology, would cause a costly delay in
using the weapon for self-defense). For a comprehensive, though one-sided, discussion of
the various kinds of safety devices, both in use and proposed, see Cynthia Leonardatos et
al., Smart Guns/Foolish Legislators: Finding the Right Public Safety Laws, and Avoiding
the Wrong Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV. 157 passim (2001). Here, too, is a case where
legislation may remove the issue from the judicial sphere. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 29-33(d) (West Supp. 2002) ("No person, firm or corporation shall sell, deliver or
otherwise transfer any pistol or revolver, other than at wholesale, unless such pistol or
revolver is equipped with a reusable trigger lock, gun lock or gun locking device
appropriate for such pistol or revolver .... ).
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knowledge of the manufacturer regarding the appeal of the gun to
criminals, the rate of its usage by criminals, and whether the gun
could have been designed more safely. The outcome of this fact
determination would dictate whether the gun is a manifestly
unreasonable design.
As Illustration Three demonstrates, some products could
conceivably be deemed a manifestly unreasonable design in some
contexts, but not others. Thus, if the plaintiff in Illustration Three
were a criminal injured during the course of a legitimate law
enforcement activity, the criminal plaintiff would not have a cause of
action against the manufacturer of the gun under the manifestly
unreasonable design doctrine. The manufacturer had a legitimate
interest in believing that the gun would be used properly in the hands
of law enforcement personnel for the purpose of the public safety.
The hazards posed by the gun (death or injury) cannot be designed
out of the product without eliminating the gun's essential function.
This legitimate "common usage" is one of high social value to the
community.
In contrast, if the gun in Illustration Three were used for a
criminal purpose, application of the test might generate the opposite
result. The crucial question in such a case would involve factor six-
the actual or constructive knowledge of the seller that the product is
likely to be used in the antisocial manner that caused that plaintiff's
injury. Factor six pushes toward liability where there is knowledge
that the product is "likely" to be used for criminal purposes.
Resolution of this factor will hinge on the availability of factual
information to support that proposition, including the marketing
practices of the manufacturer.
4. Other Support in Strict Product Liability Doctrine for a Manifestly
Unreasonable Design Cause of Action
Several other principles of strict product liability doctrine
support a cause of action for a manifestly unreasonable product
design. These principles demonstrate that liability of a manufacturer
for the inherent dangers of a product is well within the acceptable
scope of existing product liability doctrine.
a. Gun Victims as the New "Bystanders"
Section 402A of the Second Restatement established a rule of
strict liability "for physical harm ... caused to the ultimate user or
[Vol. 81
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consumer" of the product. 0 The Second Restatement contained a
caveat indicating that it expressed no opinion on the application of
section 402A "to harm to persons other than users or consumers."4 1
Comment o further explained the caveat, indicating that courts, by
the mid-1960s, had generally not extended liability beyond the actual
user or consumer of the product to casual bystanders.4 2 But the
Institute did not disapprove of such an extension. In fact, comment o
stated:
There may be no essential reason why [bystanders] should
not be brought within the scope of the protection afforded,
other than that they do not have the same reasons for
expecting such protection as the consumer who buys a
marketed product; but the social pressure which has been
largely responsible for the development of the rule stated
has been a consumers' pressure, and there is not the same
demand for the protection of casual strangers.4 °3
Thus, there did not appear to be any compelling reasons in law or
policy not to extend liability beyond the user or consumer of the
product. Indeed, the Third Restatement's alteration of language
reflects this view. Section 1 provides that sellers of defective products
are "subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect. '' 4° The section does not limit the class of potential plaintiffs
to users or consumers.
The Third Restatement's language reflects the consensus in case
law that has emerged since section 402A was written. For example, in
1969, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff injured in a
head-on collision with an apparently defective automobile that
crossed the center line of the road had a cause of action in strict
liability against the manufacturer of the defective vehicle.4 5 The
court noted that injuries to such "bystanders" may be just as
foreseeable as injuries to users or consumers. The court stated: "If
anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the
consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is
reasonably foreseeable. '4 6  The reason, the court said, was that
400. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 402A(1).
401. Id. § 402A caveat.
402. "Casual bystanders, and others who may come in contact with the product, as in
the case of employees of the retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding bottle, or a
pedestrian hit by an automobile, have been denied recovery." Id. § 402A cmt. o.
403. Id.
404. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 1.
405. Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 88-89 (Cal. 1969).
406. Id. at 89. The court characterized the limitations placed on bystander recovery by
other courts as "only the distorted shadow of a vanishing privity," something grounded in
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contrary to product users, bystanders are not in a position to judge
the safety of the product prior to use.
With the exception of accidental discharges, guns do not typically
injure their purchasers, users, or consumers. Gun victims have much
in common with traditional bystanders, for they are the innocent
victims of the wrongful conduct of the product users. With regard to
guns that the manufacturers knew or reasonably should have known
would cause the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiffs, imposition of
liability on the manufacturers is warranted. The manufacturers are in
the best position to incorporate the costs of the injuries into the price
of the product and to reduce the appeal of the guns to criminals.
b. A Lesson From the Unavoidably Unsafe Product Doctrine
The Second Restatement carved out an explicit exception to
design defect claims for products that could be considered
unavoidably unsafe. Comment k of section 402A encompasses
"products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use,"
but which have such high utility that their continued marketing is
warranted, notwithstanding the risks.4°7 If these products contain
proper warnings of their hazards, the manufacturers will not be liable
for any harm that results due to defects in design.4"8 Comment k
notes the usefulness of the unavoidably unsafe product exception in
the area of prescription drugs;4 9 but it is not limited to drugs. The
key to this exception is that the product contains substantial hazards,
but is so desirable and beneficial that its continued sale should be
encouraged.
The unavoidably unsafe product exception disappeared from the
Third Restatement. Once the Institute accepted a risk-utility test for
design defect claims, the exception was subsumed under the basic
test. Accordingly, the concept of an unavoidably unsafe product
continues to have merit, as manufacturers of products with extremely
high utility for which no safer design exists would not be held liable
under the test espoused in the Third Restatement.
an attachment to archaic concepts rather than representing a realistic view of the world.
Id.
407. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 402A cmt. k.
408. Id. "Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id.
409. For example, new HIV/AIDS drugs, despite any serious side effects that may
accompany them, may have a sufficient therapeutic value to warrant placement on the
market. See Culhane, supra note 241, at 114 n.449.
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This concept of the unavoidably unsafe product is consistent with
our proposal; indeed, our proposal complements it. The policy
underlying the rule of nonliability for unavoidably unsafe products is
that the utility of these products is so strong, and the fear that liability
would drive manufacturers from the market so great, that a shield for
manufacturers is justifiable. Furthermore, manufacturers are in the
best position to conduct the necessary research and development to
improve the safety of their products, but will only do so if they
continue in the business. Guns, which also contain serious inherent
dangers, present the converse situation. As previously demonstrated,
many guns have little or no social utility, so their manufacturers could
not fall within the protection of a rule such as that embodied in
comment k. These guns are at the opposite end of the spectrum from
unavoidably unsafe products. They have no utility and present
serious hazards. Gun manufacturers would not be able to make this
argument or enjoy the immunity saved for developers of products
with high social value. Liability of a gun manufacturer under the test
proposed in this Article would be entirely consistent with this
recognized doctrine.
c. Criminal Activity as a Foreseeable Use/Misuse
Gun manufacturers might attempt to avoid liability by arguing
that a specific criminal act of gun violence is an unforeseeable misuse
of their product for which they should not be liable. This argument is
disingenuous. With regard to guns that have no social utility, criminal
activity is virtually the only available use for those products.
Moreover, modification and alteration of many guns to facilitate
criminal activity are capabilities not merely foreseeable by the
manufacturer, but in fact intended by the manufacturer. Whether
criminal activity may be deemed either a use or a misuse of a gun, the
operative word is "foreseeable." And it is undeniable that
widespread criminal use of at least some guns is foreseeable and, in
fact, likely.41°
The Third Restatement aptly notes that "misuse, modification,
and alteration are not discrete legal issues [but rather] aspects of the
concepts of defect, causation, and plaintiff's fault." '411 Thus, the
410. See DOBBS, supra note 91, at 1028. One might well question a rule that imposes
liability on a gun maker because it cannot design the hazard of injury or death of an
innocent person out of a product the inherent nature of which is to shoot bullets. On the
other hand, gun makers can and should be expected to guard against the criminal use of
their guns through products designed not to appeal to criminals and not made or easily
modified so as to facilitate criminal activity.
411. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. p.
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foreseeability of a particular use of a product is a matter of context.
Illustration 20 of section 2 explains, for example, that a plaintiff
injured while climbing the slats of a ladderback chair to reach
something at a height is engaging in an unforeseeable misuse of the
chair and does not have a claim for a design defect.412 Had the
plaintiff been sitting on the chair, and had the chair fallen apart, the
result would have been different. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has addressed this point by invoking the language of duty: "To the
extent that misuse relates to the duty to design a safe product, 'a
manufacturer has a duty to make sure that its manufactured products
placed into the stream of commerce are suitably safe when properly
used for their intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes.' "413 This
issue could equally be characterized in terms of causation: Is the
intervening misconduct a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injury?
As the Third Restatement suggests, foreseeable misuse is only part of
a larger inquiry involving duty, defect, and causation.414
As in Illustration 20, the determination of whether a gun
manufacturer will be liable to victims of gun violence is often a matter
of context. The manufacture and sale of guns create a high degree of
risk, and such risk is compounded in many of the cases in which
parties injured or killed by gunfire have sought relief. Designing and
manufacturing guns that fire an indiscriminate spray of bullets, or that
are designed to be modified to increase kill power, to take but two
egregious examples, pose a high degree of risk to innocent parties,
even though the harm is realized through the criminal acts of third
parties. With at least some guns, the criminal use or misuse of the
product is foreseeable. In short, difficult issues regarding
manufacturer responsibility may not be sidestepped merely by
characterizing certain uses as "misuses." The issue is more complex.
B. Negligent Marketing
Negligent marketing claims should be permitted, either
independently or in addition to strict liability claims. Whether or not
a gun meets the requirements of a manifestly unreasonable product
for strict liability purposes, plaintiffs should be permitted to present a
case for negligent marketing. A gun that was manufactured for a
legitimate purpose, such as a hunting rifle, could be advertised,
412. Id. § 2 illus. 20.
413. Jurado v. W. Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1318 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Brown v. U.S.
Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 165, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239 (1984)).
414. See DOBBS, supra note 91, at 1026.
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distributed, or otherwise marketed in a manner that invites criminal
activity. The same is much more likely for a handgun.
1. Foreseeability of Third-Party Violence
Foreseeable use/misuse of a product is an even more significant
concept when one turns to claims for negligence. As stated above,
foreseeability of harm is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for liability.415 Defining the limitations on recovery for foreseeable
harm has proven elusive, but four factors are helpful in the gun tort
situation. First, would liability create a great possibility of fraudulent
or indeterminate claims? Second, would imposing liability prevent or
reduce future harm? Third, would liability create an undue burden
on the defendant or on the community? And finally, how vulnerable
is the plaintiff? None of these questions has an easy answer. In the
context of the manufacture and sale of at least some guns, however,
all of these factors argue strongly in favor of recovery by gun victims.
The first question may be answered easily in the case of gun
torts: Injuries suffered by victims of gun violence are open and
obvious, and are not indeterminate in scope. Unlike latent illness
claims, for example, the severity and extent of the injuries typically
are manifested immediately upon use of the gun. Further,
foreseeability has been an issue where problems of genuineness and
extent of harm have caused courts to proceed very cautiously, such as
claims for emotional distress and economic loss. These problems
simply are not present in the case of gun torts.
With regard to the second question, imposing liability on
manufacturers would at least mitigate, if not eliminate, the harm
caused by gun violence. This point has been missed (or ignored) by
courts that have ingested the line that "guns don't kill people; people
kill people." The quoted statement sets up a false opposition. Guns
make it easier for people to kill people, and certain kinds of guns, and
certain marketing practices increase the risk yet further. The
availability of a firearm, through certain marketing practices in which
the manufacturer has engaged and from which it has profited, will
result in the loss of life. Without acquisition of the weapon, the
shooter may not have acted at all, or may have used a less lethal
weapon. Against the background of legal and largely unregulated
gun sales, using tort liability to discourage marketing choices that
dramatically increase risk could be expected to reduce harm.
415. See Culhane, supra note 310, at 985 (arguing that while permitting recovery in all
cases of foreseeable harm "would result in unfair and excessive liability .... courts must
define a manageable subset of cases for liability given a foreseeable risk").
20021
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The third question results in non-liability when the defendant
would be held liable out of proportion to fault.416 Marketing practices
that deliberately target unsafe or illegal users should result in liability,
however extensive; liability would be entirely justified under those
circumstances. To focus the inquiry solely on the burden to the
defendant would exclude from liability some of the most culpable
acts, simply because the outcomes of those acts are often the most
costly to the defendant. Thus, the extent of culpability should be an
equally important element. As to the burden on the community that
liability would impose, the burden would be greatly reduced if some
of the most unsafe and irresponsible practices are stopped.
Moreover, placing the burden on the manufacturer would enable the
costs to be spread, with many of those costs assigned to future
purchasers of the guns, who would face higher prices.
The final question-addressing the vulnerability of the plaintiff
class-clearly favors liability. Innocent victims of gun violence are
powerless to protect themselves. Insurance is useful for property
losses, but glaringly incapable of restoring the important part of what
has been lost through gun violence. Plaintiffs are often vulnerable in
another sense, too, as those who inflict the violence directly are likely
hard to bring to account, either because they remain unidentified or
because they have few financial resources.
2. Negligent Marketing as an Enabling Tort
Professor Robert L. Rabin has explored the emerging concept of
the enabling tort, according to which the victim reaches beyond the
direct tortfeasor to the enterprise that may bear the ultimate
responsibility for making possible, or enabling, the direct tortfeasor's
416. In economic loss cases, for example, courts draw a wavering but defensible line
against recovery by foreseeable, but remote, parties because one act of negligence, such as
spilling a contaminant into a river, could otherwise bankrupt the defendant. So those who
fish the stream for a living will have standing to recover against the polluter, as might
those who run a marina at the water's edge, but restaurants that depend on a supply of fish
from the river likely will not. Compare, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752
F.2d 1019, 1029-31 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendants who were responsible for ship
collision were liable to commercial fishers for resulting pollution of Mississippi River);
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that those known to be
commercially fishing public waters may recover economic loss resulting from defendant's
oil spill); Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756, 758 (Miss. 1945) (holding that operator
of fishing resort could recover lost profits due to pollution) with Pruitt v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (E.D. Va. 1981) (allowing recovery by those who fished
Chesapeake Bay, either commercially or recreationally, but not by those who purchased
seafood from commercial fishers). By contrast, in the case of gun sales, liability might
indeed be great, but it would not be out of proportion to fault.
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actions.4"7 Among contemporary examples of attempted uses of an
enabling tort theory are claims for the negligent marketing of guns.418
The trend in the law that Rabin has identified is one toward
permitting liability in appropriate situations of "commercial activity
systematically conducted in circumstances -that heighten third-party
risks of serious injury to others. '419 He has argued that claims based
upon the negligent marketing of handguns constitute "a direct
descendant of the family of enabling torts. 420
The line of cases discussed by Rabin involved premises liability
in which the property owner created or allowed certain conditions on
the property that posed a risk of criminal violence against tenants on
the property.42 As a matter of deterrence,,he has noted that "[n]ot
only is the renter in a better position than the tenant to adopt
precautionary measures, but the renter is better situated than the
police to diminish the risk of criminal assault on the premises ....42
The same could be said of gun manufacturers, who are in the optimal
position to market their products in a manner that minimizes their
attraction to criminals who may use them to harm other persons.423
Similarly, gun manufacturers are in a better position than the police
to prevent the injuries ab initio. While the police systematically
patrol certain areas of the cities, they do not and cannot patrol every
street, building, or private space where gun violence is just as likely to
occur, Much of law enforcement activity takes place after gun
violence has occurred, in the investigation and prosecution stages.
The manufacturers may not be able to eliminate all gun violence, but
they are certainly in the best position to minimize it before it occurs.
In line with this analysis of enabling torts, we propose that
victims of gun violence be allowed to bring claims against the
manufacturers of the guns causing their injuries on theories of
negligent distribution and marketing. In situations in which gun
manufacturers have undertaken marketing or other distribution
activities that enhance the likelihood that criminals will use their guns
to harm other persons, the special relationship rule is strictly
irrelevant.424 The manufacturers under these circumstances have
417. Rabin, supra note 172, at 437.
418. See id. at 435, 453.
419. Id. at 446.
420. Id. at 449.
421. See id. at 443-46.
422. Id. at 444.
423. This point is consistent with CALABRESI, supra note 301, at 119-26.
424. For a discussion of the special relationship rule in negligent marketing cases, see
supra notes 126-73 and accompanying text.
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taken on a duty to the public by their actions that affirmatively
increase the likelihood of injury from their guns."' Examples of these
situations abound: gun kits marketed to avoid local gun regulations,
Saturday Night Specials, and guns such as the TEC-9.
3. Negligent Marketing as a Complement to Strict Liability
The negligent marketing claim has a potentially broader reach
than the strict liability claim outlined above. Indeed, this is no
different from the interaction between strict liability and negligence
in any product case. One is an essential complement to the other
when examining the entire course of product design, manufacture,
and sales. The design of a particular gun may not be manifestly
unreasonable,4"6 but the manufacturer of the gun may have marketed
it in a manner so as to reach and appeal to criminals. As a claim
based in negligence, the manufacturer's conduct would be the focus,
rather than the design characteristics of the gun. The negligent
marketing claim would thus serve a further purpose. It would prevent
manufacturers who avoid liability for the design of their guns to
otherwise enrich themselves by distribution practices targeted at
criminals. In other words, they could not vigorously market their
more useful guns to criminals with impunity.
An example illustrates this point. Assume a gun manufacturer
makes a semi-automatic handgun that has proved useful not only to
law enforcement, but also for target practice (particularly among
those seeking to learn to shoot a gun safely) and defense of self and
home. The gun appeals to criminals because of its exceptional
firepower and accuracy. It is generally known that there is a large
425. This point may have some support in the current version of the Third Restatement
of Torts, which addresses issues outside product liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), § 19
(Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 2001). But the Reporters have carefully chosen not to
wade into the muddy waters of gun manufacturer liability. Section 19 of Tentative Draft
No. 1 states: "The conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it can
foreseeably combine with or bring about the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third
party." Id. The third party's misconduct can be criminal. Id. cmt. a. An illustration in
which a father leaves a loaded pistol in an area of the home where his ten-year-old son
found it and accidentally shot another person is the only illustration of the principle of
section 19 that involves a gun, however. See id. cmt. e, illus. 3. Comment h, addressing
duty, again declines to address gun manufacturer liability, skirting the issue with vague
language of disapproval of gun retailer liability for a purchaser's improper use of the gun.
Id. cmt. h. In the reporters' note, the reporters finally refer directly to the duty issues
involved in cases against gun manufacturers, citing cases such as McCarthy and Hamilton,
but leave the subject unexplored. See id. cmt. h.
426. See, for example, the hunting rifle discussed in Illustration Two, supra Part
VI.A.3.
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secondary market for the purchase of these guns by persons seeking
to avoid the regulations imposed on the primary sellers. The
manufacturer advertises this gun in magazines and on web sites that
promote cheap, short-barreled guns such as the Saturday Night
Special variety, and other guns that are known favorites of many
criminals. Government statistics show that the use of this gun by
criminals has been growing, and it has been a gun of choice in some
high-profile lethal shooting incidents. The question whether this gun
would be characterized as a manifestly unreasonable product may be
a close one because of its significant legitimate uses. But the
manufacturer's choice to market the gun in a manner in which it is
likely to result in purchase and use by criminals makes the
manufacturer vulnerable to a negligent marketing claim. Liability
would be the result even though the manufacturer did not know that
a particular criminal would purchase the gun for use in a particular
violent criminal act.
CONCLUSION
The familiar adage should be rewritten to reflect reality: Guns
kill people, and some guns more than others. Some people are more
likely to use guns in a socially unacceptable way, just as some people
are more likely to use other products in a manner that will harm
themselves or others. But the impression that gun manufacturers
seek to create is that they have no input into the process by which
criminals choose and use guns. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Both the design and marketing of guns bear an important
relationship to whether guns kill people.
Those who reject liability of gun manufacturers for the personal
injuries of victims of gun violence do so largely on a "Pandora's box"
theory. They fear that gun manufacturer liability will create a
slippery slope of liability that would logically extend to manufacturers
of alcoholic beverages for drunk driving accidents, car manufacturers
for all vehicle accidents, or fast-food purveyors for deaths due to
cardiovascular disease. Public policy, they argue, would not support
opening this Pandora's box of societal ills, all linked to the tort
system. It is no coincidence that some of the most vocal objectors to
gun manufacturer liability are the gun lobby and the proponents of
so-called tort reform.
It is time to fashion a rule of liability that reflects reality. Gun
manufacturer liability is a logical progression of the trend in tort
liability toward holding accountable those who enable the wrongful
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conduct of others. 427  But courts have viewed gun manufacturer
liability as a knot best left tied. The reasons behind this resistance do
not hold up under close scrutiny. It is time to hold gun manufacturers
accountable for knowingly endangering the general public. This
country must move beyond the "whether" question to the "how"
question. This proposal is intended to stimulate the dialogue that is
necessary to put into place the appropriate mechanism. Tort law
must be allowed to evolve to the next logical level and not remain
mired in outdated restrictions that fail to address the problems of the
twenty-first century.
427. Rabin, supra note 172, at 453. Rabin notes that there are legitimate reasons to
draw the line of manufacturer liability to include gun manufacturers, but to exclude other
manufacturers, such as those who make alcoholic beverages. The special dangers inherent
in guns are reflected in the linguistics of modern culture. Thus, "one 'uses' a handgun in
harming an innocent victim; one 'abuses' alcohol in doing so." Id.
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